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EXTRA-CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES IN THE NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
FEBRUARY 2001
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M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by; Professor John Hird
A study of the procedures utilized by legislative leaders in attempting to pass legislation
that imposes particularistic costs in favor of general benefits. Four cases that utilize
different procedural strategies are compared to assess when and why Congress employs
different procedures and to assess the comparative difficulties involved in cutting
different types of particularistic benefits in favor of general benefits. The study finds that
the decision to delegate is a function of a variety of factors including the nature of the
particularistic cost being imposed, the scope of the policy area, the historical development
of institutions involved in the particular policy area, and the relative power and stature of
the legislative leaders who support the measure.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Political scientists have always had an easy time explaining the passage of
particulanstic legislation - legislation that confers benefits on localities or particular
economic sectors at the expense of the entire nation such as local construction projects or
subsidies for particular mdustnes. What political scientists have not had such an easy
time explaining, however, is legislation that does the opposite - legislation that imposes
direct costs on localities or partieular economic sectors in favor of some general, diffuse
benefit such as deficit reduction. Despite this difficulty, many examples of this type of
legislation exist; military bases have been closed, special interest tax loopholes have been
eliminated m favor of general tax rate reduction, targeted tax increases and spending cuts
have been approved affecting a variety of programs and regions in favor of deficit
reduction, national nuclear waste sites have been chosen, and NAFTA was adopted
despite the fact that it was an agreement that ended a number of subsidies and regulations
protecting particular industries in favor of the general goal of promoting free trade.
In The Logic of Congressional Action, R. Douglas Arnold seeks to fill this gap in
the literature by developing a theory of congressional policymaking that “allows for the
triumph of any one of three competing interests
- general, group, or geographic.”' Arnold
argues there are generally three types of strategies - strategies of persuasion, procedural
strategies, and strategies of modification - available to those attempting to build winning
coalitions in the legislative process but significantly, he points out that it is procedural
1
strategies that “are most attractive when legislators decide to impose costs on cither
attentive or inattentive publics.”^ Procedural strategies are designed to alter the political
calculus confronting individual legislators on particular votes by either strengthening or
weakening the causal chain between legislator action and policy effects. Thus, by
utilizing procedural strategies such as a closed rule, omnibus legislation, writing
legislation in secrecy, or delegating decisions to an agency, individual members of
Congress can free themselves from more parochial concerns and can vote to support
general, late-order benefits while imposing particularistic, early-order costs on attentive
publics.^ Indeed, in her most recent book, U,wr,l,oclo.x Lawmaking: New Legislative
Processes in the U.S. Congress, Barbara Sinclair points out that the use of these special
types of procedures has become so widespread in the passage of major legislation that our
textbook understanding of how a bill becomes a law is now dated. She adds, “no single
model has replaced it. Variety, not uniformity, characterizes the contemporary legislative
process.
What Sinclair does not address in her detailed account of the use of “unorthodox”
procedures in the legislative process, however, is the increasing use of what I call “extra-
' R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 5.
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Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 1 16.
^
I have borrowed the descriptions “general, late-order” and “particularistic, early-order” from Arnold, The
Logic of Congressional Action. The terms are meant to suggest continua on which various benefits and
costs may be placed. General benefits are those shared equally by all citizens and they are juxtaposed with
particularistic benefits that are shared by certain people based on their inclusion in some fixed group
delineated by age, sex, race, ethnicity, hobby, occupation, etc. Early-order benefits and costs are those that
are more quickly and visibly the result of some action taken by government. Thus, the particular policies
being discussed are those that impose costs on a concentrated group in the short term in order to realize
some benefit for a large, diffuse public later on.
Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress (Washington,
D.C.; Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1997), 217.
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congressional” legislative procedures. If what had previously been considered
unorthodox - closed rules, the use of omnibus legislative vehicles, post-committee
adjustments to legislation, the avoidance of eomniittees altogether in legislating, and
legislating in conference - has become the new orthodoxy, the new unorthodox
procedures are those that formally delegate the power to craft policy alternatives to
institutions other than Congress.^
^fining Extra-Congressional Legislative Procedure.^
Extra-congressional legislative procedures are procedures adopted by Congress
that grantformal power to craft the specifics of particularistic costs to ad hoc institutions
outside of Congress and, in some cases, to impose those costs without explicit
congressional approval. Examples of these extra-congressional procedures include the
base-closure procedures of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit control procedure, the recent line-item veto procedure, and fast track trade
agreement approval procedures.
These procedures all have several characteristics in common. First, each of these
procedures is an ad-hoc response to congressional difficulty in dealing with a particular
Some evidence of the “newness” of these procedures is suggested by additions to Gary C. Jacobson, The
Politics ofCongressional Elections, 4“’ ed. (New York: Longman, 1997), chapter 7. In a chapter on the
relationship between congressional elections and the internal politics of Congress, Jacobson argues that the
pursuit of reelection does not necessarily translate into the ability to legislate in the national interest. The
politics of Congress, he suggests, is characterized by a host of diseases which Jacobson discusses in
different sections. Among these sections are “Particularism,” “Serving the Organized,” “Immobility,” and
“Symbolism.” In the third and fourth editions, published in 1993 and 1997, respectively, Jacobson adds a
new section called “Doing the Right Thing,” in which he points out that sometimes Congress does legislate
in favor of the public interest at the expense of particular interests. Importantly, for our purposes, he uses
the fast track process and the base-closure commission as his examples of “doing the right thing.” In a
puzzling passage, Jacobson argues, “instances of this sort are the exception rather than the mle, but they are
by no means rare” (192).
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policy problem at a particular moment m time. The Gramm-Rtidman-Hollings procedure,
for instance, was designed to reach specific deficit targets in specific years. Fas. track
procedures utilized in the passage of NAFTA were designed and approved for this
particular trade negotiation and no other. The line-item veto procedure, which granted
enhanced rescission authonfy to the president, could only be used on appropriations and a
very limited number of tax provisions and. more importantly, was only granted for a
certain number of years. I. was created to deal with the problem of pork-barrel legislation
m the late 1990s. Given the tension President Clinton’s rescissions have created, the
prospect of budget surpluses in the near future, and the fact that the Supreme Court struck
down the mechanism as violating the separation of powers, it is highly unlikely the
enhanced rescission authority will be renewed. Finally, the base-closure procedures were
authorized only for specific rounds of base closures in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995
Significantly, unlike when Congress creates an agency, a new law, or even a new mle to
guide deliberations in one of its chambers, these procedures all contain some temporal
limitation.^ Not one of these procedures remains in use today despite the fact that each
was adopted within the last 15 years.
Second, these extra-congressional legislative procedures all grant formal authority
to design a package of particularistic cuts to an institution outside Congress, whether it be
a bi-partisan commission, the president, an agency, or a particular agency official. For
^ It is true that many times the legislative language in a law, in the authorization of an agency, or new rules
to guide legislative deliberations contains a so-called “sunset provision” that effectively makes them ad-hoc
institutions as well. There still remains a difference between these cases and extra-congressional
procedures, however. Extra-congressional procedures are designed for very specific rounds of policy
effects. The base-closure commission existed only to come up with four lists of bases. On the other hand,
even agencies that are created with sunset provisions have comparatively wide latitude to carry out their
actions up to the date prescribed in the legislation.
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example. Congress delegated power to the Defense Base Closure and Rcahgnment
Commission to draw up a l.st of bases to be closed or realigned and empowered the
Pentagon and the president to implement the recommendations unless Congress passed a
joint resolution to disapprove the list. A wide variety of authors have made the mistake
of lumping the base closure commission into the same category as other commissions
such as the Greenspan Commission on Social Security in the early 1980s.’ Indeed,
commissions and task forces have been utilized throughout the twentieth century for a
variety of purposes. One characteristic that distinguishes the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission from the rest, however, is its statutory authority to frame and
implement a particular policy alternative. While Greenspan’s commission had infomial
political clout. It did not have the formal power to implement its recommendations or
even to force Congress or the President to consider its recommendations.
Each of these procedures involved some kind of formal delegation of authority
stmilar to the base-closure commission. The line-item veto gave the president formal
authority to cancel individual appropriations. Fast track procedures provided fomial
power to the president to negotiate a trade agreement that Congress would be obliged to
consider without amendments. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law delegated fomial
power to 0MB to impose automatic cuts in most government programs and agencies if
deficit targets were not met.
Finally, each of these extra-congressional procedures is designed to provide at
least the appearance of legislators being kept at an arm’s length distance from the creation
^ See for instance, George Hager and Eric Pianin, “Bipartisan Buyers Beware,” The Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, December 2-8, 1996, 21-2.
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of the final poHcy product while st.ll at leas, allowing leg,slaters the option to d.sapprovc
the chosen pohey alternative.' Legislators could stop GrantuvRudman-Hollings
sequesters from taking effect, they could stop the base closure list
NAFTA from being implemented, and they could override
in toto, they could stop
the president’s decision to
rescind funds, but they could not alter the substance of these policies at the margins.
Perhaps more importantly, when any of these policy alternatives were enacted, no
single legislator could be held accountable as the author of a particular policy effect. It
was the base-closure commission that drew up the list of bases to be closed, and the
procedure even afforded legislators an opportunity to go on the record opposing the list.
It was the entire Congress that would presumably miss a deficit target under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollmgs law and it was OMB that would initiate the automatic spending cuts. It
was the president who was responsible for line-item veto cuts and the particular
provisions ofNAFTA. In short, individual legislators were provided extraordinary causal
distance from the negative policy effects of particularistic pain.
Extra-Congressiona l Le.gislative Procedures and the Legislative Process
Though Arnold does suggest that procedural strategies are preferable in cases
where coalition leaders seek to make cuts in particularistic benefits in favor of some
general benefit, he provides little in the way of guidance on how coalition leaders choose
between alternative procedural strategies. The use of these extra-congressional
In this sense, it is actually quite surprising that Congress does not utilize these extra-congressional
procedures more often. If Arnold is correct in arguing that legislators are more worried about avoiding
blame than they are with claiming credit, the focus is shifted from a question of why members would
voluntarily hand power and authority away to a question of why they don’t do it more often.
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procedures is still the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, there are enough
examples of their use, and they are being utilized to address sufficiently similar policy
problems, that it has become important to ask why, in some cases. Congress uses Ihe
internal congressional procedures Sinclair considers to be the new orthodoxy and why, in
Other cases, Congress uses these extra-congressional procedures.^
It is this question that poses the central avenue of inquiry for this dissertation.
Why, for instance, did legislators use extra-congressional procedures in the case of base
closure and use the regular, internal procedures of Congress to shepherd tax refonn
through the legislature in 1986? It is simply not plausible to assert that coalition leaders
attempting to close military bases thought of the idea of a commission to shield
legislators from the political pain and coalition leaders attempting to cut special interest
tax loopholes did not. These two groups of coalition leaders chose their particular
procedural mechanisms for a reason or some set of reasons.
Particularistic Benefits and Theories of Congressional Policymaking
The difficulty many, but not all, political scientists have had explaining legislation
that confers general benefits while imposing particularistic cuts is a direct result of the
Remarkably little attention has been paid to the use of extra-congressional procedures as a trend. Francis
E. Rourke and Paul R. Schulman, Adhocracy in Policy Development,” The Social Science Jountal, \'ol.
26, no. 2 (April 1989), 131-142, argue that “no development in modem American politics has been more
striking than the habit the country has fallen into of creating a wide variety of instant organizations and
charging them with the task of coming up with solutions to the most pressing problems of public policy”
(131). Their discussion is focused more broadly, however, on all sorts of temporary bureaucracies
including study commissions and task forces with no formal authority. A variety of other authors note the
similarity between many of these mechanisms but do not attempt to develop any model of procedural
choice. See, for instance, Christopher J. Deering, “Congress, the President and Automatic Government;
The Case of Military Base Closures” in James Thurber, ed.. Rivalsfor Power (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
1996), footnote 20. Also see Kenneth R. Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective
Dilemmas Through Delegation,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, XX, 3 (August 1995), footnote 3.
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widespread acceptance of the model of policytttaking asserted by David Mayhew in
Congress: The Electoral Connection. Borrowing theoo- directly from cconomtcs,
Mayhew began with the assumption that all members of Congress were “single-minded
reelection seekers.”'" Mayhew argued that in their pursuit of reelection, members of
Congress pursue credit-claiming, position-taking, and advertising. From this, we can see
that studies of legislatures in the Mayhew mold have no way to explain the type of
legtslatton wtth which this dissertation is concerned. While position-taking and
advertistng acttvities have little to do with actual policymaking, credit-claiming is deftned
by Mayhew as,
acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that
one IS personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit
thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable."
While this definition might seem on its face to include general benefit legislation,
Mayhew almost explicitly rules out this possibility by arguing further, “it becomes
necessary for each congressman to try to peel off pieces of governmental accomplishment
for which he can believably generate a sense of responsibility.”'^ Not surprisingly,
Mayhew suggests the best way to do this is to traffic in particularized benefits. In the end
then, Mayhew’s model of congressional policymaking boils down to a scheme of
distribution in which all members of Congress are able to bring home the bacon to serve
their own electoral needs.
David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 17.
" Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 52.
Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 53.
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Today, tl,e Mayhewian understanding of congressional poltcyntak.ng has found its
natural home in the so-called distributive school of thought. The most commonly cited
piece in this literature remains the work of Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall,
"The Industrial Organization of Congress.”’’ Weingast and Marshall open their article
with Mayhew s classic explanation for the organizational structure of Congress.
If a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of American
national assemblies with the goal of serving members’ electoral needs year
in and year out, they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists.'^
For Weingast and Marshall then, as for Mayhew, the congressional policymaking system
is one dominated by committees, but they explain that the reason is that committees are
the legislative institutions that most effectively reduce the transaction costs that result
from the market exchange in particularistic benefits. Because members of Congress are
primarily interested in “attempting to provide benefits to their constituents,”'^ and
because members of Congress are free to bid to gain access to the committee of their
choice, congressional committees are all dominated by high-demand preference outliers.'^
While this provides a remarkably stable and cost-free environment for the trade in
particularistic benefits, it also means that certain kinds of policies are impossible to enact.
Because any given committee has a fixed jurisdiction.
Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets,” in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, no. 1
(1988), 132-163.
Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 81-82.
Weingast and Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress,” 137.
By “high-demand preference outliers,” 1 am referring to members who have a higher demand for the
particularistic benefits a particular committee confers than the average member in the legislative chamber.
9
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allows the contntit.ee to block access ofL. loai’horrrn^;
”
And since all the members inside the committee are htgh-demand preference outliers, we
must expect that they are going to be precisely the last members ut the legislature to
advocate partieulanstic benefit cuts in their policy area in favor of some general benefit.
In short, as one critic of the distributive school puts it,
The single policy implication to which distributive theonsts subscribe at
rQSoT^Q? '' “chentihstic” in the sense of Wilson
[a u’
legislation is “particularistic” in the sense of
ay ew (1974, 53-55) or “distributive” in the sense of Lowi (1964, 690)
In other words, legislation generally confers concentrated benefits to
constituents (or distncts) while broadly dispersing costs. One key
consequence of these distnbutive tendencies is the oversupply (in terms of
economic efficiency) of policy benefits.'^
This critique along with the empirical observation that not all politics, legislation, and
policy coming out of Congress looks this way helped to spawn the search for an
alternative school of thought that could account for both distributive legislation and de-
distributive legislation.
Into this void stepped the infonnational school of theorists. The best example of
this school of thought is provided by Keith Krehbiel. Distributive and informational
models of congressional policymaking agree that legislatures are “arenas of individual
distributive conflict.”'*^ Importantly, however, while the distributive school argues that
Weingast and Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress,” 157.
18 -
Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1991), 25. Citations listed are Krehbiel’s.
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 5.
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legislators organize Congress so as ,o best capture ‘ga.ns front trade,- the
.nforntat.onal
school argues that legislators organize Congress so as to “provide tncem.ves for
individuals to develop policy expenise and to share policy-relevant ntfonnation with
fellow legtslators, including legislators with competing dtstributive interests.”^' The
difference between the two grows from an observation about legislatures that is quickly
turned into an assumption about legislative pol.tics. Individual legislators operate in an
environment of uncertainty about the eonnecttons between
“poltcies and their
outcomes”^^ or roll-call votes and their “policy effects.”^^
That members of Congress would be worried about the policy effects of their
votes and that members operate in conditions of uncertainty may seem on their face to be
rather obvious assumptions. A number of congressional scholars have taken this position
for some time." But both of these assumptions fonn a sharp contrast with the
distributive school. Distributive theorists, like Mayhew for instance, assert policy effects
are not important political commodities" and tend to ignore the uncertainty in
Weingast and Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress,” 141.
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 5.
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 20.
“^Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 17.
For instance, in his classic piece on Congress, John W. Kingdon, Congressmen 's Voting Decisions, 3'**
Ed. (Ann Arbor. The University ot Michigan Press, 1989), xiii, tells us that “a major enduring feature of the
Congress is that the decision-making process is best seen as a case of bounded rationality. Legislators
pursue their goals as best they can, but in the context of imperfect information, limited time, incomplete
canvass of alternatives, and a dramatic deficit of ability to consider floor votes thoroughly in the light of the
tremendous volume of decisions to be made.”
See, for instance, Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 146, fnl33. Mayhew makes the point
explicitly in asserting, “the notion of members as seekers of effects needs a razor taken to it; the electoral
payment is for positions, not effects.”
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relationships between policies and effects that infonnational theorists assume. Mayhcw
tells us members of Congress engage in credit-claiming, advertising, and position-taking
activities in pursuit of reeleetion. The first two activities are, by definition, pure
electorally profitable activities. If there are outcomes from these activities, they are
understood by all to be positive outcomes. There is no uncertainty. Position-taking, on
the other hand, is assumed to have no policy effect whatsoever. Mayhew says.
The congressman as position taker is a speaker rather than a doer The
electoral requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that
he make pleasing judgmental statements. The position itself is the
political commodity."^”
The informational school, on the other hand, assumes that legislators’ calculations are
characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. Douglas Arnold, for instance, points out that
we know this is a reasonable assumption because members of Congress
devote two of their scarcest resources - their own time and that of their
staffs - to gathering and analyzing information that helps them avoid
positions and actions that are politically risky. Since legislators are not a
frivolous lot given to squandering their scarce resources, it seems
reasonable to believe that they know what they are doing when they work
diligently to identify safe positions.
Not surprisingly, the informational school holds that members devote more than their
own personal resources to the hunt for voting cues. They also devote the organizational
resources of the institution. As a result, one major implication of the assumption of
uncertainty is that the congressional committee system is organized to deal with problems
of infonnation-gathering rather than problems of contractual enforcement as Weingast
and Marshall assert. Keith Krehbiel argues that for informational theorists.
Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 62.
’’ Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 38.
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as m the d.stnbuttve perspective, the solution is institutional. Howeverhe focus in informational approaches is on choosing rules ami proceduresthat provide incentives for individuals to develop policy expertise and toshare policy-relevant information with fellow legislators includimilegislators with competing distributive interests.^^
’ ^
These differences extend beyond organizational questions, however. Krehbiel also points
out that.
the implicit standard of performance of an efficient legislative
organization according to the informational perspective is also
significantly different from that within the distributive perspective. An
informationally efficient legislative organization is one in which collective
benefits are reaped from individuals’ poliey-specific expertise and in
which distributive benefits - rather than accruing disproportionately to
high-demanders - are carefully kept in check by legislative majonties.^"
Krehbiel is not alone in this view. R. Kent Weaver asserts that members of Congress are
far more interested in figuring out what not to do - how to avoid blame - than they are in
actually doing - credit-claimmg.^° John Kingdon agrees, arguing that members receive
few signals from constituencies about what to do. More commonly, constituents
indicate which courses not to pursue.”^’ Arnold points out that this creates a class of
policies that are “politically infeasible. Regardless of the temiinology, however, the
important point to remember in all of these cases is that the chamber is organized so as to
collect, analyze, and disseminate information for all rank-and-file members. And since
committees serve all members, and not simply high-demand preference outliers as the
•)g
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 5.
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 6.
R. Kent Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance” in Journal ofPublic Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1986),
371-398.
Kingdon, Congressmen 's Voting Decisions, xiii.
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, lA.
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distributive school suggests, it is reasonable to imagine that, given the correct political
context, montbers can and wtll vote for legislation that cuts partieulanstie benellts aind
confers general benents. In other words, an informationally efficient legislature is one in
winch ,t ,s possible for coalition leaders who are willing and able to manipulate
procedures to alter the calculus of particular roll-call votes and pass de-distributive
legislation. The significant point here, for our purposes, is that informational models of
congressional policymaking arc able to account for the ways in which rational, self-
interested legislators do this while distributive models of congressional policymaking do
not.
Notable for its conspicuous absence in either the distributive or the informational
models of congressional policymaking, however, is the congressional party. Mayhew
says of congressional parties that “they arc more useful for what they are not than for
what they arc.”'^^ For Mayhew, eongressional polieymaking is,
a system whose zero-sum edges have been eroded away by powerful
norms of institutional universalism. In a good many ways the interesting
division in congressional politics is not between Democrats and
Republicans, but between politicians in and out of office. Looked at from
one angle the cult of universalism has the appearance of a cross-party
conspiracy among incumbents to keep their jobs.
Weingast and Marshall make the point more explicitly. One of the assumptions that
guides their model of congressional policymaking is that “parties place no constraints on
the behavior of individual representatives.” Infomiationalists treat parties similarly.
Krehbiel points out that “infomiational theories omit or assume away these concerns and
Mayhew, Congress: The Eleetoral Conneetion, 97.
Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 105.
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.hereby
.nvi,e reactions rang.ng from earp.ng ,o apoplexy.- Nevenbeless, he responds,
“with the assistance of empirical findings, I would argue more strongly that the
assumptions are not overly simple.
The intuitive problem for informational and distributive theorists, however, is that
partisan institutions exist in the Congress, members spend a great deal of time and energy
contesting party leadership fights, and party leaders have fonnal power over the
congressional policymaking process. In other words, just as Arnold pointed out that the
scarce resources members were expending in the search for information suggests an
informational avenue of inquiry, the fact that members expend these same resources
maintaining and fighting for partisan structures suggests a partisan avenue of inquiry.
This objection spawned a third school of thought that would attempt to find a
theoretical justification for partisan institutions in a Congress made up of single-minded
seekers of reelection. This third school, which has come to be known as the party-
centered model of congressional policymaking, is most closely associated with the work
of Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins in Legislative Leviathan^ and the work of John
Aldrich and David Rohde.^^
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 261.
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 261.
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Part\> Government in the House (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).
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John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: Theory
and Evidence on Conditional Party Government,” Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political
Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, October 29-31, 1998. Aldrich and Rohde have written extensively
on the subject both individually and together. 1 will generally refer to this conference paper both because it
IS a recent work and because it summarizes the debate between the party-centered model and the
informational model quite well.
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Cox and McCubbins
schools of thought by arguing
begin their critique of the distributive and infomiational
on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the notions
that members of committees are self-selected
control are more myth than reality. It is the
and that committees are beyond partisan
parties, after all, that assign members to
committees. Moreover, seniority as a norm for selecting committee chairmen is violated
far more than the existing literature suggests. Finally, they also find that "a majority of
members of Congress do not serve on committees that are dominated by preference
outliers.
In the place of this committee-centered model of policymaking, Cox and
McCubbins seek to develop a theory of party organization in the House in which “parties
are invented, structured, and restructured in order to solve a variety of collective
dilemmas that legislators face.-" In this model, individual legislators delegate power to
party leaders in order to help solve collective action problems in which "unorganized
groups of reelection-seeking legislators might overproduce particularistic-benefits
legislation and underproduce collective-benefits legislation in an electorally inefficient
fashion. The reason that the overproduction of particularistic benefits can become
electorally inefficient” is that m any given congressional election, “there is a common
element in the electoral chances of members of the same party.”"^^ Much like the
committee system was a solution to the collective action problems of contractual
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 79.
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 83.
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 125.
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 121.
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enforccen, and inco.npice inlbnna.ion for d.s.ribn.ive and infonna.ional
,„coris,s
respectively then, the party leadership becomes the sointton to a different collective
action problem for party-centered theorists - the problen, of ntaintaining a posttivc party
label. Cox and McCubbins argue,
The collective dilemmas facing a party arc “solved" chiclly through the
elective. The trick is to induce those who occupy or seek to occtipvleadership positions to internalize the collective interests of the party.-*’
^
The result, hopefully, is that party leaders will organize legislative action such that the
common partisan electoral clement will be positive. Presumably, this means using the
power of party leadership to provide some appropriate level of particularistic rmt/ general
benefits.
Aldrieh and Rohde take this model a step further by arguing that the policy
implications of a party-centered theory of congressional policymaking arc differentiated
from mfomiational and distributive models. Aldrich and Rohde’s version of the party-
centered model IS referred to as a “conditional party government” model. “The
condition, they point out, “in conditional party government concerns the distribution of
policy preferences in the two partics.”'^'^ If the two parties are sufficiently homogenous
and sufficiently differentiated from one another, then the majority party is more likely to
provide its party leaders with powers and prerogatives, the party leaders can be expected
to utilize those powers, and policy outcomes should reflect the altered institutional
arrangements. In short, whereas in the informational framework, we expect policy to
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 135.
Aldrich and Rohde, “ The Consequences of Party Government in the House,” 2.
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renec, ,he preferences of .he
.nedian legislator, in .he co„d..ional party govennnen.
fratnework, we expee. pol.cy to rellee. the preferences of the n.eciian leg.sla.or vn,/„„
majority party.
The addihon of ,he qualiher “eondihonaf to .heir notion of pany govennnen.
allows Aldrich and Rohde to place their model a superior position vis a vts Krehbiel
and the informational school. When this condi.ton is no. satisfied, they point out, the
legislative process may operate quite as Krehbiel argues it does. From the.r view then,
rather than supplanting it, the model of “condit.onal party government” is placed over the
top of Krehbiel’s informational model.
The theory of conditional party government adds the centrifugal pull of the
majority party on top of the politics of the sort [Krehbiel] is interested in
modehng, varying, inter alia, by the degree to which the condition is
satisfied. Thus, we do not see this as an either-or situation. It is not that
is either his account is right or ours is. Rather, we see our explanation as
a ding party, under specifiable and measurable circumstances, to the kind
of party-free circumstances he considers.
While this IS not the view taken by infomiationalists, notably Krehbiel himself, the
question is what is at stake in the dispute for our purposes.
Both the informational and party-centered models can theoretically explain how
an atomistic Congress of single-minded seekers of reelection could conceivably vote to
cut particularistic benefits in favor of some general benefit. In this light, both models are
marked improvements upon the more dominant distributive school of congressional
policymaking. The question of procedural choice addressed in this dissertation need not
explicitly choose between these models at the start. On the contrary, to the extent that the
project fulfills its promise of explaining why coalition leaders sometimes utilize the
18
internal procedures of Congress and sometimes utilize extra-eongressional procedures, it
may be able to offer new insights on this debate. First, all of the eases examined m this
study will show that members do indeed care about outcomes and effects and that this
interest m outcomes and effects is consistent with the electoral connection of members of
Congress. In other words, we will see that the distributive model of congressional
policymaking is insufficient in explaining a wide array of major legislation that is adopted
by Congress m the past 25 years. Second, exploration into the question of why legislators
sometimes adopt extra-congressional procedures and sometimes solve collective action
problems internally may offer insights into the question of party in Congress. It is no
longer controversial to suggest that votes on procedures are proxies for votes on outcomes
and so these cases present us with an opportunity to examine whether parties dominate
outcomes or not. Finally, explaining the utility of extra-congressional procedures, which
implies an admission by members of Congress that the institution is unable or unwilling
to undertake some course of action that the majority of its members deem necessary, can
help us to explain why the internal committee and party structures of the institution both
fail to produce the most electorally efficient outcome. It is in this sense then, that the
puzzle of extra-congressional procedures provides a new challenge to both the
committee-dominated informational models and the party-centered models of
congressional policymaking.
45
Aldrich and Rohde, “The Consequences of Party Government in the House,” 3.
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Conclusion
There are at least two compelling reasons why this c,uest,on of procedural choice
deserves our attention. First, in describing the difference between distributive and
informational theories of legislative organization, Keith Krehbiel points out that these
two schools of thought “have distinctly different empirical implications at each of two
observable levels of legislative choice: the policies enacted by legislatures, and the
institutions developed and employed by legislatures,’'''' Since so few models of
congressional policymaking account, in any way, for the passage of laws that confer
general benefits while imposing particularistic costs and since the development and
employment of extra-congressional procedures appears to be an avenue towards that end,
these are observations that warrant explanations. When Congress repeatedly acts contrary
to the conventional wisdom of at least a major part of the discipline, and does so using
procedures that are new and unique, it is appropriate to ask in what ways our existing
explanations are incomplete or inaccurate.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the increasing use of extra-congressional
procedures raises important normative questions that can only be addressed if we first
understand why and when Congress chooses to use them. For instance, what will these
procedures mean for the democratic accountability of our governing institutions? Do
these procedures enhance the capacity of Congress to resist parochialism? While these
are not the central questions to be addressed in this dissertation, it is clear that these are
important questions that cannot be answered unless we first have some understanding of
why and when Congress chooses to employ extra-congressional procedures.
20
Concluding debate in the House of RepresentaUves over tirc authonzui.on of the
base-closure commission process. Representative Richard Anney (R-TX) argued,
the adventur^ of the base closing bill serve to demonstrate the strength ofour system. Our cumbersome legislative procedures ensure not only fhat it
buUta a bdl'
' f™"’ heing madeut th t ny bill that completes the complex dance of legislation has beenthoroughly considered and deliberated. Over the last 2 years everyonceivable objection to this admittedly novel concept ha; bee^
vl^:::ii; every asTec”
In this respect, Arniey sounds much like Barbara Sinclair in arguing correctly, that the
dominant textbook understanding of how a bill becomes a law is dated, often inaccurate,
and desperately in need of editing. The question to be asked and answered in this
dissertation suggests that at least one chapter in the new textbook ought to be reserved for
what are perhaps the most complex legislative dances of all - extra-congressional
legislative procedures.
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 7.
Representative Dick Armey (R-TX) quoted in Congressional Record, October 12, 1988, H30039.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS
The decision to examine procedural choice as the uni, of analysis is well-founded
in the existing literature on Congress. While he points on, tha, the various models of
congressional poHcymaking offer diffenng and contradictory intpHca.ions for a, leas, two
observable outputs (policies and institutions), Keith Krehbiel argues the study of
institutional choice ,s more fruitful because i, provides a far more tangible uni, of
analysis. Moreover, m the particular case in question, we are concerned with how
Congress cuts particularistic benefits in favor of general benefits and we have established
(see chapter 1 ) that procedural strategies are the most common avenue towards this end."
Thus, procedural choice serves as both a possible and an appropriate unit of analysis.
But beyond the appropriate and the possible, the question of procedural choice
presents an interesting puzzle. Why, when confronted with similar policy problems, does
Congress utilize different procedural mechanisms to achieve similar policy outcomes?
Much of the literature discussing cases in which Congress cuts particularistic benefits in
favor of some general benefit references the nature of the particularistic benefit involved.
More specifically, the most prominent distinction made between cases has to do with the
Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization, 7-15. Krehbiel defends his claim by arguing, “in
testing theories about complex human interactions in complex settings, clarity of inference is facilitated by
focusing on more immediately observable implications of theories. Of the two levels of observation at
which theories of legislative organization have implications
- policies and institutions - the institutional
implications are clearly the most immediate” ( 14-15).
In justifying the focus on procedural strategies in his own case studies, Arnold, The Logic of
Congressional Action, 146, states, “I repeatedly show how coalition leaders employ several procedural
strategies that 1 believe are underappreciated by congressional analysts, whereas 1 devote little attention to
the more obvious strategies of persuasion.”
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geographic concentration of the particulanstic benent being cnt or cos. bang nnposed.
This dtshncion prov.des a potential h>po.he.,cai explanat.on for the use of these diffcren.
procedural mechanisms.
Geographic Versus Group Benefits
In adopting policies that impose direct costs on specific groups in favor of some general
benefit, does the type of group incurring the cost make any difference? Is it easier to
impose costs on one type of group than another? In The Logic of Congressional Aciion,
Arnold suggests two categories of particularism which he refers to as “group costs and
benefits" and “geographic costs and benefits.”* Group costs and benefits are those costs
and benefits incurred by a particular category of people who may be delineated by their
age, income, occupation, industry, race, gender, or hobby. Geographic costs and benefits,
Arnold goes on to tell us, are simply a special kind of group cost or benefit - one in which
geographic location is the common element. While geographic and non-geographic
groups are not mutually exclusive, Arnold says,
the distinction is nevertheless useful, both because geographic areas enjoy
direct representation in Congress whereas other groups do not and because
the recipients of geographic benefits (and the payers of geographic costs)
are necessarily in close proximity to one another whereas their
counterparts who receive group benefits (or pay group costs) may have
absolutely no contact.
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
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The d.st,notion is apparently important. It hnds its way into ntuch of the literature on
Congress." Furthemrore. while Arnold suggests that geographic benefits are ntorc
difficult to cut," Kenneth R. Mayer makes the point more explicitly, arguing that
collective action problems are “part.cularly acute when the affected groups font,
geographic constituencies, rather than more dispersed economic or social interests.”"
Thus, while we can point to a significant number of cases in which legislators
imposed particularistic costs on discrete groups in favor of general benefits over the last
25 years, in examining the question of procedural choice, it is useful to separate these
cases into those in which the particularistic costs were relatively geographically
concentrated and those in which the particularistic costs were relatively geographically
In his seminal piece on Congress, David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 56-57
recognizes the distinction in his discussion of credit-claiming by pointing out, “a final point here has to do
with geography. The examples given so far are all of benefits conferred upon home constituencies or
recipients therein ... but the properties of particularized benefits were carefully specified so as not to
exclude the possibility that some benefits may be given to recipients outside the home constituencies. Some
probably are. Narrowly drawn tax loopholes qualify as particularized benefits, and some of them are
probably conferred upon recipients outside the home districts. (It is difficult to find solid evidence on the
point.) Campaign contributions flow into districts from the outside, so it would not be surprising to find
that benefits go where the resources are.” In another example, Weingast and Marshall, “The Industrial
Organization of Congress,” 136, point out, “interest groups are not uniformly distributed. They typically
have concentrations of voters in particular locations.” The authors go on to argue that members are thus
more sensitive to constituencies within their district. “In the competition for interest group support, specific
representatives have a comparative advantage. The lack of complete fungibility of votes implies that
legislators are advantaged in attracting support from interest groups located in their district (see Denzau and
Munger 1986). This advantage arises because service to local interests attracts both votes and organized
resources for the district’s representative. Service to this group by an outsider, in contrast, attracts only the
latter and may lose votes.” Finally, in reviewing the work of distributive theorists, Krehbiel, Information
and Legislative Organization, 26, argues, “the key point is that distributive theories consistently presume
that legislators’ preferences are geographically based and therefore that legislative decision making
provides opportunities for gains from trade."
For his part, Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 141, argues, “competition for geographic
benefits has only modest effects on the shape of public policy when programs provide abundant general
benefits” and that legislators “seldom support programs simply because they wish to obtain such benefits.”
But he also goes on to point out, “the policy effects are actually greater on the downside - when geographic
benefits are to be curtailed.”
Kenneth R. Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally)...,” 394.
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dispersed. Table 2.1 illustrates a number of cases in which Congress was able to pass
legtslatton that imposed direct, early-order costs on particular groups in favor of general
benefits. Both categories include several major pieces of legislation and a variety of
different types of procedures were utilized to enact them. As a result. Table 2.1 suggests
the utility of a case study approach in order to identify other relevant factors that impact
on procedural choice. While the distinction between geographically-concentrated and
geographically-dispersed particularistic costs will be the main independent variable to be
examined in the question of procedural choice, a case study approach will allow for a
Wider view in the search for other factors of significance.
Table 2.1 - Cases m Which Congress Imposes Direct, Early-Order Costs on Particular
Groups to Provide Benefits to a General, Diffuse Public
Geographic Groups Non-Geographic Groups
Choice of Nuclear Waste Disposal Site
Line Item Veto
Base Realignment and Closure
Commission
Airline Deregulation
Tax Reform Act of 1986
Social Security Reform
North American Free Trade Agreement
Other Factors
Broad Versus Narrow Policy Areas. Ultimately, the decision to utilize extra-
congressional procedures is a decision by Congress to delegate authority. Closed rules,
the use of omnibus legislation, and legislating in secrecy all help to allow legislators to
frame votes as binary decisions on an entire package without amendments. But
25
ultimately, they all require that some legislator, some eommtttee, or some group of party
leaders craft the final policy alternative. This means that some legislator, some
committee, or some group of party leaders must be intimately connected with the direct
costs that legislation imposes on concentrated economic or geographic groups. It is not
surprising then, that in many such cases, legislative leaders have chosen to delegate
authority to an agency or some particular member of the executive branch.” Delegation,
however, poses its own set of problems for Congress.
In their generalized theory of delegation, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D.
McCubbms refer to one such problem as “Madison’s dilemma’’ - a reference to the logic
employed by James Madison in justifying the use of “auxiliary precautions” such as the
separation of powers, bicameralism, and federalism as a counter-balance to “a
dependence on the people” in American constitutionalism. On the one hand, the principal
must delegate enough power to allow the agent to carry out his or her duties. But on the
other hand, the principal must find some way of limiting the agent’s power so that it is
exercised as closely to the way the principal wants it exercised as possible. The fear is
that by delegating power “agency losses”^^ will be incurred that will outweigh the
benefits of delegating in the first place. The point, for Kiewiet and McCubbins, is that
See, for instance, Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” 371-398.
These “agency losses” could come in a variety of forms. The agent may have different policy desires
than the principal. Additionally, because the principal in this case is the Congress, a body made up of many
principals, the agent may be loyal to or act on behalf of only some of the principals. Finally, the principal
also incurs losses in the process of monitoring the agent to be sure the foregoing losses are avoided.
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principals will only delegate power if the delegation includes some method ofeontainino
agency losses.
It IS clear, however, that opportunities for containing agency losses are not the
same across policy areas. Specifically, policy areas that are more narrow are, by
definition, better candidates for delegation because the nature of the poiiey area serves as
a natural limit on the agent’s discretion.^* Thus, one factor that we can examine in
addition to geography is the scope of the policy area. We would expect that the
delegation of authority to impose particularistic costs is less likely in the case of broad
policy areas because, by definition, it would be more difficult to limit the jurisdiction of
the agent in the way this can be done in more narrow policy areas.
While the discussion above focuses on blame avoidance as a reason legislators
might be more willing to delegate authority in narrow versus broad policy areas, there is
” D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic ofDelegation (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991).
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“Broad” and “narrow” policy areas are admittedly vague terms in need of clarification. There is no
precise index by which to measure the scope of a policy area but two characteristics of policy areas can help
us to classify them m relation to one another. First, by a “broad” policy area, I mean one that cuts across
other issue areas in a more substantive way. By a “narrow” policy area, 1 mean one that impacts a lesser
number of other policy areas in a lesser way. It is true, of course, that virtually every piece of legislation
could be argued to have an impact on multiple policy areas and it is also true that it is impossible to quantify
the level of impact a particular policy area has on another. But it is equally clear that some policy areas
impact others in a relatively greater way than others. For instance, fiscal policy clearly impacts a broader
number of policy areas than endangered species policy in more substantive kinds of ways. Second, policy
areas may be categorized according to their fiscal impact. Though this is a cmde measure that offers little
insight into the nature of some policy areas that have nothing to do with money, it is clear, on the other
hand, that a bill that closes 10 military bases is significantly more narrow than an omnibus deficit reduction
bill that raises income taxes and cuts spending m a host of programs and entitlements. The point here is that
it is clear that military base closure, for instance, is a more narrow policy area than comprehensive tax
reform. Where exactly the line is drawn between “broad” and “narrow” is unimportant for our purposes.
All that matters is the recognition that one is more narrow in relation to the other.
For instance, Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally)...,” 393-413, argues that members of Congress
were willing to delegate as much authority as they did in the case of base closures not only because the
particular procedure employed limited “the domain of the agent’s authority” in a wide variety of ways, but
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also a positive reason reinforeing this blame avoidance. Just as narrow policy areas offer
fewer opportunities for negative policy consequences in legislators’ districts, they also
offer fewer opportunities for noticeable policy benefits that accrue to the general public.
The cases in question - cases in which Congress cuts particularistic benefits in favor of
some general benefit - are difficult cases precisely because legislators fear those who will
benefit (the general public) will be unlikely to notice or appreciate the benefit while those
who bear costs (groups and constituencies) will certainly notice and care. That stated,
there is a difference between broad and narrow policy areas m the extent to which the
general public will notice and appreciate the general benefit. Because policy areas like
tax reform are more broad than base closure, a vote for the general benefit of tax reform
has more electoral value than a vote for the general benefits offered by base closure.
As a result, members of Congress have two reasons to be more likely to delegate
m narrow versus broad policy areas. In narrow policy areas, members are more likely to
avoid the agency losses associated with delegation and they are less likely to be able to
credibly claim credit for helping to deliver a general benefit. For both blame avoidance
and credit claiming reasons then, the scope of the policy area becomes an important
potential factor in determining when and why legislative leaders employ their own
internal procedures and when and why they employ extra-congressional procedures in
cutting particularistic benefits in favor of some general benefit.
Moment in Political Time. Another factor that may impact procedural choice is
suggested by Stephen Skowronek. Skowronek argues that presidential leadership is
also because the nature of the policy area itself was sufficiently narrow that the potential costs of delegation
had a natural limit.
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constrained by its part.cular ntomen, within an historical epoch.™ While Skowronek's
study is focused on presidential power, extending tins concept to ntclude other
governmental institutions such as Congress and the bureaucracy seems reasonable.
There are two rough ways in winch the moment in political time offers
opportunities and constraints to coalition leaders seeking to impose particularistic costs
while conferring general benefits. First, coalition leaders are sensitive to the electoral
calendar when enacting policies sueh as these. Votes in Congress, administrative
decisions, and policy impacts can be timed to occur later or earlier, before or after an
election, or at the beginning or end of a congressional or presidential term in order to
strengthen or weaken the ability of constituents to link negative policy effects with
legislators’ votes. Second, coalition leaders seeking to enact the types of policies with
which this study is concerned are sensitive to unique institutional developments in
various policy areas. For instance, has there been a history of mistrust between the
Congress and the relevant agency involved in the policy area? These considerations thus
also play an important role in determining when and how legislative leaders will choose
to delegate authority to impose particularistic costs in favor of general benefits. In other
words, the moment in political time may constrain the procedural options available to
legislative leaders.
Existence of Powerful Champions. Another potentially important factor in
determining whether legislators will impose particularistic costs from within Congress or
will delegate is whether there exist legislators who are well-positioned enough and
Stephen Skowronek, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,” in Michael Nelson, ed.. The Presidency
and the Political System (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), 1 19-161.
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mteresled enough to chantpion the cause. No observer would dispute that tax refonn
could never have moved forward in 1986 wtthout the efforts of the Cha.nnan of Ways
and Means, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), and the Cha.nnan of Finance, Bob Packwood (R-
OR). Why such powerful champions are attracted to these pteces of legislat.on is beyond
<he scope of this study and will be treated only pertpherally. What is relevant for our
purposes is that it matters that tax refonn attracted such powerful champions and base
closure did not.
3MOne.theFeM^ A final important factor we will consider is the
number of particularistic groups that must bear the costs in the course of delivering
general benefits. In tax refonn, legislators sought to close a large number of tax
loopholes favored by various groups whereas m siting a high-level waste repository,
legislators sought to impose particularistic costs on one group - those who live in and
around the site. This distinction is important because it suggests that, in these cases, the
hurdle to be overcome in enacting such policies is higher or lower because of the sheer
number of groups m opposition. In short, legislators would find it more difficult to site
ten high-level nuclear waste repositories than one because it would require overcoming
the objections of ten times as many obstructionist fellow legislators and groups.
Methods
The factors discussed above offer a number of general propositions about
procedural choice. First, when cutting particularistic benefits in favor of some general
benefit, we would expect Congress to be more likely to employ an extra-congressional
procedure when the particularistic benefits being cut are more geographically
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concentrated. Seeoncl, when ct.lt.ng partienlaristic henellts in favor „l sonte general
benellt, wo would expect Congress to be ntore hkely to entploy an extra-congressional
procedure when the seope of the poliey area in question is more narrow, riurd, when
enacting policies of this type, we would expect legislative leaders to he constrained by
institutional developments within the given policy area. Fourth, we expect that
procedural ehoice is also a function of whether or not powerful champions emerge wiihm
Congress, willing to stake scarce political capital on enactment of a policy that will, by
dennition, impose costs on particular groups and/or locations. Finally, we expect that
legislative leaders will be more likely to employ an extra-congressional procedure when
the particularistic costs arc being imposed on one or a few groups rather than many.
I here arc several reasons why a case-study method is most appropriate in testing
these propositions. First, while it is clear that Congress is quite capable of enacting
legislation that cuts particularistic benefits in favor of some general benefit, it is equally
clear that the universe of cases under study is limited; far more limited, for instance, than
if we were studying ail legislation that confers general benefits or all legislation in which
coalition leaders utilized procedural mechanisms. Because we arc examining exceptional
cases, it is more appropriate to study a small number of cases in greater detail. In short,
the central question to be asked in this dissertation is less likely to be answered reliably
by crude quantitative measures than by the rich detail of partieular cases.
Second, as the discussion above implies, there are numerous factors at work in
procedural choice that the dissertation seeks to explore. In short, since geography cannot
adequately explain the use of an extra-congressional procedure in all cases, we need to
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ngure out what does. The case study metliod will allow us to utilize more of a
poke” methodology in our search for these additional factors.
“soak and
Case Selection
The cases selected for study are those arranged above in Table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2 - Cases Selected for Study
Geographic Groups Non-Geographic Groups
Internal Procedures Choice of Nuclear Waste
Disposal Site
Tax Refomi Act of 1986
Extra-Congressional
Procedures
Base Realignment and Closure
Commission
North American Free Trade
Agreement
Because the geographic/non-geographic distinction is so prominent in the literature, it is
important to be sure cases are selected with an eye towards the geographic dispersion of
the particularistic benefits being cut or costs being imposed. The cases of tax reform and
base closure thus serve as two cases that meet the hypothetical expectations of the
independent variable of geography. Because base closure requires imposing costs on
relatively discrete geographic constituencies and because the literature tells us that the
geographic nature of these costs makes them particularly sensitive, we expect members of
Congress to have a great deal of difficulty in making these decisions internally.
Therefore, it is not surprising to us to find that an extra-congressional procedure was
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ut.lizcd. SimMarly, in tl,e case of lax rclbnii, we would cxpccl inlcmai procedures to he
used. Because the part.eularistie benelits to be cut are less geograph,e in nature.
Congress prefers to handle these matters internal ly.
Each of the other two cases fails to meet geographic cxpcclalions of p,oeedural
choice. The ease of nuclear waste disposal, like the case of base closure, is a ease in
which Congress seeks to impose geographically-concentrated costs in favor of some
general benefit. While we would expect an extra-congressional procedure to be utilized,
the choice of a high-level nuclear waste disposal site was effectively handled within
Congress. Similarly, the fast track procedure utilized in the negotiation and approval of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) fails lo nteel the hypothetical
expectations of this independent variable. Trade policy, like lax refomi, clearly imposes
costs on geographically dispersed communities suggesting Congress would be more
mehned to handle the matter internally. In this case, however. Congress utilized an extra-
congressional procedure.
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CHAPTER 3
BASE CLOSURE
There are many reasons why it makes sense to first open the black box of base
closure. We want to examine an extra-congressional procedure first because, after all, in
the search for variables that lead coalition leaders to utilize extra-congressional
procedures, it makes sense to begin our search where those elements are, rather than
where they are not. Second, as I pointed out m chapter 2, base closure, like tax reform, is
a control case of sorts. It is a case in which geographically concentrated costs are being
imposed m a relatively narrow policy area in favor of general benefits. That an extra-
congressional procedure was utilized in this case is therefore expected according to the
main independent variable and other factors we have already identified.
The problem of elosing military bases presents a classic collective action problem.
Members have obvious electoral incentives to acquire military bases for their districts just
as they regularly seek federal grants and construction projects. But members have even
greater electoral incentives to ensure that benefits already acquired are maintained.^' It is
not surprising then, that members are willing to fight tooth and nail to maintain military
bases in their districts. Bases provide jobs both directly and indirectly to large numbers
of constituents. Members fear these constituents will hold them personally responsible
for their fate should they lose those jobs. The sum of all members fighting to maintain
This concept has become conventional wisdom among political scientists. For instance, see Arnold, The
Logic oj Congressional Action, 32, and Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” 371-98.
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the,r bases means that Congress, as an institut.on, is unable to shut down mihtaty bases
Utilizing the nonnal legislative process.
The commission procedure eventually utilized to close military bases has taken
two very similar forms. Under the procedure adopted in 1988,“ Congress gave legal
sanction to a commission that had already been established by Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucct to draw up a list of bases to be closed or realigned by December 31, 1988. The
hst would then be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, who could either reject or
accept the list without amendment. Congress retained the right to pass a joint resolution
disapproving the list without amendments, but this effectively meant a two-thirds
majority would be required to stop the list.“ Signincantly, the new procedure also
exempted the commission and the Pentagon from complying with National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 environmental impact statement
requirements, but did require compliance with NEPA requirements in closing and
realigning bases. The NEPA requirements had been the main source of congressional
delay and obstruction in attempted base closures since 1977.
There were only a few differences in the second procedure, adopted in 1990.^’'*
The second procedure called for three additional rounds of base closures in 1991, 1993,
and 1995. In these rounds, the Secretary of Defense was empowered to write the initial
list and forward it to the commission, which would be empowered to add or delete bases.
P.L. 100-526, approved October 24, 1988.
A joint resolution requires the signature of the president and it is fair to assume the president would be
supportive of a list approved by and forwarded to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense. Effectively,
this means that Congress could only stop a list of base closures and realignments by overriding a
presidential veto, which requires a 2/3 vote.
P.L. 101-510, approved November 5, 1990.
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The list would then be forwarded to the president, who could approve or reject the list
without antendments. Congress would again have the option of disapproving the list as a
whole with a joint resolution. While in the first round, the commission was forced to
choose for closure only those bases whose savings would offset closing costs within SIX
years, this requirement was dropped in the second procedure. A more automatic funding
mechanism was also adopted in the second procedure to cut off the appropriations
process as a potential back-door option for legislators hoping to keep their base open, and
GAO review of commission calculations was also mandated in the second procedure.
Finally, under the second procedure, appointment of commission members was to be
subject to Senate confirmation.
From a public choice perspective, both procedures provide a solution to a classic
collective action problem. The question, however, is why this particular solution! Why
didn t Congress, for instance, simply allow a committee to report legislation and consider
the legislation under a closed rule? Why didn’t Congress delegate authority to the
Pentagon to close bases? Answers to these questions can only be had by first
understanding the unique institutional and historical context surrounding military base
closures. When the collective action problem of base closures is placed within that
context, it becomes clear that the base closure commission procedure represented the only
politically feasible route to closing military bases in the 1980s and 1990s.
36
^Brief History of Military Base rioQn.v>c
Christopher J. Deering points out, "the roots of the base closure
controversy run deep in American history Article I, Section 8 grants the Congress
authority for the "erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings” and Article IV, Section 3 grants the Congress power to "dispose of and make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property” of the federal
government.
As IS the case with many powers granted to Congress, authority to construct and
close bases was delegated to the executive. And like many other policy areas, Congress
restricted, rather narrowly, executive authority for the construction and disposal of
military facilities during peacetime and provided more liberal grants of power during
wartime.'^'’ One distinctive characteristic of military construction as a policy area,
however, is its parochial nature. This led to relatively wide divergence in policy views
between the legislative and executive branches in this particular part of defense policy.
Because there are many communities which owe their growth and, in some cases, their
existence to the presence of a local military installation, the legislators who represent
these military communities quickly became more ardent advocates and defenders of the
activities undertaken on the base, and of the existence of the base itself, than any
executive branch official. The classic expression of this remains the Armed Services
Committee aide who pointed out to one researcher, “our committee is a real estate
Deering, “Congress, the President, and Automatic Government...,” 155.
Deering, “Congress, the President, and Automatic Government...,” 155.
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our committee, you arc studying real estate
committee. Don’t forget that. If you study
transactions.”^’^
Th.s line of thinking is the most important legacy of the early dcvclopntcnt of
military tnstallations policy and remains to the present day. Arnold points ont that the
intensity and political sensttiv.ty that surrounds military installations policy is highlighted
by the division of labor in the appropriations subcommittees of the House and Senate.“
Appropriations for the Department of Defense are reported by two of these
subcommittees. For fiscal 1998, the Subcommittee on Militai^ Construction reported a
$9.2 billion bill to pay for new military construction. The Subcommittee on National
Security (Armed Services in the Senate) reported a $247.7 billion bill to pay for all other
activities associated with the Defense Department. Moreover, for all the anger and
resentment that President Clinton’s use of the line-item veto aroused on Capitol Hill, only
one package of rescissions was ever reinstated overriding the President’s veto - a $286.7
million rescission package from a military construction appropriations bill.
All of this is significant, of course, because what matters most are i\\Q perceptions
legislators have about the costs and benefits associated with legislative action. For
instance, Arnold argues that,
the eventual impact of local benefits on congressional policy making
depends crucially on how congressmen evaluate both the general and
group costs and benefits associated with particular programs. Local
benefits become paramount when congressmen believe that a program
An unidentified staff member of the Armed Services Committee quoted in Lewis Antliony Dexter,
“Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy,” in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds.. New
Perspectives on the House of Representatives (C'hicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 182.
R. Douglas Arnold, “I he Local Roots of Domestic Policy” in Thomas L. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein,
eds.. The New Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Lnterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1981), 263.
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™uld have few general or group benehts, or considerable costs of either
In the case of base closure, the format,ve role the development of mil.tary installations
poltcy plays in legtslators’ perceptions is therefore cntcial. Legislators who concetve of
mihtary installations policy ,n temts of the local benefits ,t delivers cannot be expected to
receive notices of executive plans to close military bases with reticence.
196Mm The contemporary battle of base closures began with the Kennedy
and .lohnson administrations’ initiatives to close bases between 1961 and 1965. Each
year, the Pentagon released a new base closure list and each year the lists were extensive -
73 bases in 1961, 98 bases in 1962, 33 bases in 1963, 95 bases in 1964, and 149 bases in
1965.™ The congressional response was increasingly hostile. In May 1965, the House
Armed Services Committee inserted a provision in the fiscal 1966 defense authorization
bill providing for a one-house legislative veto of base closure plans and, after conference
on the bill, a compromise provision was approved by both houses that imposed a variety
of restnctions on Pentagon attempts to close bases. The restrictions included a mandatory
120-day delay between announcement and implementation of base closures. More
importantly, the bill restricted the Pentagon to announcing closures between January 1
and April 30 so that the Armed Services Committees would have an opportunity to write
69 '
Arnold, “The Local Roots of Domestic Policy,” 253.
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David Casimir Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures: How Congress Balances Geographic and General
Interests” (Berkeley; University of California, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1993), 51. These figures appear to be a
matter of some controversy. Charlotte Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Mihtary Bases;
The Political Economy of Congressional Resistance” in Robert Higgs, ed.. Arms, Politics and the Economy
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990), 241-242, reports the figures as 73 bases (37 in the U.S.) in March
1961, 33 bases in December 1963, 63 bases in April 1964, 95 bases in November 1964, and 149 bases in
December 1965. For our purposes, the exact figures are not relevant. It is sufficient to say that the
Department of Defense was regularly releasing lists of significant numbers of base closures.
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language mio delcnse anthori.alion hULs greclu.ln.g II,c dosme nfha.scs the Congre.s.s did
no. wan. .„ close. l-.esnle,..
.loin. so,, vetoed the Angus. 1 0„5 on the grounds ll.at i.
V.olaled Ihe
.scparallon of powers and Ihe Congiess did no. a.lemp. to overnde Hie
I'.esiden.’s veto. However, a new p.ovision was passed delaying nnplen.e.i.al.on of
ciosnres nnlM .1(1 days afler Ihe lenlagon had piovided
.he Armed
.Saviees Comnuiiees
wilh ti jiisli llccilion lor closure decisions.
Despilc Ihis inini-ievolt, Ihe I'enlagon had lemaikahle success closing bases
clnnng Ihe IhbOs. I here was icsislanee Iron. Congress, hnl lhal resislance generally look
ll.e ronii of legislators appealing dircclly to the l>enlagon on behair ok ha.scs, and
legislalo,-s generally accepted even the lenlagon’s adver.se decisions.''^ If, as argued
above, legislabus viewed the eonsirnelion, and even inoie so. Hie closure of inilitary
nislallalions Ihrougb local lenses, bow is il Ibal Ibey allowed Ibese closures lo proceed
will, al.nosi no syslenialie resislance? More specilically, why didn't legislalors engage in
Ihe dilatory and obsirnelioni.sl ladies they would employ jiisl a decade later iu respon.se lo
base closures?
I here aie several reasons why ('ongress allowed closures to go forward, but in
general, we can say that the base closure policy process in the l%()s was merely
rellective ol what many other policy processes looked like in the l%()s - it was
dominated by its own set of norms and practices consistent with a sub-government model
o( policymaking. Members ofC’ongress generally were more willing than today to defer
to the expertise and objectivity of Pentagon analyses. Particularly during the early IbPOs,
” fwight, “Dcpiiitmcnl oC I )c fcn.se Altcinpts to Close Mililaiy Ha.ses...,” 242-4.C
Iladwiger, “Military Base Closures..,,” ')!.
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the Pentagon retained widespread prestige and dominated the defense pohey proeess.
The early 1960s arguably marked the height of the Cold War and so members of
Congress were also less willing to ehallenge Pentagon assessments about appropriate
foree posture. But another important faetor in explaining the relative congressional
complaisance on base closures was the cozy arrangement that had developed between
members of the relevant military committees in Congress and the Pentagon. Arnold
argues that “the evidence is compelling that bureaucrats avoided closing bases in districts
with representatives on the military committees.”” David Casimir Hadwiger points out
that although bases in important members’ districts were closed, “Arnold is probably at
least partially correct.”" In exchange for the courtesy paid to them by the Pentagon, the
military committees gave relatively wide latitude to the Department of Defense on base
closure.
— cozy arrangement began to break down in the late 1960s.
During the first half of the next decade, four factors would converge to help construct a
large bipartisan coalition against Pentagon base closure lists. First, Pentagon prestige was
rapidly eroding as the situation in Vietnam deteriorated. At the same time. Congress was
rapidly developing its own sources of expertise and analysis. The number of staff
members on both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees tripled between
R. Douglas Arnold, “Legislators, Bureaucrats, and Locational Decisions,” Public Choice vol 37 (1981)
117.
Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 89.
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1961 and 1976. Together, these developments meant that Congress would be less likely
to defer to Pentagon expertise.
Second, Congress was undergoing its own rapid institutional change in this
period. Kenneth Shepsle points out that the old equil.bnum in which Congress was
dominated by its full standing committees, and more specifically by the chatrs of those
full standing committees, was being replaced by a new institutional dynamic m which
rank-and-file members were becoming active players in greater numbers of policy areas.’‘>
This decentralization of power meant not only that each member had more tools at his or
her disposal to defend bases selected for closure in their districts, but also that members
were less likely to display the kind of deference to the committee chairs of the relevant
committees on base closure policy that had been the norm previously/^
Third, the particulars of the base closure lists of the early 1970s angered members
of Congress. Many members came to believe that closure lists were politically motivated,
that the Pentagon selected for closure bases in the districts of members who were
uncooperative with the administration, that the Pentagon was complicit in hiding
information and actively deceiving members of Congress, and that the savings from base
Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 92.
Kenneth A. Shepsle, “The Changing Textbook Congress” in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds..
Can the Government Govern? (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 238-66.
Speaking in general of the changes in Congress during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Shepsle, “The
Changing Textbook Congress,” 264, argues, “the slow accretion of resources permitted members to respond
to the changes in their home districts and encouraged them to cross the boundaries of specialization. These
developments began to erode the reciprocity, deference, and division of labor that defined the textbook
Congress.”
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closures were not nearly as large as the Pentagon ela.med™ Looking back on the
impositton of restrietions on Pentagon closure plans in 1976 and 1977, Senator Carl
Levin (D-Ml) argued,
the onpn of the congressional restrictions on base closings, which we
happened in
sachusetts in the early 1970s. Massachusetts was the only state to voteDemocratic in 1972 and what happened in 1974? President Nixon’sPentagon came up with a list of bases to be closed, and Massachusetts was
isproportionately and heavily impacted by that list.
.
. .Let me remind my
colleagues that there was a reason for this protection. This country isbased on a premise that we do not want all power in one branch ofGovernment. There was too much power for the executive branch to
unilaterally close bases, and Congress did something about it.^‘^
Finally, deteriorating economic conditions in the nation as a whole, and in the
northeast and midwest in particular, made members of Congress much more sensitive to
the economic impact of closures.*^" When the Pentagon released a base closure list in
April 1973 that included 274 separate realignment and closure actions, there was a
widespread belief that the actions disproportionately fell on those districts in the
northeast. Shortly before the list was released, a group of predominantly northeastern
legislators proposed legislation for an independent commission to review base closure
proposals from the Pentagon.^' The release of the list fanned the flames of discontent in
Congress and though the legislation never passed either house, it served as a formative
For greater detail on this line of argument, see Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close
Military Bases.
. 255-62.
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) quoted in Congressional Record, May 10, 1988, S10197.
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Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 88.
Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 70-73.
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period for the coalition that would eventually impose real
plans.
restrictions on Pentagon closure
Wtth roughly 500 bases closed during the early 1 970s “ the Pentagon’s
announcement of 147 additional closures ,n March and April 1976 becante the straw that
broke the camel’s back. Led by House Majority Leader Tip O’Netll (D-MA) and
Representative William Cohen (R-ME), who was enraged by the tncittston of Loring Air
Force Base ,n central Maine on the most recent list of closures, Congress attached
restrictive provisions to the military construction bill. It required notification when bases
were candidates for closure, a mandatory waiting period of 9 months, DOD compliance
with NEPA requirements, a detailed justification of decisions to proceed with closure,
and a 90-day waiting period after a decision was made by DOD to close a base to allow
Congress to block a closure if it so desired. President Ford vetoed the measure despite
strong sentiment in Congress for an oveiride. The House did eventually override the veto
but the Senate fell short. Despite this failure. Congress eventually passed and the
President signed a nearly identical version of the bill. The only significant change was
that the one-year delay in implementation of closures was shortened to 60 days, but the
change was effectively meaningless because compliance with NEPA requirements would
still take a year. Though this legislation was only effective for one year, a nearly identical
provision was passed a year later which made the procedural changes permanent.
Moreover, while the original legislation applied only to military installations employing
Congressional Quarterly, “Bases: A History of Protection by the System,” in 1988 CQ Almanac
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1989), 441.
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over 500 people, it was amended in 1978 to
over 300. 83
cover all military installations employing
1972dm The new base closure procedure effectively stopped base closures
cold. When Secretaot of Defense Harold Brown proposed base closures and realignments
in 1978 and 1979, he was completely frustrated. Charlotte Twight outlines the difficulty.
Congress now had a profusion of tools with which to undercut proposedbase closures: NEPA court challenges, Congressional hearings on *e
candidate bases and on the detailed justifications DOD Lbinitted
Congressional demands for environmental studies during the authorization
and appropriation process even when not otherwise required by law denial
of design funds for base consolidation, disapproval of construction funds
to effect closures or realignments, imposition of requirements for alternate
use studies or one-year delays prior to implementation, and “remedial”
legislafion to block entirely DOD’s decision to close or realign a military
base. These tools were employed with zeal.^*^
Congress’ victory on the issue was total. No major base - not one - was closed in the
period between 1977 and 1988, while 13 were created.*^ Moreover, the Reagan
administration’s homeport project, which effectively spread out the home ports for the
Navy, made closures even more difficult politically by e.xpanding the number of
legislators with something to defend. Minor revisions were made to base closure
procedures in 1982 and 1985, but the net effect was negligible.
What changed then, in the late 1980s, to make base closure politically viable again
in the Congress? First, the budget deficit had become a politically salient issue and
members were increasingly searching for votes to bolster their deficit-hawk credentials.
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Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases...,” 244-45.
Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases...,” 246.
Congressional Quarterly, “Bases: A History of Protection by the System,” 441.
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Second, the .haw ,n relat.ons between Eas, and Wes, mean, ,ha, many
.nembers of
Congress were beginn.ng ,o look a, the large defense budge, as a po.enbal source of
spending cuts. Third, as we will see, the late 1980s offered a unique window of political
opportunity that would make base closure easier for members to swallow.
Whatever the changed political atmosphere was, however, one thing was sure. A
successful base closure procedure would have to be sensitive to the historical and
institutional developments of the preceding quarter century. Members could no, be
expected to defer to executive expertise or prestige and the rise of the more individualized
political enterprises in Congress meant that the new process would somehow have to be
insulated from the meddling of individual legislators without entirely delegating away key
institutional prerogatives. Only the base closure commission procedure me, all of these
requirements.
Procedural Choice and Base riosnrpQ
The congressional debate over the base closure commission procedure reveals a
variety of ways m which the unique procedure satisfied congressional apprehension over
base closure. More specifically, while we find that the geographic nature of the
particularistic cost being imposed and the scope of the policy area were critical factors in
the choice of an extra-congressional procedure, it is also clear that the institutional
developments in this policy area outlined above served as another critical set of factors in
procedural choice. In short, an extra-congressional procedure made sense in the case of
base closure because of the sensitive nature of the particularistic cost and also because the
policy area in question provided a relatively cost-free avenue of delegation. But the case
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also po.nts ,o the
.ntportance of h.stoncal developnten, as a key factor procedural
choice.
more widely cited and discussed m the d.fftculty surrounding base closure than the fact
that the benefits from mihtary installations are shared by concentrated geographic
groups “ As dtseussed earlier, not only does this mean that these groups have d.reet
represemat.on in both houses of Congress, but ,t also means that these groups are more
likely to organize in opposition to a base closure as a result of their geographic
proximity.^^
One piece of evidence suggesting the importance of geography is the fact that base
closures have always been a matter of much greater sensitivity m the House with its
smaller constituencies than in the Senate.^^ This gap m comparative sensitivity is perhaps
best revealed by the way the two houses reacted to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s
attempt to unilaterally close bases m 1990. Cheney proposed a list of 47 bases to close
early in 1990. In response, the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the 1991
Defense Authorization bill included provisions to remove some of the procedural hurdles
to base closure in place since 1976. The House, on the other hand, adopted procedures
In addition to the many scholars I have cited in favor of this general proposition, it is important to note
that many scholars cite base closure as the prime example of how geographic benefits are more sensitive
than non-geogiaphic benefits. See for instance, James M. Lindsay, “Parochialism, Policy, and Constituency
Constraints: Congressional Voting on Strategic Weapons Systems” in American Journal ofPolitical
Science, Vol. 34, No. 4 (November 1990), 936-60. Significantly, Lindsay finds that parochial concerns
intrude on defense policy decisions far less than the political science literature would suggest but that
military installations policy is the most notable exception to this mle.
See, for instance, Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases...,” 241.
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designed ,o preclude base closures, even those that would have heen allowed under
the O’Neill-Cohen proeedures, until Cheney offered legislation estahhshing a non-
partisan base closure procedure.
The problem of geography was so pervasive in the ease of base closures that no
major base had been closed in the United States under the O’Ne.ll-Cohen procedures
matniy because individual members of Congress were very active in blocking base
closures in their distnets. As Twight points out, ‘Mt is the perceived duty of every senator
and representative to block military base closures or reductions in his or her state or
district within the bounds of existing law. Constituents demand ,t; reelect.on requires
It.”"" The result was that, by 1988, actively blocking the closure of a military base, no
longer provided any reward for legislators. It was expected and required of them. The
new commission procedure, on the other hand, “might expand such credit-claiming
opportunities”"' by allowing members to become heroic advocates for bases on the
closure list. In frequently cited remarks, Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) outlines the
political rationale.
The beauty of this proposal is that: If you have a military base in your
district - God forbid one should be closed in Texas, but it could happen -
under this proposal, I have 60 days. So I come up here and I say, “God
have mercy. Don’t close this base in Texas. We can get attacked from the
south. The Russians are going to go after our leadership and you know
they are going to attack Texas. We need this base. Then I can go out and
lie down in the street and the bulldozers are coming and I have a trusty
aide there just as it gets there to drag me out of the way. All the people in
Congressional Quarterly, Congress ami the Nation, Volume VIII, 1989-1992 (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1993), 353-354.
Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases...,” 250.
Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases...,” fn44, 276.
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Muleshoe, or wherever this base is, will say ‘You know Phil r,-« it was ,i.e the Ala.o, S
Many others were equally expliet, about the way in winch the contnttsston procedure
would free members of Congress from blame for the loss of geographic benefits.
Argumg for the political logic of a congressional vote of disapproval rather than Congress
having ,0 vote to approve the base closure list from the comnnssion, Representat.ve John
Kasich (R-OH) argues,
think It makes far greater sense from a political perspective foryourselves not to be held responsible for being able to stop a bill from
coming up. t IS much easier to be able to make the argument that, •] tried
buy it
d’sttPPtoval, but the Congress just simply wouldn’t
The unique political sensitivity of geographic benefits is further underscored by
the intense debate surrounding congressional involvement in commission deliberations.
During that debate, Representative John Porter (R-IL) proposed an amendment that
would have included the chairmen and ranking members of the relevant military
committees as ex-officio members of the commission. Without hesitation.
Representative Les Aspm (D-WI) and Representative William Dickinson (R-AL), the
chair and ranking member of the House Armed Service Committee fought the
amendment. Aspin argued, “I have enough trouble getting myself elected as chairman of
this committee in the caucus over here every 2 years.”” Dickinson added, "I would not
92
^^Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) quoted in Dick Armey, “Base Maneuvers,” Policy Review (Winter 1988),
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Representative John Kasich (R-OH) quoted in Congressional Record, July 7, 1988, HI 7079.
Representative Les Aspin (D-Wl) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, H17747.
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. e ,0 serve on [the commiss.on], I do no, think the gentlentan front Califontia [Mr.
Dellunts] or the gentlentan front New York [Mr. Martin] are chontphtg a, the hi, or wislt
to serve on
The antendnten, was defeated by a voiee vote and its easy defeat underscores the
rationale for utilizing an extra-congressional procedure to deal with base closure rather
than utilizing more common, internal procedures such as closed rules and ontnihns
legislative vehicles. While Congress has been able to craft other pieces of legislat.on that
cut parttcularistic benefits in favor of sonte general benefit, such as the Tax Refomt Act
of 1986, this could only be accomplished because there was sonte legislator or group of
legislators willing to become a champion of that legislation. Because of the geographic
nature of the benefit involved in base closure, however, it is clearly impossible to attract a
champion of specif,
c
closures. It is not surprising then, that the delegation of authority
became an attractive alternative to handling base closure internally. But how would the
costs of delegation be contained? To whom should Congress delegate?
The Scope of the Policy Area. Representative Richard Armey (R-TX) was the
main sponsor and the driving force behind the commission procedure. He had nearly
succeeded m attaching the commission procedure to the defense authorization bill in
1987, coming just seven votes short. Armey believed that the key to the base closure
issue was to view it through an institutional lens. Speaking of the O’Neill-Cohen
procedures, Armey said, “one can speculate on whether or not the Maine delegation had
parochial motives in stopping base closings with red tape, but they would never have
Representative William Dickinson (R-AL) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, HI 7747.
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ccn able to sell it to the Congress as a purely parochial concern.”'^'’ The real issue, he
argued, was the legislative-executive battle.
ab,l. y to deny ,t. If,he oxeeutive braneh I,as unrestneted (Veedo,
,
hands' n 'TIT' ««'!»., in ,ts
y gress has an institutional interest in insuring that the
defca'ter ms,i,ut°“ T'T "'Crests ean beuci dteu, ... inst t ional interests cannot.
Anney knew then, that a base elosnre proeedure would only be adopted if ,t eould address
this problem of delegation.
Opponents of the commission proeedure knew this too, and they went to great
pains to depict this delegation of power as apocalyptic. Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL), the
primary opponent of the legislation in the Senate, argued,
I do not know, in my professional career, which spans now almost fourdecades, any kind of exceptional authority as immense, as dramatic as
overwhelming, as undemocratic as the provision in this bill that will
permit the Secretary of Defense to appoint a commission of people of his
choice to bring back to him a list of bases to be closed, and, boom, they arc
closed and Congress has nothing to say.”‘^*^
Representative Frank Horton (R-NY) refetred to Amtey’s bill as "the largest unbridled
delegation of legislative authority in the history of this country,”'” and Senator Levin
Armey, “Base Maneuvers," 73.
Armey, “Base Maneuvers,” 73.
Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) quoted in Congressional Record, May 9, 1988, S10142.
Representative Frank Horton (R-NY) quoted in Congressional Record, July 7, 1988, 1117063.
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power. It IS not in keeping with our
referred to it as “an excessive delegation of
celebration of the Constitution, which calls for divided power.
Meanwhtle, both sides of the debate outlined the dangers of allowing for t,
5.100
iny
“polittcar influence over base closure decisions, whether it comes from Congress, the
Pentagon, or the White House. Senator William Cohen took to the Senate floor to
explain that it was the constant stonewalling of tnformation front the Air Force regarding
the proposed closure of Coring Air Force Base tn Maine that had led him to become a
sponsor of the restrictive base closure legislation in 1976 and 1977 .'“' Representative
Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) pointed out that the “most tniponam” aspect of a base closure
procedure must be that “the executtve branch will not be able to make arbitrary or
caprtctous decisions.”'"^ Representattve Armey reiterated his view that the “larger
concern in base closure is the interest of the institution.
Historically, base closing has been used as a point of leverage by
administrations, both Republican and Democratic administrations as
political leverage over and above Members of Congress to encourage them
to vote m a manner that the administration would like. So we have
communities afflicted, and we have seen, I am afraid, even base closings
that would hamper our nation’s defense out of a sense of political
interest.
This institutional problem was so sensitive, in fact, that during the congressional debate
many members raised concerns about the lack of independence of the commission and its
staff. An opponent of the commission process. Representative Porter pointed out that the
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) quoted in Congressional Record, May 10, 1988, S10197.
See the remarks of Senator William Cohen (R-ME) in Congressional Record, May 10, 1988, S10223.
Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) quoted in Congressional Record, July 7, 1988, HI 7065.
Representative Dick Armey (R-TX) quoted in Congressional Record, July 7, 1988, HI 7072.
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Armey bin would simply be prov,d,„« legal sanebon base elosure cITobs already
underway by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.
Lmn^nsed or which presently is
II probably lead to the closing or realigning of a number of milii-.rvinstallations. All of that wilhonl any congressional input."”
^
Porter eventually proposed an amendment barring anyone from serving on the
commission staff who had been employed by the Pentagon within the last year."’-'
In the light of these institutional concerns, it is not hard to imagine why the
commission process was politically allraclivc. Congress would delegate authority to
propose base closures to an ad-hoc institution and force the executive to close only those
bases approved by the independent commission or close none at all. But as with most
great works of art, the beauty of the commission process as a solution to the institutional
problem of delegation was most evident in the details.
Kenneth Mayer points out that members of Congress made sure to limit “the
domain of the agent’s authority”""' by establishing decision-making criteria for the
commission, establishing membership controls over the commission, and most
F^epresentative John Porter (R-II.) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, FI17743.
'
^ The amendment was defeated but restrictions of this sort did eventually find their way into the final
version of the bill. Defense Secretary ITank Carlucci had created the commission without congressional
approval earlier in the year and the plan was that the commission was to report to the Secretary by the end
of the year. I he Armey bill was seeking to provide legal sanction for the Secretary of Defense to
implement the commission’s recommendations. It would therefore be difficult to terminate all of the
existing commission staff and hire entirely new staff so late in the process. Porter and Senator Dixon were
partially successful, however, in arranging for a compromise. The final 1988 bill did impose controls on
the portion of commission staff directly from the Pentagon and expand the number of commissioners, and
congressional leaders were informally a part of the process of selecting the new members of the
commission. See, for instance, the remarks of Senator Sam Nunn (D-CiA) quoted in Congressional Record
October 12, 1988, S29888.
Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally)...,’’ 395.
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importantly for our purposes, restriCng the jttrisdtctional scope of the coutunssion’s
dehberattons. The deeision-nraking crtteria urtposed upon the eonrnnss.on both hnrited
the range of candidates for closure and forced the creatton of a wntten record, which
could later be subjected to analysis by other independent organizations such as the GAO.
Mayer provides an example of how the cnteria hmited the commission’s discretion.
One criteria imposed on the 1988 commission, but dropped thereafter wasa requirement that all costs of any one base closure be recovered wh^m sa
im bii^ h d'^H ™yacry; it was added to the
the
*
^ m
Services Committee, but nobody outside ofcommittee - not even the commission itself - knew who had inserted itor why It was there. The provision meant that the commission could notclose any large bases because it was impossible to quickly recover thege costs of shutting down a major installation (transfer of militarypersonnel, upgrading facilities elsewhere, property disposal, etc.) and tteshutdown itself might take several years.
Congress also exerted control over the membership of the commission and its
staff Under the 1990 procedure, the president could appoint members of the commission
but the nominees were subject to Senate connrmation. In the first round. Congress
required that half the commission staff had to be people who had not held positions
within the Department of Defense within the last year. In the 1990 law, the level was
raised to two-thirds, and requirements were added specifying that no Defense Department
employee could serve as a lead analyst on commission research and that Defense
Department employees who had previously worked on base closure issues within the
Pentagon could not serve on the staff’®*
Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally)...,” 400-01.
Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally)...,” 402.
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Finally, and most importantly. Congress also limited the commission’s discretion
by limiting its jurisdiction. Many members of Congress fought to allow the commission
to consider overseas bases for closure. Representative John Kyi (R-AZ) argued that
foreign bases should not be included because “it is going to muddle the thing up, it is
going to complicate it so much that we are really not going to accomplish the first task we
set out to accomplish.”'"'’ Armey pointed out that foreign bases had to be left out to
prevent,
this commission from being sort of sucked into what might be, from a
decision-makmg point of view, a bottomless pit of international relations
and a number of considerations of foreign policy and international treaties
that take us far beyond the original scope of this bill.”®
But this was more than just a matter of making life easier for the commissioners.
Members of Congress were very much interested, as Mayer points out, in limiting the
ability of the commission “to make judgments and trade-offs that crossed any issue
boundaries.”'" Provisions were added in 1990, for instance, that prohibited the
commission from looking at facilities that were not under the direct control of the
Department of Defense, so that facilities under the control of the Army Corps of
Engineers could be protected.”^
It is clear then, that the scope of the policy area played a central role in procedural
choice in the case of base closures. The amendment to include foreign bases in the
commission’s purview has obvious political appeal. Members could then vote to cut the
Representative Jon Kyi (R-AZ) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, HI 7751.
' Representative Dick Armey (R-TX) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, H17753.
' '
' Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally). . .,” 404.
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deficit, improve defense posture and know ,ha, a, leas, sene of the costs (and hopefully
most of then,) would be home by nobody's district. Despite this inherent appeal, the
amendment failed by wtde margins in both houses. Why? Because members obv.ously
perceived more political danger in allowing the agent (in this ease, the commission) to
influence a larger number of issues in other policy areas than they saw in simply rolling
the dice and allowing for the potential of the commission closing bases in their own
districts.
Thus, the variety of ways in which members of Congress were able to limit the
discretion of the commission goes a long way towards explaining why Congress utilizes
extra-congressional procedures in the case of base closures and does not do so in broader
policy areas such as lax refonn. The delegation of authority to implement particularistic
cuts is simply not a politically realistic possibility in the case of broad policy areas
because, by definition, it would be impossible to limit the jurisdiction of the agent in the
way this was done in base closure.
Ihe Moment in Political Time. The case of base closure also points to the
importance of the unique history of the policy area in procedural choice. As discussed
earlier, military installations policy is very much a product of its own historical
development. That members of Congress view the construction and closure of military
bases through a parochial lens has as much to do with the ways in which military bases
were first built as it does with the nature of the policy area or the geographic
concentration of the benefit. In other words, while it is relevant and important that the
benefits and costs associated with the construction and closure of military bases are
' Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally).
. 405.
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relatively geog.aphica„y concentrated,
.s also relevant and nnportant that
.nenrhers of
Congress came to view mil.tary mstallations pol.cy through that parochial lens over time.
A good part of the reason why that happened is because of the unique historical
development of military installations policy.
In addition, we have also seen that the perceived political abuse of base closures
by the Pentagon and the White House in the ,970s was a major reason why members
restricted the Pentagon’s power to unilaterally close military bases in the late 1970s. In
attempting to close military bases a decade later, coalition leaders had to be sensitive to
this histoncal development. Effectively, this meant that certain procedural options were
not politically feasible. Specifically, delegation of authority to the president or the
Pentagon to unilaterally draw up a list of bases to be closed was understood by all to be
an unrealistic option.
Much of the congressional literature deals directly with the development of social
nomis, practices, and patterns of behavior that help to structure conflict within the
institution. While those norms certainly owe their existence, in part, to rational actors
seeking to structure conflict within a large and diverse body, they also are the result of the
outcomes of previous conflicts and resolutions. As a result, the case of base closure
teaches us that m developing a more complete model of procedural choice, it is important
to examine histones of policy areas in order to assess the ways in which those histories
open or foreclose certain options.
It IS important to note as well, as we will see in other cases, that the base closure
commission process was also very much a product of the political calendar. Any piece of
legislation that cuts particularistic benefits or imposes particularistic costs can
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realist.cany be adopted only ,f .t finds sonte way to obscure the causal chain between the
votes oflegislators and the negative poi.ey effects.- I, ,s this notion, after all, that leads
legislators to utilize procedural tactics ,n the first place. In this light, there are a variety of
reasons why the contntission process was ^ore attractive to legtslators
.n 1988 than
.t had
been ,n 1987, or 1973 (the first time it had been proposed) for that matter.
First, legislation authonzing the first round of closures was passed shortly before
Election Day in 1988, when voters, and more tmportantly, challengers, would know that
the
.neumbent had voted to close bases generally, but would have no idea winch bases
were going to be closed. The specific base closure list was to be released after Elect,on
Day, on December 31, and there was a requirement that no closures would be
implemented prior to 1990. This meant that by the time the economic pinch of base
closures was being felt by constituents, there would be several years, redistricting, and at
least a couple of elections between any legislator’s vote for base closure and the policy
effects of those closures."^
The 1990 law, which called for three additional rounds of base closures, in 1991,
1993, and 1995 displayed similar temporal sensitivity. First, it called for three rounds of
closures at once, limiting the number of votes legislators would have to cast to close
bases. Second, it added an extra round of base closures before members would be
running for office in their new district boundanes in 1992. Finally, closures would be
announced m the middle of non-election years, allowing members in affected districts
time to contain the political damage.
For a discussion of this concept, see Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 44-51.
Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally)...,” 406.
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Bu, JUS. as in.por.an, as all of
.I.ese fea.ures was
.he pohhcal of
.ho
original base closure procedure. During
.he congressionai deha.e, Reprosen.a.ive
Dickinson pointed out that,
the fact IS that many circumstances have come together to it ui
in .his shor. window ,o pass this legislation now. I, is my opinio uhit ifwe do no, pass this bill and allow these base closures to be n™e^‘
,is
have a^lamXctleS’e;^^^^^^
'ameduck adm.nis.ra.iou, we
legislation.""
uetense, all of wbom support this
In later debate, Dickinson added, “all these things come into alignment a, the same time,
and this adds to the credibility of the bill.”"" Representative
.loel Hefley (R-CO)
explained that the timing was politically safe because “the commission would report after
Election Day and the Secretary would have to act before Inauguration Day.”'"
In short, there was something special about 1988 as a moment on the electoral
calendar that made the vote to close bases far easier than it would have been otherwise.
That it was a unique moment is undisputable. The rare double play of a lame-duck
administration and congressional redistricting directly on the horizon had occurred only a
very few other times in this century at limes when an extra-congressional procedure was
arguably unnecessary for base closure."* The point here is that the particular moment in
political time offers constraints and opportunities to coalition leaders that need to be
considered in developing a working theory of procedural choice.
Representative William Dickinson (R-AL) quoted in Congressional Record, July 7, 1988, HI 7057.
Representative William Dickinson (R-AL) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, H17745.
Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, HI 7776.
These two factors also came together in 1908, 1920, 1928, 1960, and 1968.
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Did it Work'^
Of course, all of this is empty symbolism if it did not work. We have seen that
Congress decided ,o ge, action on base closures out of Congress ,n par, because of the
sensitivity of geographic benents. We have seen that Congress created a new, ad-hoc,
institution with a rentarkably limited jurisd.cional author.ty to avoid the problems tha,
attend delegation. We have also seen tha, Congress timed the procedure so as to further
obscure the causal chain between legislators’ votes in favor of base closure and the policy
effects of base closure. But did t, work? Were bases closed? Was money saved?
In most cases, it is difficult to answer these questions because one cannot prove
the counter-factual. We cannot say with certainty what would have happened in the
absence of the commission procedures. On the other hand, one is hard pressed to find a
single political commentator or political actor who believes that the commission process
did not result in more closures than would have been the case otherwise.
In the first round, 86 bases"’ were slated for closure and in the second, third, and
fourth rounds, another 246 bases"" were slated for closure. Many other bases, of course,
were slated for realignments, which led to job losses in some cases and job gains in
others. The amount of money actually saved from these closures is a matter of some
dispute as the total estimated savings depends on what is counted. The Department of
Defense excluded both environmental cleanup costs and the projected revenue from land
sales from its calculations and estimated the total savings of the four rounds together
Bob Benenson, "Members Hustle to Protect Defense Jobs Back Home," Cmgressiomil OuarKrly
Weekly Report, January 13, 1990, 87.
1 20
Karl Vick, “It’s Closing Time for Base Commission,” The Washington Post, December 29, 1995, A21.
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would be $56.7 bill,on over the next 20 years.''' In rejecting calls for another round of
base closures, on ,he o.her hand, nrany n,embers of Congress argued ,h„, .he four rounds
had no. generated as ntueh in savings as the Pentagon and the con,mission claimed.'^^
Even these eri.ies, however, do no. dispute the fact that money ,s hemg saved as a result
of base closures, regardless of how savings arc calculated.
Another measure of the success of the commission process is the fact that there
were relatively few attempts to circumvent the process to keep bases on the commission
lists open and the few attempts that did occur were largely unsuccessful. Hadwiger
suggests that, in the firs, round at least, many of the bases closed were bases that were
unpopular within their districts. While legislators could no. be seen to stand tdly by while
the Pentagon closed these bases, they could allow the bases to be closed if their hands
were symbolically tied.'^^ In any event, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that
the reasot, for the muted response was that legislators correctly determined that the base
closures would not be decisive factors in their reelection efforts.
There were many cases, however,
Dixon, described as “the Senate’s most
mandate,”"^ planned hearings to “grill
where the response was not muted. Senator
vocal opponent of the base-closing panel’s
Pentagon base-closing staffers.”"^ Others
1 2 i
'
Department of Defense, “Base Closure and Realignment Report” (March 1995), 1-3.
1
2
^
Paul Richter, “Senate Rejects Bid for More Base Closures,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1997, A 19.
Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 195.
See for instance, Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 218-39, and C’harles E. Cook, “Base Closing
Furor: Minimal Political Impact for Members,” Roll Call, March 18, 1993.
1 25 Mike Mills, “Base Closings: I'he Political Pain is Limited,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
December 31, 1988, 3629.
61
planned ,o circunwen, the connniss.on process by figh,i„, b,ocb ,be appropr.a.ions
necessary ,o go forward with base closures.- Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) challenged
.he closure of the Ph.ladelphia Naval Shipyard in court and took his case all the way to
the Supreme Court. Though there were cases of a few jobs being saved in very few
cases, legislators were otherwise completely unsuccessful m keeping targeted bases
open.
Another possible rndica.or of the commission process’ success was its ability co-
op. some of its strongest victims and detractors. For instance, Representative Jim Coulter
(R-NJ) served as the chair of the commission for its second and third rounds. Though
Coulter supported the commission process, he was a strenuous and vociferous opponent
of the list that emerged from the first round of the commission process.'" That list called
for the closure of Fort Dix, a major base in New Jersey, and on April 18, 1989, less than
two years before he was appointed as chair of the second commission by President Bush,
Coulter voted for the joint resolution seeking to overturn the base closure
recommendations in the House.
126
Mike Mills, “A Dogged, if Futile, Trench War is Planned by Some on Hill, ” Congressional QuarterlyWeekly Report, Usitch 25, \ 9% 9
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Mills, “A Dogged, if Futile...,” 660-62.
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“Military Base Closures...,” 195-217. Describing such efforts in the wake
of the 1988 closure list, Hadwiger points out that a few efforts to keep open some facilities on or near bases
being closed were successful. Similarly, President Clinton, along with the California and Texas delegations
worked to privatize a number ofjobs lost as a result of the closure of Air Force depots in those states.
While this effort was successful, it so alienated members of the delegations from states where these
privatized jobs were supposed to go, that it remains the central reason another round of base closures has
not been approved. See Helen Dewar, “Behind the About-Face on Base Closings,” The Washington Post
July 16, 1997, A 17.
Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Commission May Help Ease Members’ Unsavory Task,” Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, March 2, 1991, 555.
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Senator Dixon, as we have seen, was the primary opponent of the commission
process in the Senate in ,988, te.hng one reporter, “you-ve go, to understand. This
process was designed to stop a guy hke me."'» He fought vtgorously to keep Chanute
Air Force Base in Illinois open after it was recommended for closure in the first round of
the commission process, declaring tts closure “an Amencan tragedy."'^' Nevertheless,
Dixon accepted the appointment as the chair of the commission for its fourth round of
closures.
Without a doubt, the greatest conversion on the issue of military base closures,
however, is that of William Cohen. No sooner was Cohen, the author of the legislative
provisions in ,976 and 1977 that made it so difficult for the Pentagon to close military
bases in the first place, named Secretary of Defense than he was calling for additional
rounds of base closure. Sounding like a member of the base closure choir, Cohen said.
What I’ve told my former colleagues is that there aren’t any more easy
choices. Those are all gone. It’s hemlock time now. Are you going to
protect these excess facilities that are no longer needed, or are you going to
protect our forces by putting modem weapons in their hands?
Cohen recently reiterated his call for additional rounds of closures, this time calling for
two rounds in 2001 and 2005.'^' The reason his call will be ignored on Capitol Hill,
however, is the same reason why his restrictive base closure provisions were accepted by
Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) quoted in Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Former Sen. Dixon to Oversee Painful New
Round of Cuts,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 8, 1994, 2898.
Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) quoted in Palmer, “Former Sen. Dixon...,” 2898.
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William Cohen quoted in James Kitfield, “Cohen Opts for the Middle Ground,” NationalJournal May
24, 1997, 1042.
Susanne M. Schafer, “Cohen to Seek New Base Closures,” Associated Press, April 2, 1998.
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legislators in 1976 and 1977, and tlie same reason why the commisston process was
adopted in 1988 and 1990 - historical and institutional incentives.
<^onclusion
Several important factors have changed since the commission process was
adopted in 1988 and again in 1990. Ftrst, the deficit, at the $200 billion mark and rising
at the time, has been eliminated. Second, there is a sense among many members of
Congress that the defense budget has already been cut as far as is appropriate. But most
importantly, the last round of the commission process led to nearly as much anger and
resentment withm Congress as existed in 1976. President Clinton privatized jobs in
Texas and California that were supposed to have been shifted to bases in other states in
the 1995 round of closures and realignments. Armey, now the Majority Leader in the
House, suggested,
They [members of Congress] could overcome their fear of losing a base as
long as they thought they had a fair shake in the matter. But the president
poisoned the well badly ... You cannot have a commission, you cannot
have closures without trust and confidence.
... It’s my honest assessment
that you will not have another commission as long as Bill Clinton is in the
White House and the reason is that, no matter how much he pleads that
this time he will play it straight, they won’t believe it.'^^
This view reemphasizes the argument made in this chapter. Congress will not close bases
itself because of the geographic nature of the particularistic benefits involved. Congress
will not delegate authority to the Pentagon or the president to close bases unilaterally,
because of the history of base closures. Today, military bases can be closed only with a
procedure that delegates authority, temporarily, to an institution independent of the
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executive, and only with a procedure sensitive to the political
of base closures teaches us that extra-
calendar. In short, the story
do what it simply cannot do othenvise
congressional procedures can empower Congress to
Additional questions about extra-congressional procedures remain, however. For
instance, a deeper understanding of the sto,^ of base closures raises our level of curiosity
about the case of nuclear waste site disposal. On the surface, at least, these two cr
appear to have much in common. They are both
ases
cases m which Congress is seeking to
impose geographically concentrated costs in favor of some general benefit. Moreover
they are both very narrow policy areas, suggesting delegation of authority as a possibility
since the jurisdiction of the agent could be restricted quite easily. Why then, did
legislators not utilize an extra-congressional procedure in the case of nuclear waste
disposal?
Similarly, the case of base closures raises interesting new questions about
Congress’ use of an extra-congressional procedure (fast track procedures) in trade policy.
The congressional debate surrounding base closures clearly indicates that one reason
members of Congress were comfortable delegating the extraordinaiy authority they did.
was because of the narrow nature of the policy area. This is clearly not the case with
trade policy and NAFTA clearly displays the wide range of policy areas trade policy
Representative Dick Armey (R-TX) quoted in Dewar, “Behind the About-Face...,” A 17.
This view echoes the view of delegation generally asserted Kiewiet and McCubbins in The Logic of
elegation. They challenge the predominant view of political scientists that Congress abdicates its
responsibilities for crafting difficult policy solutions because it lacks strong centralized leadership. They
argue, ‘the alternative we pose to the abdication hypothesis is that it is possible to delegate authority to
others and yet continue to achieve desired outcomes. Indeed, it is often the case that desired outcomes can
be achieved only by delegating authority to others,” 3.
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affecs. We w,ll explore eaci, of these quest,ons in tun, but Hrs, ,t is useful
the case of tax refom, as it serves, like base closure, as a control case of sorts.
to examine
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CHAPTER 4
TAX REFORM
Base closure presented a control ease of sorts. Because base closure took
geographically concentrated benefits away front constituents, and because the literature
suggests that taking away geographically concentrated benefits is harder for legislators to
do than taking away geographically dispersed benefits, it is no, sun,rising that legislators
chose to delegate the power to make the painful cuts. Moreover, because base closure is
a relatively narrow policy area, and because we expect that legislators would be less
worried about agency losses in narrow policy areas, it is no, suntrising that legislators
chose to delegate.
In this light, It IS useful to think ol the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Puhlic Law 99-
514) as the mirror image of base closure. Tax reform is a case where legislators are
operating in a broad policy area and arc taking away particularistic benefits that arc
relatively dispersed. It is not surprising to us then, that in enacting these particularistic
cuts. Congress utilized its own inlcniai procedures to get the job done. But, as we will
sec, procedural choice in lax reform, like in the case of base closure, was a function of
more than just geography and the scope of the policy area - it was very much impacted hy
the moment m political time and the presence of powerful champions of the cause of lax
rcfomi.
Before addressing the question of procedural choice, it is first necessary for us to
understand the policy problem the legislative proponents of tax reform were attempting
address. After a very brief history ol tax policy, we will examine the problem of tax
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reform and assess why so many believed the Tax Refonn Act of 1986 (TRA86) would
never become law. Finally, we will discuss the procedures utiltzed to pass TRA86 and
devote some attention to each of the factors that impacted procedural choice.
A Brief History o f the Income Tav
The Constitution written in 1787 did not give the national
government clear authority to tax income. Article I, Section 8 granted Congress the
power “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” But the
clause qualified that power stating, “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States,” and Article I, Section 9 added, “No capitation, or other
direct. Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken.” As a result, while some income taxes were employed in very
limited ways, - mainly to address war-time deficits - the nineteenth century was primarily
spent arguing over the constitutionality of the income tax. This debate culminated in the
Supreme Court s 5-4 decision in 1895 that the income tax was a direct tax that hit certain
states disproportionately and was therefore unconstitutional.
When the concept was given new life in 1913 with the enactment of a
constitutional amendment. President Wilson and the Congress quickly enacted a very
modest income tax that affected less than 2 percent of the population. From its modest
beginnings, the income tax rapidly expanded with each successive political crisis in the
John F. Witte, The Politics and the Development ofthe Federal Income Tax (Madison, WI: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 78.
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nrst half of the twemie.h century; World War 1, The Great Depression, and World War II.
More than any other event, however, the second world war transfonned the income tax
from a tax on the wealthy to a tax that impacted most Americans. Whereas, before the
war, those with incomes under $3,000 paid about 10 percent of all inconte taxes, by 1948,
they were paying From this point on, the income tax stood
significant part of American life.
as a pennanent and
m>rld War 11 - 1974, Like base closure policy, tax policy in the three decades
following World War 11 was characterized by a sub-goveniment type of polihes. Timothy
Conlan, Margaret Wrightson, and Davtd Beam point out that “details, not principles, were
the focus of action” during this period.
Impenetrably complex and often boring, the making of tax policy became
the province of a closed elite of key legislators, executive leaders and
lobbyists whose actions were seldom challenged (or even closely
inspected) by the public or its elected representatives. Indeed, for much of
the post-World War period - from 1958 through 1974 - tax legislation was
closely guarded and controlled by a single individual, Wilbur Mills, the
powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.
None of this is to say that there was no change in tax policy in these years. On the
contrary, tax bills were regularly drafted and adopted and the face of taxation changed
over time. For instance, between 1948 and 1974, the share of federal revenues from the
corporate income tax fell from 25.6% to 21.0% while the share of federal revenues from
the individual income tax increased from 51 .0% to 64.6%.'^“^ The rapid economic growth
Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson. and David R. Beam, Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax
Reform (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990), 18.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 18.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features ofFiscal Federalism, 1984
Edition, 46. These figures exclude social insurance taxes and contributions.
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the nation experienced in tlre 1950s and 1960s fueled the rapid expansion n, the
tndividual ineonte tax. Because of the progressive rate structure of the utdtvidttal inconte
.ax, more and more of the tax burden automatically sh.fted from eorporations to
.ndtviduals. As a result, the tndividual tax rose in comparison with the corporate tax
because of so-called “bracket creep.” The income tax rates were not indexed to inflation
and so while incomes were rising, taxpayers were being pushed into higher tax brackets.
Tins provided the federal government with automatic revenue increases. And these
increased revenues came more from individuals than from corporations because whtle the
corporate income tax also utilized a multi-bracketed system throughout this period, there
were fewer brackets and most corporations paid at the same rate.
A second, and even more significant, way in which the face of tax policy changed
m the post-war period was the expansion of so-called tax expenditures. Tax expenditures
are tax deductions, credits, or other preferential treatment given to specific kinds of
income that result m revenue losses. They are commonly referred to as tax expenditures
because they provide monetary benefits that could otherwise be provided by federal loans,
guarantees, or expenditures. Because the growth of the economy and bracket creep
offered legislators pain-free revenue increases, it also offered legislators opportunities to
provide tax relief In that context, the question then became what form tax relief would
take and tax expenditures were the most attractive choice for several reasons. As Douglas
Arnold points out in his discussion of tax policy, across-the-board rate reductions are less
attractive to legislators because small rate reductions become very expensive very quickly
and those who benefit rarely appreciate what has been done for them. On the other hand,
tax expenditures are very much appreciated by the beneficiaries, cost far less than across-
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.hc-board rate rcduCons. and „,„s, often pnovKie legislators w,,h an opporlnnfty elain,
credft for sonre general benefft. For ins.anee,
.he nroftgage imeres, deduelion allows
leg.sla.ors ,o clain, eredft for expand,ng ,be Irons,ng s.oef n, ,l,e na.,on and lower,ng ,be
cost of hous.ng. In tins sense then, ,ax expendi.u,es offer legislators the additional
benefit of be.ng able to advance policy goals .ha, they tnay be unable to advance
.h,ough
cosily direct expenditure programs tha, rec,uire legislative oversight and large
bureaucracies.'*’®
Given the fact that legislators prefer to provide lax relief through tax expenditures,
we should no, be surprised to see tha. the expansion of tax expenditures has been a
regular staple of the histoo, of tax policy. As we can see in Table 4 . 1
, between the
adoption of the income tax in 1913 and 1974, Congress created tax expenditures a, a rate
of about one tax expenditure per year.
Table 4.1 - The Growth of Tax Expenditures
Period New Tax Expenditures New Tax Expenditures / Yci
1914-1945
1945-1974
1975-1981
ar
29
30
15
.91
1 .03
2.14
Source: Data compiled from a list of all tax expenditures in John Witte, The Politics
and Development ofthe Income Tax, 276-281
.
This pace accelerated rapidly after 1974 for a variety of reasons that we will examine in
the next section. The important point here is to get some sense of the magnitude of tax
For a more complete discussion of the lure of tax expenditures versus tax rate reductions, see Arnold,
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expenditures as instruments of tax policy. By 1975, the
(measured as lost revenue) was $92.9 billion
income tax receipts.
cost of these tax expenditures
per year or 56.6 percent of total federal
ii25 im Even though tax expenditures totaled nearly $93 billion in 1975, it
.s important to note that this
-hidden welfare state- had been co.ts.ructed during a
period when the Ways and Means Committee served as a guardian of the treasury. But
the institutional upheavals of the late 1900s and early 1970s made the Ways and Means
Committee far less likely to serwe that function after 1974.
.lust as changes in the
incentive structure in Congress had opened the door to legislators seeking to protect bases
in their districts in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s. legislators were also more free to enact
tax expenditures in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
As we saw in Table 4.1, the pace of enacting new tax expenditures accelerated in
the late 1970s. This acceleration is even more staggering when one looks at the cost. By
1982, tax expenditures cost over $253 billion or 73.5% of federal income tax receipts.
By 1985, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the fiscal 1986 revenue loss
from tax expenditures would be over $424 billion.''’^
The Logic ofCo?igressional Action, 198-204.
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 292.
For an excellent discussion of the importance and magnitude of tax expenditures as an ignored part of
the American welfare state see Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and
Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 292.
Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates ofFederal Tax Expendituresfor Fiscal Years 1986-1990 (JCS
8-85), April 12, 1985, 22.
'
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How did this happen.’ The central reasons are institutional. Stinsiiine rcromis,
rules changes, changes in the ntentbership of the Ways and Means Committee, the
declining influence of the Ways and Means Committee vis a vis the Senate Finance
Committee, and high inflation all conspired to create an atmosphere more conducive to
the expansion of tax expenditures. Douglas Arnold argues.
if one assumes that legislators’ motives for creating and expanding taxpreferences were unchanged, then one must consider both means andopportunity. In both instances there were significant changes.''’’
The refomts of the early 1970s that were designed to make Congress more open to
scrutiny and open to participation by junior members hit the Ways and Means Committee
particularly hard. Ways and Means drew the fire of refonners mainly because it was one
of the power committees in the House. Ways and Means was forced to become larger,
was forced to hold open hearings, to create subcommittees, lost its role as the "committee
on committees,” and lost its standing closed rule on the House floor. In expanding the
Committee and opening ,t up, more and more members were recruited who were less
“safe” electorally. For obvious reasons, these legislators would then have greater
incentive than Ways and Means members in the past to provide benefits to constituents in
the form of tax expenditures. As if that was not enough, the powerful Chairman of Ways
and Means, Wilbur Mills, eventually lost his chairmanship when his alcoholism and his
Strange relationship with a stripper became public knowledge.
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 202.
Gary Mucciaroni, Reversals ofFortune: Public Policy and Private Interests (Washington, D.C.; The
Brookings Institution, 1995), 46.
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It IS easy to see how less prestige and tnfluence ,n the chantber, less centralized
power, more open heanngs, and less restrictive rules on the House door for Ways and
Means gave all legislators enhanced means to prov.de expanded tax expenditures to
constituents. With Ways and Means retreat,ng from tts traditional role as guardian of the
treasury, the induence of the Senate Finance Committee was on the nse; and the Finance
Committee had always been a more hospitable place for the expansion of tax
expenditures. With its more collegial atmosphere and far less restrictive rules, the Senate
is a more institutionally fertile ground for tax expenditures.
As these institutional reforms provided the means for expanded tax expenditures,
the opportunity was provided by the succession of tax relief bills that were a result of the
changed issue context of tax policy in the late 1970s. High indation pushed more and
more taxpayers into higher tax brackets and Congress thus found itself with the additional
revenue necessary to enact tax relief bills in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1981
Last, but not least, among the expansions in tax expenditures that grew out of the
reforms of the 1970s was the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) - the Christmas
tree to end all Christmas trees. John Witte argues that the ERTA “was historically in a
category by itself. The new law indexed income tax brackets to inflation taking away
the automatic revenue increases to which legislators had become accustomed. More
importantly for our purposes, ERTA expanded and added new tax expenditures that grew
radically in a short time. Witte estimated that the new tax expenditure provisions of
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 202.
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 235.
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KRIA cost the federal government nearly $14 bi||
by fiscal 1983.''^'^
ion in fiscal 1982 and over $29 bilMion
Hy l‘«5, ,hc l„s, revenue Iron, ,ax expenditures had reached its peak. In that
year, the Joint Co.nmiUee on Taxation estimated that the lost revenue Iron, all tax
expendi.ures hetween llseal 1986 and fiscal <>90 would he over 2.5 trilhon dollars.- As
a result, when Senator liill Bradley (D-N.I) hegan pushing Tor tax reforn, in 1982, the
intuitive appeal of the idea seemed clear. Legislators would he able ,o vote for a
sign, I,cant tax rate reduction in return for trinumng a variety of tax expenditures. The
problems confronting such a piece of legislation were many, however, and i, is worth our
attention to outline in some detail why experts on Ihe history of the income tax such as
John Witte would declare in 1985 that rather than attempt to reform the tax code,
policymakers ought to set their sights on simply hailing the further erosion of the tax
base.
I he answer is not to reform the tax system or even to seek immediate
policy remedies, but rather to alter the political process to prevent even
further regression. The general goal should be, as Allen Schick has
compcilingly argued, to restore non-deeision making - to change the
polities of taxation so as to retard and stabilize change. Thus, the goal
should be to seek not remedies but merely a remission from the malady.
And that requires political, not policy, reform.'^'
Given this melancholy forecast, we ought to first outline why Witte and virtually every
other expert on tax poliey argued that fundamental tax reform was an impossible dream.
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 233.
Joint C ommittee on 1 axation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1 986- 1 990 ( IC'S-
8-85), April 12, 19X5, 22.
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 380.
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The Problem Posed bv Tnx Rpfnrr..
The colleclivc action problem posed by tax reform is one which is not unfamiliar
us at tins point. In their detailed account of the triumph of tax refonn,
.leffrcy
Bimbatim and Alan Murray offered a concise but complete description.
he groups with an interest in the existing tax system were well-organized
and ready to defend their breaks at a moment’s notice; the populace who
soo to benefit from lower rates was unorganized and diffuse
hurthermore. Congress was a slow and cumbersome institution that
usually made only ptecemeal, tncremental changes. Tax refonn proposed
something very different: a radical revamping of the entire tax structure
There was a tremendous inertia in Congress that resisted any such
sweeping change.
In this atmosphere, rank and file legislators could not be counted upon as likely allies.
One member of the Ways and Means Committee, Rep. Willis Gradison (R-OH) argued,
this will inevitably be an uphill fight. The potential winners are skeptical that Congress
will ever enact reform and the potential losers are organizing.”''^ Moreover, legislators
also knew that taking benefits away from one group and conferring them on another, is a
negative-sum game. A decade earlier, the former Chainnan of the Senate Finance
Committee, Sen. Russell Long (D-LA), articulated precisely this view.
When we proceed to shift the taxes around so that one set of taxpayers
pays a lot more taxes and somebody else pays a lot less taxes, the people
who benefit from it do not remember it very long. They tend to feel that it
should have been that way all the time, and the people who are paying the
additional taxes resent it very bitterly."'^
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch (New York: Vintage Books 1987)
13.
1 53
Representative Willis Gradison (R-OH) quoted in Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch,
108.
Senator Russell Long (D-LA) quoted in Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 15.
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In addi,,on ,o the collecive action probletn posed by tax rcfonn though, thee was also
.he problent of htstoty. Con,an, Wngh.son, and Scant pent on, that antong the obstacles
faeng advocates of tax rcfonn was the “bitter historical expcnence"'« tax refonners had
endured. As one of those non-believers, John W.tte summarized this view best.
There is nothing, absolutely nothing in the history or politics of the income
.ax that tndicates that any of these schemes lie L shgh.esrhoprTfbe.ng enacted ,n the forms proposed. In fact, if the past is any gmiderefbm efforts
... are very likely to aggravate the problem over L long
Finally, there was the additional question of whether Congress had the
institutional capacity at the particular moment in political time to pass such a radical
piece of legislation. Randall Strahan points out that one of the biggest puzzles m
explaining tax reform is that,
the critical first step in enacting reform was successfully undertaken by the
ays and Means Committee, whose power, autonomy, and centralized
lead^ership had been major targets of the congressional refonn movement
of the 1970s.
Thus, if procedural mechanisms were necessarily central to any effort to pass tax refonn -
as is the premise of this study - there was reason to think that the very committee in
which tax refonn legislation would need to originate was incapable of employing them.
For that reason, many believed that tax refonn, and all of tax policy more generally, ought
to be handed over to an independent commission responsible for raising revenue.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 7.
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 380.
Randall Strahan, New Ways and Means (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press
1990), 143.
1 58 -1
See for instance, Stanley S. Surrey, “Our Troubled Tax Policy: False Routes and Proper Paths to
C'hange,” Tax Notes, February 2, 1981, 185.
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Such arguments notwithstanding
delegation for that matter, would not be
,
an extra-congressional procedure, or any kind of
the route for tax reform. In the end, this complex
policy probicn, was hanclial by Congress, ubli.ng i,s own internal proceclnrcs ,o shield
legislators (Voin electoral retribution when possible. Uefore discussing why Congress
haiKlIed this matter internally, it is nsefnl to Hrst review the provisions of the Tax Kefornt
Act ol 1986 as it was eventually adopted so that we have r
direction of the policy involved.
i sense ol the scope and
d he Provisions of the Tax Reform Aet of 19^
I he central provisions of tax reform as it was enacted in 1 986 cut income tax rates
for both individuals and corporations and eliminated or scaled back numerous tax
expenditures. The point of the exercise was to enhance the horizontal equity' ''' of the tax
code, make the tax code less complicated, and to pass a bill that was revenue neutral.
While the new law did not treat all income and all tax breaks equally, it did succeed in
significant measure in each of these areas. The key provisions are listed in Table 4.2
below.
'
^ By “Iiori/.ontal equity” 1 mean that one goal of reformers was to ensure that persons who receive similar
income pay similar amounts in taxes, lax expenditures obviously frustrate horizontal equity because they
give special tax breaks to individuals or corporations engaged in particular kinds of economic activity
without providing a compensating benefit to others, d'he result is greater variance in tax liability between
persons with equal incomes.
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Table 4.2 - Key Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
Reduced
the number of individual tax rate brackets from 1 4 to 2m ividual tax rates from a maximum marginal rate of 50% to 28%
corporate income tax rates from a maximum rate of 46% to 14^ with Inbrackets at 1 5% and 25%
Increased
the standard deduction (or old “zero bracket” amount) from 82 480 tn non r
smgle taxpayers and from $3,670 to $5,000 for ma^upfaf ’ ”
personal and dependency exemptions from $1,080 to $2,000 in 1989 and afterand hberahzed the earned ineome tax credit for low-income families “dt dhidren
the pa“op ratr°"'
" “““
^ applying
ra^si^;^: ri:: 2™r
840*ooT
minimum taxes by creating an alternative minimum tax of 20%, with a$ ,000 exemption, to replace the previous add-on minimum tax
penalties for tax negligence and fraud
cpealed
deductions for state and local sales taxes
deductions for consumer interest (like credit card, auto, and student loans) with aphase-out through 1990
the marriage penalty” deduction for two-earner households
the $50 tax credit for political contributions
the exclusion of $100 dividend income
income exemptions for many “private activity” municipal bonds
provisions for income-averaging
the 60% deduction for long-term capital gains, treating all capital gains (short- or
long-term) as ordinary income
the exclusion of income from unemployment compensation benefits
deductions for expenses of adopting a child
the exclusion for most prizes and awards
deductions for charitable contributions by non-itemizers
deductions for educational travel
extra personal exemptions for the elderly and blind
deductions for the land-clearing expenses of farmers
lower rates on the capital gains of corporations
the investment tax credit (ITC) for business expenditures on machinery,
automobiles, and other property placed into service after December 31, 1985
(continued on next page)
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Tabic 4.2 - continued
Limited or Modified
deductions for contributions to individual reirenent accounts (IRAs) and 4(1 1(K)
deductions for business meals and entertainment to 80% of expensesdeductions for mortgage interest to qualified first or second homesthe exclusion of scholarship and fellowship grants
deductions for home office expenses
personal exemptions, as well as the lower 15% tnv r-Uf' m.-
reporting requirements for municipal bm^s
’
the deductibility of losses from “passive" economic activities to income gained onlv
sr
tTncT
''’dividual and employee business expense deductionsOncluded among them employment-related education, professional and union duesrk-relatcd tools and supplies, tax and investment counseling, and job-scarch
’
costs) by imposing a 2% income floor
deductions for business cruise travel
touting'”'
'’i"‘°'-i<' buildings and the provision of low-income
credits for research and development
de^rmpn rules for business property under the accelerated cost recovery system
Retained
deductions for state and local income, real estate, and personal property taxes
deductions for mortgage interest on a primary residence and a second or vacationhome
exemptions for income from “public activity” municipal bonds
tax deferral on the proceeds from the sale of a personal residence
credit for child and dependent care expenses
credit for the elderly and the pennanently and totally disabled
deductions for alimony, business gifts, and gambling losses
the exclusion of employer-provided fringe benefits, life insurance proceeds,
workers’ compensation payments, and veterans’ disability benefits
tax incentives for natural resources (including oil and gas drilling, timber growing,
and solar and geothennal energy)
Source: Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 4-5.
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One rcsuK ol all ,l,oso provisions was a dra.nalic dccimc in boih ihc mnnbcrs oC
tax expcndiinros and ,n the revenue los. as a resul, of iax expen.l, tores. 14 tax
expenditures were repealed - roughly the same as the total nutnher ol' lax expenditures
repealed between Idl3 and 1985.'“ In Apnl, 1985. the .loud Committee on Taxatton
projeeled that the total revenue lost from tax expenditures in ftseal 1990 would he $597.9
b.llion."" In the wake ofTRAHh. in February, 1987, the Contmittee estimated that the
lost revenue from lax expenditures in fiscal 1990 would be $3.35.7 billion'" - a tlilTerenee
of $262.2 billion.
I'recisely because of these base-broadening measures, the rale reduelions that were
part of TRA86 were not butigel busters, fhe hill was revenue neulral meaning that the
total revenue game, I and lost from Ihc provisions of TRA86 summed roughly to zero.
And with the exception of the fael that TRA8(, removed roughly six milhon'" poor
Anterieans from the lax rolls, the bill was also dislribulionally neulral across income
classes. The most noticeable shift resulting from TRASb was the fact that corporate taxes
were increased by roughly $24 billion per year while taxes on individuals were decreased
by Ihc same amount. .Some 81) percent of Americans thus received a direct lax cut as a
rcsiill of TRA86 while corporate income taxes rose by 40 percent.'^’''
( edne Sandlord, Successful Tax Reform ( rrowbridge, (treat Britain: Idscal l'ublication,s, 133.
Joint C ommittcc on 1 axation, hstimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1986-1990 ( K'S-
8-85), April 12, 1985, 22.
Joint ( ommittcc on I axation, hstimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1988-1992 (JC\S-
3-87), l•'cbruary, 27, 1987, 17.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing' Choices, 3.
Arnoltl, The Lof^ic of Congressional Action, 2 1 5.
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Procedures as Ke
While the tax cut for individuals that was part of TRA86 suggests some of the
appeal of tax refonn to legislators, the larger question that focuses this study rematns.
The taxes to be paid by corporations - a class with significant organizational presence in
Washington - were increased by $120 bill,on over five years so that legislators could give
a $120 billion tax cut to a general, diffuse public. How does Congress approve polices
that impose particularistic pain in favor of a genera, benefit? The case of base closure
discussed in the previous chapter seemed to prove the old aphorism that necessity is the
mother of invention. Incapable of closing military bases with the traditional, internal
procedures of Congress, legislators created a new institutional fomt. While tax refom,
certainly did not utilize an extra-congressional procedure or even any procedures that are
unique to the particular piece of legislation, it should be pointed out that the tactful
utilization of legislative procedures was no less central to the enactment of TRA86.
Despite this centrality, however, what is most surprising about the standard
accounts of the passage ofTRA86 is the extent to which the deft use of procedures is not
even mentioned. In the epilogue to the most widely read account of TRA86, Jeffrey
Bimbaum and Alan Murray ask, “what created this legislative miracle that defied all the
lessons of political science, logic, and history?”'^^ They offer some description of how
tax reform passed but fail to include procedural tactics explicitly or implicitly. Similarly,
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 285. Douglas Arnold also finds the explanation for
tax reform offered by Bimbaum and Murray to be deficient. Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci
Gulch, 175, argue that the vote on the House floor for TRA86 showed that “under the right conditions,
members of Congress would cast a vote for a tax bill that was in the general interest, even though it went
against the wishes of powerful lobbyists. But as Arnold, The Logic oj Congressional Action, 213, fn42,
points out, “Bimbaum and Murray never specify what those conditions or circumstances might be.”
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n .he other popular book-,eng,h account of tax refonn. Con,an, Wngbtson, and Bean,
argue that TRA86 ntade its way through the House through
-a cotnbination of leaders,,, p,
cajoleo,. calculation, idealism, and ,uck.”'“ While these amorphous elements were all no
doubt present, this v.ew fails to recognize the degree to which procedural tactics altered
the environment in which
.deahstic leaders could cajole, leg.slators could calculate, and
luck could be utilized.
The procedural tactics utilized were many but they revolved around a single goal;
weakening the links in the causal cha.n between legislators’ votes and the loss of group
benefits. A firs, step in this direction was taken by the Chaimtan of the House Ways and
Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL). Desp.te sunshine reforms a decade eari.er,
Rostenkowski had returned to closed committee markup sessions in 1982.'" By 1985,
when the Committee was considering tax reform, the use of closed committee hearings
was nothing unusual. When simply closing the doors proved to be insufficient protection
from interest group influence, Rostenkowski employed a second procedural tactic -
delegating difficult decisions to small informal task forces within the committee. In the
end, Rostenkowski employed 12 such task forces that included between 5 and 7 members
each."’'’ This not only gave rank and file members of the committee some greater
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 85.
Strahan, New Ways and Means, 143-144.
Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 219, points out, “all that the proponents of a specific tax
preference had to do to pressure committee members to retain a favorite tax preference was to demand a
recorded vote. Indeed, despite the fact that the doors were closed, Strahan, New Ways and Means, 144,
points out that proponents of specific tax breaks were successful in forcing 48 recorded votes in the Ways
and Means markup.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 115.
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attachment to and pride in the committee’
difficult decisions out of the formal hands
s ultimate product, it also took the most
of the committee reducing the number of
opportunities for legislators to save specific tax breaks. Of this
Rostenkowski claimed, “they would work
procedural innovation.
out a project, report back with some pride of
creation, and then help me defend it.”'^®
On the House floor, procedures were no less important. The bill was given a
modified closed rule that allowed only 3 amendments
- a Repubhcan substitute and 2
other minor amendments. Moreover, the rule only allowed for 5 hours of debate - a bnef
period given the broad scope of the legislation involved.'^' In employing each of these
tactics, the strategy of coalition leaders of TRA86 in the House was clear. Procedures
would be used to ensure that most legislators - even many of the legislators on the Ways
and Means Committee - would be shielded from the opportunity to save their favored lax
break. Finally, one additional procedural tactic employed on the House floor that helped
to weaken the traceability chain occurred by accident. When the time came for a vote on
the bill itself. House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) said in a mechanical way, “Ail those m
favor say aye, opposed no, the bill is passed.”'" Bimbaum and Murray relate what
happened next.
He then looked to the Republican side of the chamber, expecting to see a
Republican member rise and call for a roll call, but no one moved. The
speaker banged his gavel, and it was done. The Republicans, in a moment
of confusion, had missed their only opportunity. A few Republicans made
Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) quoted in Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 1 15.
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 162.
^
^^Representative Thomas P. O’Neill (D-MA) quoted in Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch,
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a show of complaining that the speaker had gaveled ton i, ,
fatr witness could see that the Republicans had simply made a mistake.'”’^
Thus, TRA86 passed through the House without a roll call vote. The result was that most
of the members did not have to go on the record as for or against the bill at all.
The fact that a number of the procedural tools available to coalition leaders in the
House are not available to coalition leaders in the Senate is renected in the differential
treatment that tax packages receive on the House and Senate floors. The formal powers
given to the Speaker and the Rules Committee in the House allow coalition leaders to
bnng complex legislative packages to the floor without offering rank and file legislators
an opportunity to amend. The Senate, on the other hand, has two important relative
disadvantages. First, the rules of debate and the rules governing amendments are very
relaxed in the Senate. As a result, the body is generally run by unanimous consent
agreements. As the name implies, any one senator is generally free to offer amendments
to any bill at any time. Second, Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that “All
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with Amendments as on other bills.” Effectively, this means that
by the time a bill gets to the Senate floor, it is the proverbial last tram leaving the station
and each senator is anxious to add their own caboose. The result of these two procedural
differences is not surprising. John Witte examined all revenue-losing and revenue-
gaining tax provisions enacted into law between 1970 and 1981 and classified them by
which institutional actor - the executive branch, the House, or the Senate - had originally
proposed the provision. He found that the executive branch and the House displayed
Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 175
.
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rough balance between revenue-losing and revenue-gain,
ng provisions with respect.ve
ratios on. 17 and 1.34. The Senate, on the other hand, weighed in at 4.24. Of 97 tax
provisions ongmating in the Senate, only 17 increased revenue.'^"
Despite this difficult
.nstitutional environment, coaiit.on leaders ,n the Senate
were able to ut.lize several procedural tactics to their advantage. The F,nance Committee
nrst attempted to mark up the bill in open sessions and, not sutpnsingly, the revenue loss
was staggering. So the first procedural tactic utilized was to privately draft a new bill
behind closed doors. Once the members of the Committee were satisfied with the central
components of the bill, members met to mark up the bill in open session, and the first
decision the Committee made was to agree that all subsequent amendments must be
revenue-neutral. This agreement forced particulanstic interests to face off against other
particularistic interests rather than particularistic interests facing off against the general
interest. After only a few amendments, the Committee approved the bill 20-0.'^^
On the Senate floor, there is no doubt that it helped that Finance Committee
Chairman Robert Packwood (R-OR) had built a bipartisan coalition of 35 senators who
agreed to oppose all amendments, and had established another informal agreement among
senators that amendments be revenue-neutral. But Packwood also received procedural
relief from a provision of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.
Arnold explains the provision which.
Witte, The Politics and Development ofthe Income Tax, 323.
Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 221.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 179.
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mlal^t'hat rl of a™ h H r , if Congress had not yet adopted itsannual budget resolut.on. Although this prohibition eould be overturnedby a majority vote waiving the point of order, it was much easier to defenda procedural vote of this kind than it was to defend the stlbseoue
agreement by proposing an unbalanced amendment, but the Senaterefused, 54 to 39 to allow Its consideration.'”
Two other interesting procedural tactics utilized on the Senate floor deserve
mention. First, TRA86 was one of the first bills ever to be considered and enacted on the
Senate floor m full view of live television cameras. According to Bimbaum and Murray,
this had a significant impact on the Senate floor.
Members were leery of appearing to obstruct reform. They feared that
their usual long harangues might look unseemly to the public. Few wanted
to risk appearing in full color on the evening news as a defender of the
special interests.” *
Second, when an amendment to restore the tax credit for IRA contributions was
sponsored by Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), coalition leaders cooled support for the
popular amendment by offering a symbolic “sense of the Senate” resolution that the IRA
issue should be revisited in conference. Support for the resolution cooled support for
D’Amato’s amendment, whieh was narrowly defeated by a 51-48 margin.'^'^
The bills that emerged from the House and the Senate were substantially different
and given the sensitivity of many of the provisions, those differences raised the possibility
that TRA86 could unravel in conferenee. Again, procedural tactics were utilized to save
the bill. Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam argue,
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 222, fn59
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Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 179.
’’’ Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 181.
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.eveuue
cslimales l,o,„ h.ghly-lr slalT, Ihose who coulrol access lo slalT lesouices are „, a„
...Ivamaged posiliou. As a .esull, because pro-,elon„ Kosleukowsk. and Packwood had
gicaler coulrol over stall' resources, they were able lo I'ruslrale the ability of ault-rel'orii,
legislators to even propose anieiulinents and alternatives.
II is clear the.., lhal .lespile II,e lack of sysle.ual.e alleul.ou devoid lo the del'l
ulib/.alio,i of piocedures ,„ the passage of TKAHb, ihe bill coul.l „„i have otherwise
survived. Arnold sums up this view well.
II legislators had not chosen to accept these extraordinary procedures in
order to weaken the traceability chain lor group elTeets, the electoral
eonneetion would have prevented many of them hoin ever supporting tax
relorm. There ean be little doubt that these procedures were e.ssential lor
tax reform.
Ihoeediiral rhoieeiand Tax Reform
I hat procedures were central to the passage of TRAK6 is thus clear. What is less
elear is the answer to the c|uestion that consumes this study. Why those procedures?
('oiiliiii, Wnglilsoii, and Ik-ain, Taxing C/ioicr.s, l‘)()-|‘)l.
I ^ I
Arnold, I'lw l.o^ic of ( 'oii^ivssioiKil Action, 22.V
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Why d,d„-. legislators choose to ut.lizo a procedure sinular ,o the base clostne procedure
to weaken the traceability chain? The ianswer to this question is to be found
the same factors that we examined in the case of base closure. Beca
in examining
uisc of a variety of
factors particular to the poHcy area and the pol.cy instrument involved, legislators did not
need to uttlize an extra-congresstonal procedure. On the contrary, there ts reason to
believe that legislators wanted to handle TRA86 internally because the bill offered
opportunities for claiming credit o,v we// avoiding blame for the loss of particularist.c
benefits.
Geographic Versus Non-Geouraphir Rcnefiis., The central variable impacting
procedural choice that this study examines is the nature of the particularistic benefit being
ctit or the particularistic cost being imposed. Because he is one of the few authors who
explicitly discusses the importance of the nature of the particularism involved, it is not
surprising that Douglas Arnold assesses the impact of the geographic distribution of
particularistic cuts in tax reform. He argues, “coalition leaders tpiickly learned that a
reform bill needed to he geographically neutral in order to survive all the legislative
hurdles.”' He continues,
although coalition leaders failed to temiinate any major tax preferences
that were geographically concentrated, they were far more successful in
eliminating those that were geographically dispersed. Legislators on the
tax-writing committees could protect but a limited number of tax
preferences without undennining the entire bill. They quite naturally
chose to protect geographic benefits, lest they be accused of neglecting
their constituents, while allowing coalition leaders to terminate dozens of
group benefits that were geographically dispersed. Many legislators may
have wished to help the real estate, financial, and restaurant industries, but
1 82 1
Arnold, 77/e Logic of Congressional Action, 2 1 6.
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.Specncally. A,.nol.l suggests ,hu. ,hc
.datively s.nall price pa.d hy the oil and gas
industry and the
,dent, on orthe dcduetib.lity oCstate and ioeal n.co.ne and prope,ty taxes
tne evidence of the privileged pos.tion „r geographieaily concent, ated bcncllts ,n ,l,e
scrantble to llnd tax expenditure cuts to pay for lower lax rates. Aside (Von. these geneial
claints, however, Arnold offers no en.pnical support for what is a central ,dea the
context of this study. If ,, is true that legislators do care more about protecting
geographically concentrated henelits than geographieaily dispersed benelits, and if they,
in laet, dirl tins in the ease of tax reform, the nature of the partieularistie henclit would go
a long way lowartls explaining proce.lural choice. If we know that legislators a,e more
sensitive to cutting geographieaily concentrated heneliis than geographically dispersed
benelits, ,1 would make sense that legislators were willing to handle tax reform internally
and were unwilling to handle base closure internally. Ifase closure is a policy instrument
Unit imposes geographieaily concentrated - and only geographically eonecnlraletl - costs
on particular groups. While eliminating tax expenditures imposes both geographically
eoncenlrated and geographically dispersed costs on groups, Arnold is suggesting that
IRA86 was handled internally hecaiisc legislators could selectively |irolcct the types of
benehts that were most sensitive and thus minimize the electoral damage. It is important
then, that we examine the differential trealmenl of tax bcncllts with an eye towards
geography to seek out evidence to support or refute Arnold’s claim.
18.1
Arnold, The Logic of Congressioiwl Action, 2 1 7.
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While they don’t always refer explicitly to the
several authors argue that there is wide variation in the
geographic nature of benefits,
of tax expenditures originate in the executive branch, Christopher Howard suggests that
Similarly, James Buchanan points out the important distinction in political logic hetween
If individual taxpayers are presumed to be unable to trace out the incidence
and effects of alternative corporate tax structures, the observed support for
the 986 tax law changes may have reflected a failure to make the
translation from corporate to individual tax accounts.
Describing the political environment in the House Ways and Means Committee, Randall
Strahan argues that there was a clear geographic pattern to which tax expenditures were
saved and which were not.
Rostenkowski was forced to shift from a coalition-building strategy
stressing opportunities for enhancing prestige and enacting good public
policy to a strategy that included negotiating changes to accommodate
local or group interests of importance to individual committee members.
As one committee member described the markup process, “There was an
awful lot of protection going on - in terms of protecting what ’s good for
your state, your region, your district." By the count of a staffer who
worked closely with the chairman, five of the twenty-eight members of the
Howard, The Hidden Welfare State, 186.
individual and corporate tax expenditures. He argues.
i 85
James M. Buchanan, Tax Reform as Political Choice” in Economic Perspectives, vol 1 no 1 (Summer
1987), 31.
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coalition that iiltimalcly supported the committee bill (four Democrats indone Republican) supported the chaimian from the outset; the reniainde!exacted as a condition ot support at least some conecssions for
„flocal or regional concern} qj
Finally, James Snyder, Jr. makes the point more explicitly arguing.
tax preferences for speeifie industries or finns, such as those for
agriculture, timber, oil and gas. Philips Petroleum, and Cimarron Coal
clearly have the properties of locally concentrated benefits and diffuse
costs. On the other hand, for many big-ticket, federal versus local taxpolicy issues - such as the deductibility of state and local sales taxes andthe deductibility of interest on state and local bonds - both benefits and
costs are dispersed rather widely, at least viewed geographically.'^^
In making this point, Snyder, of course, leaves out state and local income and property
taxes, the deductibility of which was retained in TRA86. We are left to assume that the
reason legislators retained the deductibility of state and local income and property taxes
while eliminating the deduction for state and local sales taxes was because the benefits of
the deductibility of state and local income and property taxes are more geographically
concentrated than the benefits of state and local sales tax deductibility. That is also the
explanation to be inferred from Arnold’s claim that state and local income and property
tax deductibility were retained because of their geographically concentrated character.
Fortunately, this happens to be a case in which we can do more than infer from
claims made by a number of authors. Data on per capita state and local taxes are readily
available and serve as an excellent measure of the comparative concentration of the
benefits of the deductibility of state and local sales, income, and property taxes. Because
our hypothesis is that geographically concentrated benefits are more difficult for
Strahan, New Ways ami Means, 149, my emphasis.
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James M. Snyder, Jr., “Comment on ‘Loeal Interests, Central Leadership, and the Passage of TRA86’” in
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 12, no. 1 (1993), 183.
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legislators ct„, we would expect to tl.td that u, choosing wh.ch tax prelerenees to retan,
an<l winch to einninate, legislators would retan, those that are ntore geograph, eally
concentrated and einninate those that are more geographically dispersed. In ad.hlion, we
know that in TRA86, legislators retanted the deduet.h.hty of state and local n.eonte and
property taxes and elintinated the tleducib.hty of state and local sales taxes. Therefore, if
-ho geograph.e eoneentrat.ons of these taxes are an in.portan, variable in detennining
winch tax benents are cut and winch are spared, we should see some statistically
signilicant difference between the variation in per capita state and local ineo.ne and
property taxes on the one hand and the variation ,n per capita state and local sales taxes
on the other.
Income, and Property d’axes
Stcl. Deviation of Per Capita Sales Tax in 50 States
Std. Deviation of Per Capita Income Tax in 50 States
Std. Deviation of Per Capita Property Tax in 50 States
F Statistic for Income Tax versus Sales Tax
F Statistic for Property Tax versus Sales Tax
Source: Statistics above arc from author’s calculations based on data from Tax
Kmndation, Facts and Figures on Government Finanee, 23'^' edition (lialtimore MD-
I he Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), Table 31 and Tax Foundation, Faels and
Figures on Government Finanee, 26"’ edition (Baltimore, MD: J'he Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1 99
1 ), Table 31.
* Significant at .1
** Significant at .05
Capita State and Local Sales,
Fiscal 1985 Fiscal 1988
$156.40 $175.66
$195.75 $235.63
$212.47 $240.38
1 .566* 1.799**
1.845** 1.873**
188
recognize that tliere is some dispute as to wliether it is appropriate to utilize an I-’-test given that this is
population data as opposed to sample data. I have included the relevant I-'-statistic here for those who find it
useful.
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4.3 p, ovules con.pa,a,ivc n.oasu,cs of va, ia,i„„ hc.wccn slalcs lo. pc,- cap,,a s.alc
local incon,e, p,-„pe„y, a.ul sales
.axes r„,- lx.U, Hscal |.,«5 „-,g|„ „ero,-e
,|.e
e„ac,n.c„l of TRA86) and llscal IW8 (ligh, alle,- Ihe enael.neni of TRA80). As
cxpecleci, we .see Ihal .here is sian.licaally greale,- va,-,a.io„ a,„ong stales in sla.e a,„l
local per cap.,a ineonte and pioperly laxes eon,pared w.lh per capila sales laxes. This
greater varial.on
.neans lha, ihe benelils of II,c dedncUInlity a,e n,o,e geograp.neally
concemraled
,n cerlain slates whose men,hers then have a nnu|.,e and sign.nean,
incenl.ve to relan, the deduclih.lity of these taxes. Moreover, as we will see shortly, the
drive lo retarn the dedrreirhilily of slate and local income and property laxes came from
die I iorise. Tor this reason, rt is appropriate U, weight the stale per capita lax payments in
Tahle 4.3 hy Ihe nriniher of I louse memhers lion, each slate.
•fable 4.4 - Comparative Weighled Varial,.,,,ll^i^^;;;;,7^;i^^ Capita
.Slale anT
Local Sales, Income, and I’ropcrty Faxes
Sul. Deviation of Per Capita Sales l ax in 50 States
Stcl. Deviation of Per Capita Income l ax in 50 States
Stcl. Deviation of Per Capita Property 'Fax in 50 States
V Statistic For Income Fax versus Sales Fax
F’ Statistic For Property Fax versus Sales Fax
Foundation, luic/s and Figures on Government Finanee, 23''’ edition (Baltimore Ml)'
Ihc Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), Table 31 and Fax Foundation, Faets and
h^ures on Government Finanee, 26"’ edition (Baltimore, Ml): Flie Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991), Tahle 31.
* Signilleant at .OOP I
Fiscal 1985 Fiscal 1988
$1 14.44 $131.77
$230.87 $284.88
$162.37 $199.27
4.070* 4.674*
2.013* 2.287*
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The results of this weighting are displayed in Table 4.4 a
the disparity between sales taxes and
ind we can see there that
income and property taxes becomes even greater. In
addition ,0 this empirical evidence, there is more than ample anecdotal evidence to
suggest that geography played a signiftcant role in explaining why income and property
tax deductibility were retained while sales tax deductibility was eliminated. For instance,
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam point out that the slate and local income tax deduction was
a particularly difficult provision for legislators to eliminate because.
such popular provisions were not viewed by the average taxpayer as
special-,merest loopholes. They were often incidental to Jere one
worked or lived, and few used the provisions as a ploy to lower taxes.
This fact and the high concentration of benefits from deductibility of state and local
income and property taxes were not lost on the members of the House. In the Ways and
Means Committee, where 3 committee members were from New York - the state with the
highest per capita state income tax in the nation - retaining the state and local income and
property tax deduction became “the fulcrum of reform.”’ In addition to the influence of
committee members from high-tax states, Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) made it clear to
Chairman Rostenkowski that eliminating the state and local income and property tax
deduction was unacceptable telling him.
Dan, the power of the Speaker comes down to whether a bill gets on the
floor or doesn t get on the floor. Two things I’m interested in: state and
local taxes. You don t have those in the bill, you don’t get a day in the
court. Remember that.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 95, my emphasis.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 112.
Representative Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill (D-MA) quoted in Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing
Choices, 113.
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n.c fate oChe slate a„cl local sales lax daluelion ii. the Senate piovicles rinll.ei evulenee
ol-
. 1,0 in,po,
-lance of the geo^iaplne eoncenlialion of pailicnlanslic Hener.ls. l ooKnig
hack at Tables 4.3 and 4.4, it ,s n„l snipiising Ilia, when llie House veis.on ol'lax lelonn
allowed ,„e slate and local sales lax dednclon ,o be einnnialed, Iheie would be a move in
Hie Senate ,o leinslale
,1. The vaiialion n, per eapiu, stale and local
.sales lax is
.signilleamly lower when the ilala is weighted hy ihe ninnher of members n. the I louse
rrom each slate n,d, eating lha, henellls or,Caini„g Ihe slate and local sales lax deducon
were more likely ,o he sensitive ,o members of Ihe Senale than memhers of Ihe House.
Senalors David Dnrenberger (K-MN) anri Palriek Moynihan (l,-NY| wauled ,o reslore
.lie dednclion on the Senale lloor, bul because relaining ihe deduclion would blow a
$17.5 hillion hole in Ihe hill, and because mos, senalors were eonmnlled ,o revenne-
neiilrahly on all ainendmenis, neither senalor was willing to even put lorward an
amendinenl. When several oilier senalors pul forward an amemlmenl that would allow
taxpayers lo deduct eilher Iheir stale sales lax or Iheir income laxes, bul nol both, senalors
Iron, high-mcoine tax slales liirned against Ihe dediiclihilily ofslalc and local sales laxes
lor tear lhal Ihe amendinenl would open up Ihe possibility oflampering will, slate income
lax deduclibihly u, conference.''" I lighlighling Ihe differeiil polilical calculus for Ihe
sales lax vis a vis income and properly laxes, Moynihan would later explain his reversal
saying, “the sales (ax was no big deal for New York.”‘‘^^
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, /W,v///g Choices, 183-184.
Senator l>aliick Moynihan (I)-NY) inioted in (’onlan, Wnght.son, and Beam, Tasw}’ Choices, 184.
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In addmon ,o ,he state and local tax deductions, the other set of geographically
concentrated tax expenditures ntenhoned hy An,old were tax preferences for the oil and
gas industo^. Just as retention of the state and local inconte and property tax deductions
were critical components of passing tax refom, in the House, the
tax credits was critical in the Senate. Despite the lack of
retention of oil and gas
a strong oil and gas presence on
Ways and Means, the warning signs on this geographic benefit were clear at the House
Committee stage when lawmakers from oil and gas states voted m lock-step to retain the
deduction for state and local income and property taxes. Bimbaum and Murray point out
that,
Rostenkowski s people knew there was trouble for sure when Democratic
Representative James Jones of Oklahoma wrote an op-ed piece for TheWashington Post that demanded the retention of the deduction for state
and local taxes. State taxes in Oklahoma were so low that PresidentReagan had chosen Jones’s home state to make his biggest pitch for repeal
of that deduction. He argued the write-off represented a subsidy by low-
tax states like Oklahoma to high-tax states like New York but Tones
wasn’t buying that line. For political expediency, Jones and other “oilies”
breakT'^'^'’^
Jewish groups to protect each other’s tax
The Senate Finance Committee, in particular, proved to be a hostile environment for
cutting oil and gas tax expenditures. When Chairman Packwood brought the bill to
committee, he quickly met resistance according to Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam.
The committee rank-and-file promised nothing but trouble. Building on a
bloc of oil and gas votes that included Long, Dole, Bentsen, Max Baucus,
D-Mont., and Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., outspoken opponent David
Boren, D-Okla., was actively soliciting conspirators for his “kill the bill”
coalition.
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 129.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 148.
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The .ru,h is, however,
,ha, ,h.s assess.,,e„, actually understates the role that oil and gas
would play in the Finance Committee. Before the bill had
from the Treasury Department, oil and
ever been sent to Congress
gas interests, led by Secretary of the Treasury
James Baker, a Texan, had been successful „, removing provisions from the bill that
would have taken some $44 billion in tax benefits from the
years. Gtven the differing geographic makeup of the House
oil and gas industry over 5
in general, and the Ways and
Means Committee m particular, it is not sunrrtsing that oil and gas interests had been hit.
But the partisan and geographic makeup of the Senate and the Senate Finance Committee
were far more hospitable to oil and gas interests. First, the Senate had a Republican
majority more synipathetic to Baker’s political logic and the bias of that logic was clear.
One anonymous administration official was quoted in the National Journal as saying of
the offending oil and gas provisions, “the Republican party is going to have to find a new
way to finance campaigns in Texas if this goes through.”'
Administration influence notwithstanding however, a second and more important
reason why oil and gas tax expenditures would receive favorable treatment in the Finance
Committee had to do with the geographic makeup of the committee. Table 4.5 displays
the percentage of the gross state product comprised by oil and gas extraction for each
state represented on the Senate Finance Committee. 8 of the 14 states with the largest oil
and gas sectors are represented on the Finance Committee, including numbers 2 through
5. Overall, nearly 3 times as much of the economies of the 20 states represented on
Finance are comprised by oil and gas extraction compared with United States as a whole.
Anonymous administration official quoted in Ronald Brownstein, “Wagering on Tax Reform,” Nationul
Journal, February 2, 1985, 247.
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Table 4.5 Comparison of Dependence on Oifii^as Exlraction by State
Senator % of State’s 1986 GSP from Oil and
Gas Extraction
State Rank
Long (D-LA)
1 7.90%
Wallop (R-WY) 17.35%
1
Boren (D-OK) 8.85%
i
A
Bentsen (D-TX) 8.25%
4
r
Baucus (D-MT) 3.02%
8
11
12
14
20
27
29
30
34
35
36
Dole(R-KS) 2.06%
Armstrong (R-CO)
1 .62%
Pryor (D-AR)
1 .08%
Heinz (R-PA) 0.18%
Moynihan (D-NY) 0.08%
Symms (R-ID) 0.04%
Durenberger (R-MN) 0.03%
Roth (R-DE) 0.01%
Packwood (R-OR) 0.01%
Danforth (R-MO) 0.01%
Chafee (R-RI) 0.01%
ou
40
Mitchell (D-ME) 0.01% 41
Grassley (R-IA) 0.00% 43
Matsunaga (D-HI) 0.00% 44
Bradley (D-NJ) 0.00% 45
Oil and Gas Extraction as % of Gross National Product
1 06%
Oil and Gas Extraction as % of Finance Committee Member States’ GSP 2.89%
Source. Author s calculations of data from Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Bureau of the Census
For the purposes of this study, however, this latter statistic is less important than the
former. The existence of a solid minority of senators intensely committed to preserv ing
oil and gas tax benefits meant that tax reform could proceed through Finance only when
this geographically concentrated interest was appeased. Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam
point out that on the final day of committee markup, when it was becoming clear that the
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proverbial train would be leaving the station, the oU and gas bloe was more suecessful
than any other group. They add,
the outcome was only a matter of who had the votes. In the end it was notPackwood, and so energy-state senators won their amendments to protecttax benefits enjoyed by “working interests” in oil and gas projects^ Likeothers Boren owed his committee assignment to Long, and all had
Zmafe of c
^ " "oiideological, nonpartisan
nramage onvenience that no one, not even Wallop, was about to
abandon, tax refonn or no tax reform. Energy’s strong track record inturn, was enough to convince the core group that, without an
aecommodafion, the committee might be unable to report a bill. It shows
hat, even during a period of remarkable esprit de corps, traditional
alliances never wholly broke down.
Significantly, the battle lines over the oil and gas amendments show how the power of
geography can overwhelm the power of party. Dole (R-KS), Bentsen (D-TX), Boren (D-
OK), and Long (D-LA) fought and won on oil and gas against Chafee (R-RI), Bradley (D-
NJ), and Mitchell (D-ME).
In addition to the special treatment accorded the oil and gas industry and state and
local tax deductions, the important role of transition rules in enacting TRA86 serves as
further evidence of the importance of geography. Technically, transition mles are special
provisions inserted into tax bills that provide for an easier transition between old tax law
and new tax law. But because the chaimien of Finance and Ways and Means have
effeetive control over who gets transition rules, it is easy to see how these provisions are
the grease that lubricates the legislative tax machine. And because transition rules are
targeted towards specific companies or localities, they are perhaps the purest form of a
geographic benefit. The best-case scenario for legislators seeking to protect constituency
interests in tax reform would be to save the tax expenditures their constituents utilize
100
most. A sccoml-bcsl scenario is to gel a I'avotable lr;i
the tax bonclil. In the ease of lax rcronn, transition rnles we
over each legislative hurdle.
insition rule that will ease the loss of
re used to help move the bill
During the marknp of TRA86 in the Ways an.i Means Committee, Chainnr.n
Rostenkowski, sensing he was abont to lose revenue to an aineitcimeni that wotiUI expand
the dednelibilrty of business lunches, pleaded with the eontm.itee that tletluetion should
be scaled back as a matter of lairness. Itut he also pointed out that there would be a bill,
and that he would tlceide who got transition rt.les and who tlid not. ISrrnbaum and
Murray describe what followed.
Rostuikowski s threat to tieny transition rtiles to any member who crossedInm could not be ignored. Whether it was Rostenkowski's plea for reform
or his threat to deny transition rides that caused the change, the committee
majority shifted after the speech.
On the Hnal day of markup, Rostenkowski did indeed dispense more than $5 billion in
transition rules to members who had been friendly or to members who the Chairman
hoped would still be willing to get on board. Not surprisingly, Rostenkowski also
inserted a number of favorable transition rules for Rep. Claude Pepper (D-FL), the
Chairman of the House Rules Committee, who Rostenkowski knew he would need to get
a favorable rule for the bill on the House lloor.''^'^
Transition rules were no less a part of the success Chairman Packwood had in the
Finance Committee. Gary Mucciaroni points out that.
197
C'onlan, Wrighlson, and ficam. Taxing Choices, 176.
Birnbauni and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 146.
Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 146-147.
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As o„o p.r(,cipanl in Ihc llnal ,n„mcnls ,n l inancc rclalcs, the lu.nl f„,-
somclimcs looked like the lloor of a slock exchange.
rules
ackwoo. was stanihng up there talking like an a.ietioneer: ‘'1^0 got liliv|nii hon| here. Can I hike lilly |million| there?” Overall, thal’s^wlril itcame tU>wn In. I lc was hoUling up this paper ami auclinning nITprovisinnsin order to pay (or the last few special deals.
On the Sctialc llonr, Packwo.xl’s eontrnl ever liansilinn rules also helped In keep troops
itt Hne. After Sen. Pete Wilson ,K-CA, and Sen. Alan Cranslon ,I)-CA) had ahandoned
the Chairman on an aiuendmenl seeking to expand tax credits for conlribuimns to IKAs -
an amen<lme.u Paekwood had beaten baek by the slinuuest of margins - Paekwood got
behind an amendment by
.Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OII) to eliminate a transition rule
for Unocal that California’s senators had leqtiested. Ihc amcntlmenl passed by a wi.lc
margin and the message to other senators was clcar.^"^
In conlercncc, transition rules emerged again as a saving grease. When trouble
broke out among Senate conferees, Paekwood made a point of reminding his fellow
conferees that he and Roslenkowski would each have about $3 billion in additional
transition rules to hand out and that those who supported the conference report would be
remembered. Some were remembered more quickly than others as Sen. Chafee (R-RI)
dropped his objections after Paekwood provided Rhode Island $100 million in authority
Miicciaroiii, Reversals ofFortune, 52.
Quoted in ('onlan, Wrighl.son, and [team, Taxitif' Choices, \15.
202 ^
( onlan, WriglUson, and Beam, Taxing C hoices, 185.
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.0 issue cenain types of tax-free bonds.-
„t ,ts Hna, vetsion, TRA86 contained neatly
700 transit,on rules at a total cos, of S„ billion - every one of then, a geograpineally-
concentrated benefit for some member of Congress.^”'^
In concluding our discussion of geographic vs. non-geograph,c benefits, it is
important to be rennnded of our focus
- procedural choice. I, is clear that leg.slators were
w.llmg and able to utilize an internal procedural strategy in the case of TRA86 precisely
because it allowed them to make the very chotces we have discussed in the preceding
pages. Summarizing the final contours of the bill, Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam offer
this revealing passage.
The TRA IS neither pluralist in tone nor modest in the scope of its
noutedom°™ f
predecessor, and interest-group bargaining was clearly
virti a^
/nfluenee on the legislation. Indeed, losers constituted atu l W,os Who among the U.S. economic interests that traditionallyhave shaped tax policy, including real estate, heavy industry, large banks
casualty insurance, defense contractors, and multinational corporations.^”
’
What is noticeably absent from this list, however, are beneficiaries of geographically-
concentrated tax expenditures. Legislators proceeded with tax refom, precisely because
they employed a procedure that allowed them to choose winners and losers. Sen. Russell
Long (D-LA) expressed this view best in defending the oil and gas interests so vital to his
state agatnst an amendment supported by a former judge Sen. George Mitchell (D-ME),
who argued for “blind justice” in tax reform.
We fellas are lawmakers. We’re supposed to know who we’re helping and
do It deliberately and know who we’re hurting and do that deliberately.
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 277-279.
Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 218.
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Conlan, Wrightson. and Beam, Taxing Choices, 233-234.
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Now the people in the oil and gas husincss arc the most denresse.1
.ndusto- .n the Un.ted States. If you’re s.tt.ng over there iranurre
Til
“'l
” soing to treat then, ’all theame. riiis fella s broke, down and out. God knows he needs heln Buthe hell with him. 1 can’t do anything about that.” If you’re a judgi that’s
~
Not surprisingly, the tax expenditures most legislators sought to save were the most
sensitive particularistic benefits of all
- geographically-concentrated benefits.
Ihe Scope of
_ihe_Ppliey Area. A second factor found to be relevant in the
question of procedural choice in base closure was the scope of the policy area. While
base closure presented a clear ease of a narrow policy area, it is equally clear that tax
refomi is a broad policy area. TRA86 not only put every aspect of the then nearly $500
billion in revenue from individual and corporate income taxes on the table, but also
touched upon and affected virtually every other policy area. Conlan, Wrightson, and
Beam correctly point out that TRA86 is an interesting story for students of American
politics if only because of “the size and sweep of the TRA, bringing nearly every
important institution and interest in national politics to the foreground.”^^' Bimbaum and
Murray make the point more explicitly suggesting that tax refomi was different in a
fundamental way than dealing with more narrow policy areas. Early on. Treasury
Secretary James Baker and his lieutenant, Richard Damian, had hoped to secretly cut a
deal with key legislators ahead of time and push tax refomi through the Congress just as
they had done with Social Security in 1983. But Bimbaum and Murray argue such a
strategy could never have worked in the case of tax refomi because.
Senator Russell Long (D-LA) quoted in Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 176.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 230.
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Enacting tax refonn thus poses more legislative problems than jus, the fact that you are
cutting visible and concentrated particulanstic benefits in favor of a diffuse general
benefit. It also means you are making decisions m other policy areas in which legislators
and citizens have cross-cutting policy preferences. In relating some of the difficulties
encountered while negotiating the final contours of TRA86 in conference, Conlan,
Wnghtson, and Beam provide two examples of this problem.
Not only did conferees despair over changes affecting most corporations
Bm RoTh ® T For example;ill t - an advocate of savings incentives and a consumption tax todiscourage spending - made IRAs his line m the sand. When Packwood
went back on his promise (made earlier during Senate floor debate) to helpRoth out m conference, the Republican from Delaware withheld his
support. Similarly, Danforth was determined to preserve the so-called
completed contract method of accounting for defense contractors. Whenhe couldn’t, this much-respected Presbyterian minister voted against the
conference agreement and, later, against the TRA.^®*^
Thus, while legislators wanted to protect the particular benefits flowing to their districts
just as they wanted to in the case of base closure, tax reform’s broad scope added an
additional dimension of complexity. Legislators could be sure in the case of base closure
that the agency losses incurred by delegating authonty to draw up a list of bases to be
closed would be limited. But in the case of tax reform, legislators could conceivably lose
particularistic tax benefits and lose in a host of other policy areas far beyond the tax code.
The power to tax, after all, is the power to destroy. Given these facts, it is inconceivable
'JQg
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 76.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 210-211.
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tl>at logislalors could feel secure delegating the power to relornt the tax code. The
institt,tional prerogatives that were at stake were ntadc clear in Rostenkowski-s response
to Baker s plan to move TRA86 through the Congress quickly. I le remembered,
I sat tn my rocker and said: “Jesus, Jim, don’t show me how in,prudent
Wc’rrcrcatina r. T7'''® "T m “’''licence.e e creating legislation, and this is the first step in the process We’re
tetli year™olTr’’"« ^
While the concern over agency losses would certainly be enough to prevent
legislators from delegating the power to craft tax reform to a base closure type of
commission, the ease of lax reform also points out a second, and perhaps more
compelling reason, why legislators are unlikely to delegate authority in broad policy
areas. Precisely because the particular laws we arc focusing on in this study confer
general bcnclus that arc tliffusc while they impose concentrated costs, we expect
legislators to want to delegate the authority to make these decisions so long as they can
contain agency losses. But TRASb presents such a massive policy area that delivering the
diffuse general benefit actually offers legislators some political reward.
This differs from base closure in a fundamental way. In base closure, legislators
can support the policy vehicle when, and only when, they arc reasonably sure that the
electoral fallout from their vote will be negligible. Not surprisingly, we saw all kinds of
tactics legislators employed to increase the distance between their votes and the negative
policy effects including delaying implementation of closures, handing off the decisions
over which bases to close to others, placing restrictions on the agent’s authority, and
timing their votes at particular moments in the political calendar. Importantly, however.
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Will, legislators thus loensed on ihe geneial henelil and on Ihe opporlnn.iy u, clam,
eredd, Ihe noiinal polilieal logic wenl o„l Ihe win.low, hor instance, while Ihe nonnal
course ol evenis in a coiireience eonimillee on a lax hill was lo comhine Ihe pel loopholes
ol boll, sides, Ihe conl'erees in I RASh sotiglil lo comhine Ihe loophole-c/o.vmg pi-ovisions
li-o,,, holl, Ihe lio„,se and Ihe Senate lo gel rales down as low as possible, Qmie ollen, as
a resnil, conleiees cho.se Ihe longlier provision li-om the House and Senale hills for Ihe
lliud version of TRA86.^'^
Kc'prcscnlalivc Dan Ro.slcnkowski (D-ll.) qiiolcd m (’oiilan, Wnglilsoii, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 93.
Arnold, The l.o^ic of( 'on^ressioiial Aeiion, 2 1 3.
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See Appendiees A and H in Ihmbanm and Murray, Showdown at (iiieei Cidch, for a detailed t-rapliie on
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Co.I.,ion leaders were so succcssCuI in p.m.ng ihe general benem up from ihal
ui.in-alely, nrany legislators eanre U, believe lha, Ihey had to vote lor I KAKb les, ihcy
mcur Ihc wralh of angry constiUienls. Conlan, Wrigh.son, and lieain eorrecly poin, out,
‘‘.0 be sure, directing bla.ne or credit for tax reronn was not at that ti.ne on the minds of
average Americans.- lint what really matters most to legislalors is their perception of
wha, average Americans will be thinking, or wha, they might be made to think, on
EIcclion Day. Gary Mucciaroni argues,
members of Congress who might have been tempted to vote against
rclorm risked having challengers at Ihc next election point out llun theyhad denied their constituents a dilTuse bcnelll and that they were captivel
hey hatl had Ihe opportunity to vote for greater fairness and efllciency andless government and they had shied away from it. In the end their fear
support "e’lbrm.^'“'‘'
'"“"y "'«"hcrs to
More than anyone, legislative leaders feared being blamed for failing to enact
FRA86. One senior Ways and Means Committee aide recalled,
when we had trouble, when we lost on the bank vote,
... [the chairman’sl
argument tended to be: “We can’t do this. The Democrats arc going to get
blamed lor killing tax reform. 1 can hear Ronald Reagan out there right
now saying your rates arc now 50 [percent] and I could have lowered them
to 35
[
percent
^
That legislative leaders had these sorts of worries was important. In his analysis of the
enactment of TRA86, James Buchanan suggests the possibility that tax reform was
promoted “by political entrepreneurship of self-interested agents who exploited the
2 1
3
Conlan, Wrighlson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 174.
Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune, 38-39.
Quolcti in Strahan, New Ways and Means, 1 50- 151.
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td-porary ccnciclenco be,ween ,hc, own and gencal c„ns,i,ncncy in,crests.-'' This
view assigns ,„o passive a role ,o legislative leaders, however, hegislalive lea.lers, as we
Itave seen, actively maniptdated proeednres, and the legislahon itself, to ereate an
atmosphere in which the general bcnellt of lax reform was pm
„p from.
For tnstance, the Hnal bill gave individuals a net tax en, of roughly S24 bilhon
annually and increased corporate taxes by the same amount, fhe benefits of this ,ax cm
were spread around so that 8t, percent of Ameneans would pay less in taxes - an average
or b. I percent less to be exact.- Individuals file tax returns every year and are hhely to
notice a difference of this sixe. Though corporate tax inereases are even,
.tally passed on
lo indivitinals in the form of lower corporate earnings, lower dividends, increased priees,
or reduced services, these costs are mdirec, and tlifficul, for voters to trace to the actions
of legislators.
Moreover, legislative leaders did more than spreati the general benefit around.
Once again, they manipulated the procedures they could, utilizing the newly installed
Senate television cameras lo shame senators pushing for amendments that were not
rcvcnuc-nctilral or that disproportionately favored wealthier individuals or corporations.
When Senator Alfonsc D’Amato (R-NY) and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Cf) sought
lo restore some of the deduction for contributions to IRAs, Senator Rill Bradley (D-N.I)
came to the lloor with charts lo explain how the amendment would only benefit wealthy
taxpayers. Bradley’s tax aide, Gina Despres pointed out the utilily of the cameras.
Buchanan, “Tax Reform as I’olitical Choice,” 33.
2 1
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Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 214-215.
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making $200,000 would make out like a bandit. This was show hiz."'*
Procedures and modifications of the bill aside, the point for our punroses is that
the general benefit was large enough that legislators had a positive incentive to support
tax reform. This could not have been the case in base closure as the general benefit was
not large enough for legislators to credibly claim their actions had any positive impact on
citizens’ lives. And most importantly, the difference in the size of the general benefit
offered by tax reform and base closure was a direct result of the difference in the scope of
the respective policy areas. Therefore, in addition to the fact that legislators were wary of
delegating power for fear of agency losses m such a broad policy area, legislators also
found a positive incentive to be a part of enacting TRA86 - a chance to claim credit.
Ihe Moment in Political Time
,
A third factor of importance in the question of
procedural choice is the notion of political time. There are a variety of reasons why this
parttcular point on the political calendar was right for tax reform. First, any law that
imposes particulanstic costs while delivering general benefits requires at least some
semblance of a public willing to endure the costs. Bimbaum and Murray point out, “the
American people were disgusted with the [tax] system, and that disgust represented a
latent political force waiting to be tapped.”'’'^ The political weight of such claims can be
overdrawn of course. There is always a certain amount of latent anger on a variety of
issues. But congressional action on policy proposals of this sort does not require angry
Gina Despres quoted in Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 182.
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 285.
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cmzens calling their leg,slaters and imploring then, ,o tlx a problem. All ,, reepnres is
that legislators Mievc there is a significant chance cit.zens be ung^ on Election Day
If Congress does nothing. So desp.te optnion polls showing that the public was skeptical
of tax reform,““ Bimbaum and Murray point out.
smart politicians knew that beneath the apparent public indifference01 ed a potential gusher of discontent that could prove to be a fearsome
orce. Few members of Congress cherished the thought of ending up on
nLrsrxhef
president's battle against the special
terests. T y may not have wanted refonii, but they were not about to beseen standing in its way either.^^
A second reason the particular moment in political time was ripe for tax reform is
that, as we saw above, the period from 1975 to 1981 had seen the most rapid expansion of
tax expenditures in the nation’s history. Ironically, that very expansion helped to make
tax reform a possibility. The previous section argued that one reason legislators
supported tax reform was that the general benefit to be delivered was sufficiently large
that legislators were willing to endure some particularistic pain. Without the expansion
of tax expenditures in the 1970s, this incentive would have been lessened.^^^
Third, the mid-1980s witnessed the rise of an elite consensus on tax reform.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam argue that the enactment of TRA86 should be attributed, at
220 '
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Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxwg Choices, 39.
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Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 285.
This line of argument is similar in a way to the description of legislative behavior in Morris P. Fiorina.
Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Second Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1989). Fiorina argues that legislators profit politically by claiming credit for the creation of big
government and then profit politically by becoming the monopoly provider of “bureaucratic unsticking”
services to constituents. One could similarly argue that members of Congress profited politically by
creating the myriad of tax preferences that they then sought to claim credit for eliminating in 1986. I would
not ascribe any conspiratorial or even remotely organized intent to this pattern of policymaking. The only
point of relevance here is that the timing is important. Tax reform could only have happened after a period
of expanding tax preferences like the one in the late 1970s.
leas, in pan, to the role played by “policy ,deas and professionals, poHbcal emrcprencrs,
and the news media.- They point ou, .ha, “by .he n.id-,980s,
,nos. experts - including
.hose within government - were agreement on baste principles’’^^ of tax rcfonn. This
eonsensus even extended to members of Congress, some of whom tlte authors claim.
“devoutly believed that tax refonrr should be enacted because it was ’right’ and
courageously chose to subordtnate the.r own electoral interests to this purstut.’’^^ That
such a consensus among elites existed is incontestable, and there is also httle doubt that
many members of Congress shared that vtew. But precisely because many members of
Congress were true believers in tax refonn, very few were required to subordinate their
electoral interests to what they believed to be “right.’’ After all, that very consensus
allowed legislative leaders to employ the procedural tactics with winch this study is
concerned.
Fourth, there is some evidence to indicate that the political dynamics unique to
divided government were critical to the enactment of TRA86. We have seen that both
Democrats and Republicans were wary of being caught holding the knife that killed tax
reform. But Rostenkowski was also clear in asserting to Ways and Means Democrats that
divided government offered an opportunity that unified government could not. One
person who participated in meetings on tax refonn with Rostenkowski recalled,
most of us had made speeches in favor of tax reform at every civic club.
Rostenkowski seized on this and said: “Now you people have been talking
about reforming the tax code and making it fairer for the lower income
^23
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 240.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 242.
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In Rostenkowski's view then, the m.d-1980s served as a somewhat unique window of
opportuntty for tax refomr because ne.ther polit.cal party could be held accountable by
the myriad of groups likely to lose favored tax preferences.^”
It is also
.mportant to point out that, like in the case of base closure, legislat.ve
leaders in TRA86 were very sensitive to the political calendar. We have seen that
revenue neutrality, distnbuttonal neutrality across income classes, and geographic
neutrality were key components of tax reform. But legislative leaders were equally
careful to ensure that citizens were given tax relief at least at the same time if not before
their prized tax preferences would expire. One component common to the House bill, the
Senate bill, and the Treasury bill, was a so-called “stagger." To get to revenue neutrality,
each bill had delayed the effective date of the rate reduction by half a year to July 1, 1987.
But this would mean rates would go down 6 months after the elimination of scores of tax
preferences. The effective policy result would be that in April, 1988, in the middle of the
presidential and congressional primary season, millions of middle-income taxpayers
Quoted in Strahan. New fVays and Means, 147.
2">7
“ This line of argument flies in the face of many of the arguments advanced by observers such as James
Sundquist, Needed; A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States” in
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 4, Winter 1988-89, 613-635. Sundquist complains that political
science needs to rescue America’s governing institutions from the “electoral accident” of divided
government. The mam deficiency of divided government, he claims, is immobility - the inability of our
governing institutions to act decisively to resolve obvious policy problems. The view advanced by
Rostenkowski here implies that divided government may, in fact, be more capable of acting decisively.
113
would come to the unpleasant realization that tax reform had increased their tax bill by
about $700. Eliminating the stagger would cost about $29 bilhon over 5 years. While
Senate conferees, potential presidential candidates Dole and Bradley aside, were willing
to live with the problem. House conferees, all of whom were facing reelection bids could
not. The stagger remained but the top tax rate was increased from 27 percent to 28
percent. This maneuver moderated the effects of the stagger, particularly on middle and
lower-mcome taxpayers.^'* As in base closure, the political calendar had proscribed the
policy possibilities available to legislative leaders.
Finally, and most importantly, TRA86 benefited from its moment in political time
because of the state of the institutions required to enact tax reform. Gary Mucciaroni
points out that because of the massive projected budget deficits in the wake of the
enactment of the 1981 budget. Congress and the White House had both recognized the
need for centralization in decisionmaking on tax policy. This meant that, by 1985, “the
atmosphere surrounding Ways and Means had become more conducive to a return to the
kind of stronger, more directive leadership that characterized the pre-refomi era.”^^^
Specifically, there are at least 3 ways that the Committee had reformed its environment to
become better equipped to handle tax reform by 1985. First, Arnold points out that, in
seeking to find electorally-acceptable ways to raise taxes to combat deficits in the early
1980s, Ways and Means had developed an array of procedural tactics that were familiar
and comfortable by 1985.^^° This included drafting bills behind closed doors and the
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avo,dance of roll-call voles. Second, despite efforts to open up Ways and Means bills on
the House floor to amendments between 1973 and 1975, the Committee had become
more and more successful since then in securing some ktnd of modified closed rule for
cons.derat.on on the floor. By 1985, the use of such a rule was no longer
groundbreaking.^' Finally, the early 1980s also saw a return to the practice of appointing
members to the Ways and Means Committee who were considered to be electorally
secure. Randall Strahan points out that,
percent of the vote in the previous election. As a result, only four of the
m 1985 had won reelect,on ,n 1984 by less than a 60 percent margin I.,
addmon, the rout.ne appointment of freshmen members (a prac.ce T.m.ted
to the Democratic side during the reform era) had also stopped.^“
Thus, with elosed committee hearings, the use of voice votes in committee, the
establishment of modified closed rules, and the recruitment of more clectorally-secure
members for Ways and Means, the Committee found itself, by 1985, more capable of
handling tax reform than a decade earlier.
All of these factors relating to the political calendar served to influence the
question of procedural choice. Legislators chose to handle tax reform on their own
because there was a public ready to be tapped, because tax expenditures had expanded to
the point that comprehensive reform would yield significant tax cuts, because there was
agreement among key elites, because divided government provided the opportunity,
because legislators were able to alter the timing of policy effects, and because
Strahan, New IVays and Means, 145-146,
Strahan, New Ways and Means, 146.
congress, onal ins.iuu,„„s had developed enhanced capacuy shephcd ,ax relo,.,,
enactment. In short, the moment in political time was right.
One final lac,or nnpaefing proced.nal cl,nice
,n ,hc case of tax refonn was ,he exislenec of a se, of powerf.,1 leaders willing ,o
chanrpion the issne. In ,hc discussion of base closure, was pointed om ,ha, one reason
lcg,slalors delegaled authority to draw up a list of bases to be closed was tha, nobody
within the Congress wanted to he associated with specific closures. Proposing a specific
l,sl ol bases to be closed, „ was asserted there, would he seen as an attack no, jus, on
parltculansn,, but as an attack on the particularistic benefits enjoyed by specific fellow
ntenbers of Congress. If Congress were to handle base closure internally, even under the
best procedural conditions, sontebody, whether it be a conunittcc chairman, a party
leader, or the lowest rank-and-file n,ember, would need to be associated with that attaek.
Cotntng back to otir dtscussion of tax refonn, it is important to point ot,t that any
cxplanatton of the enactment of TRA86 would be incomplete if it did not reserve space
for the role played by powerful coal, lion leaders who were willing to champion the cause.
All of the procedural tactics employed, all of the legislative ann-twisting that went on,
and all of the media attention that kept rank-and-file legislators focused on the general
benefits of tax reform, were the result of the efforts of powerful individuals including
President Reagan, Speaker O’Neill, and, of course, the chainnen of the Ways ami Means
and Finance Committees, Rostenkowski and Packwood. Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam
argue that TRA8b succeeded because a few dogged anti well-placed individuals made
heroic, if not always purely motivated attempts to save it and because their efforts wore
grudgmgly approved by the optionless majority Senator Bradley had been ottt in
front pushtng the tssue of tax refonn from the early 1980s until its enactment. But
despite hts best efforts, tax refonn eottid never have sueeeeded without these
-well-
placed” individuals guiding it past legislative roadblocks. In arguing that the issue and
institutional contexts were critical in enacting tax refonn, Gary Mtteciaroni also reserves
credit for the importance of leadership commitment. He argues,
those leaders pushed and persuaded reluctant majorities in Congress toaddress the issue and to approve refonn measures. They possessed^greater
tneenttves and capacities than nonleaders to champio7diffuse interests
r specific interests, and their support was an indispensable ingredientfor the success of reform efforts.^^-^
^
Such leadership is especially crucial in overcoming the dynamic that led legislators to
delegate in the case of base closure. Who will champion the general interest over the
particular tax preference defended by a particular fellow legislator? In answering this
question, several authors point to the critical role played by Chairman Rostenkowski.
Rostenkowski’s fervor for tax reform was exceeded by many including Bradley.
But Rostenkowski offered two things that Bradley could not. First, Rostenkowski’s key
institutional position as Chaimian of Ways and Means meant that only he could get the
ball rolling on TRA86. His institutional advantages allowed him to employ the full array
of procedural tactics in support of tax refonn including closing committee hearings,
handing out transition rules to key legislators inside and outside the committee and
monopolizing control of staff expertise. The frequent use of this latter tactic led one
member of the Ways and Means Committee to remark, “if I had really wanted to
^33
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 221-222.
Mucciaroni, Reversals ofFortune, 49.
influence the way the actual law was written, I would have applied for a job on the Joint
Tax or Ways and Means staff.
A second characteristic that Rostenkowsk.’s leadership offered that Bradley’s
could not was his particular style. Bimbaum and Murray descrtbe it best.
as “the single most important factor contributing to congressional passage of the Tax
There is a sense then in which the inexplicable force of personality played a
significant role m enacting TRA86. It is beyond the scope of this study to speculate on
why Rostenkowski, or Packwood, Reagan, O’Neill, or Bradley for that matter, wanted to
take on tax reform. Others have done so in their accounts of the saga. The relevant point
for our purposes is that TRA86 did attract powerful champions inside the normal
legislative process and that impacted the question of procedural choice.
cApiaiianons or legislative success, such as
or political quid pro quos. The methods
himself.^^^
seniority or leadership position
were wrapped up in the man
Characteristics such as these led Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam to refer to Rostenkowski
Reform Act of 1986.”^^^
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 244.
Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 132.
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Conclusion
We have seen four reasons why legislators chose to handle tax refonn intentally
rather than relying on some sort of extra-congressional procedure. F.rst, handhng the bill
internally allowed legislators to protect more poHtically sensitive geographically-
concentrated tax benefits. Second, handling the b.ll internally allowed legislators to not
only avotd the prohibitive agency losses that attend delegating power in such a broad
policy area, but also allowed legislators to claim credit for the larger general benefit that
attends such broad policy areas. Third, legislators found themselves at a moment m
political time when the institutional capacity of Congress was well-suited to handling tax
reform internally. Finally, powerful champions of tax reform emerged from within the
nomial legislative process that had both the inst.tutional position and the legislative skills
necessary to shepherd TRA86 past legislative hurdles.
One final point about tax reform, touched upon earlier, merits discussion before
moving on to other cases. In assessing the lessons to be learned from the story of tax
reform, Randall Strahan argues,
the politics and the outcome in the tax refomi case directly contradict the
basic assumptions about committee behavior derived from the electoral
connection model. Both the prominence of appeals to members’ concerns
with good public policy in Chaimian Dan Rostenkowski’s coalition-
building strategy, and an outcome in which broad, diffuse, and poorly
organized interests were advanced over those of well-organized clientele
groups show that congressional politics, in at least some cases, are more
complex than Mayhew’s model assumes. To put it simply, a theoretical
framework that incorporates goals other than reelection is needed to
explain the politics and outcome in this case.^^*^
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Sin, Marly, wo saw earlier ,ha. becanse of, he high degree of elite consensns „„ the need
for .ax refon,,. Conlan, Wrtgh.son, and Bean, argne tha, son.e n,e„,be,s of Congress
‘couragconsly chose lo snbordinale
.heir own electoral miaesls to tins pnrsinl.”^’''
Tha, ntentbers of Congress have goals other than rcelection is no donbt Irnc. B,„
winic
.ncmbers of Congress may no, be single-nnnded, t, is cqnaMy
„o„-con,rovers,al ,o
assert ,„a, even the most policy-oriented tncnbers of Congress “care intensely abont
reelection Fortnna.eiy lor then,, however, il'tlns acconn, of tax relorn, teaches ns
attytlnng, it ,s that the choice Conlan, Wrightson, and Bean, sngges, ,s a lalse one.
Policy-onented legislators arc jnst as adept and jnst as l.kely to ntilixe procednral tactics
that reshape the caicdns of legislative ilccisioinnakmg creating an cnviro.nnen, where
their policy interests do not contradict electoral interests. In his assessment of the polities
of tax reform, Douglas Arnold makes the point more eloquently.
fhese proeedural strategies allowed legislators to reform the tax system
but they did not A;/re legislators to do so. At each stage legislators had to
agree to tic their own hands, and most of their decisions to limit the range
of choice were unaffected by electoral calculations. When legislators
decided to meet in secrecy, to delegate difncult decisions to the chairmen,
to prohibit amendments, or to require that amendments be revenue ncutraf
they were declaring that they were personally in favor of tax reform. If
legislators had been personally opposed to tax reform, all they had to do
was insist that the sun must shine on any tax bill, knowing that sunshine
would have destroyed tax reform. It is hardly surprising that many
legislators were disgusted with the current tax system, but it is a healthy
reminder about the limits of electoral explanations to recall that
legislators own personal policy preferences were necessary conditions for
tax reform.^*’
'
2V)
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing’ Choices, 245.
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I hese are Douglas Arnold’s words substituling for Mayhew’s claim that members of (’ongress are
single-minded seekers ol rcelection.” For a more extensive discussion of the meaning of this distinction
sec Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 5-6.
241
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 222-223.
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Thus, it is not contradictory to suggest that legislators have policy preferences that
transcend electoral pol.t.cs while also suggesting legislators constantly pay attention to
the electoral implications of their actions. Because legislators are able to shape the
context within which they make decisions, they are able to have it both ways.
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CHAPTER 5
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
sue selection for a high-level nuclear waste facility presents a policy problem that
ts very stmilar to base closure. In closing military installations, legislators arc faced with
the prospect of imposing significant geographical iy-concentrated costs on specific
districts in favor of a general, diffuse hcncm. In that case, we saw that because of the
political sensitivity of these geographically-concentrated costs, legislators chose to
delegate authority to close bases while restricting the scope of that delegation and
maintaining the power to stop the base closure process. With this political logic in mind
then, we would expect legislators to want to delegate restricted authority to choose a site
for a national nuclear waste dump rather than serve as the author or supporter of
legislation that dumped highly toxic radioactive waste in a partietdar fellow legislator’s
district.
As wc will see, however, Congress did not delegate the authority to make this
choice. In adopting the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (Public Law 97-425) and the
1987 amendments to that law as part of the fiscal 1988 reconciliation bill (Public Law
l()()-203). Congress narrowed its sights and eventually singled out Yueca Mountain,
Nevada as the sole site for a pemianent repository designed to house high-level nuelear
waste for thousands of years. Before examining the question of why Congress ehose to
handle this policy problem internally and how it did so, it is important to first understand
the scope and history of the policy problem. After a very brief history of nuclear waste
policy, wc will examine the particular procedures employed to narrow the choices to
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Yucca Moumain and cxan.inc the (actors examined m the eases of base closure and tax
refont, in order to draw conclusions about procedural choice in the ease of site choice.
ABrief History of Nuclear Waste Poliry
A.Primer on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Before launching into an analysis of nuclear
waste policy, it is appropriate to first have a minimal understanding of the particular kind
of nuclear waste with which we arc concerned in this chapter and how that nuclear waste
IS generated. This study is only concerned with spent fuel and, for reasons that will
become clear later on, mostly with spent fuel that is generated from civilian commercial
reactors.
Today, roughly 23 percent of the nation’s electricity is generated hy commercial
nuclear reactors.^'^^ In a nuclear reactor, uranium atoms contained in fuel rods fission.
producing heat. This heat produces steam that generates electricity. Over time, fuel rods
become less efficient as the chain reaction within them is slowed despite the fact that they
remain highly radioactive. After three or four years, spent fuel rods, which arc contained
in large fuel assemblies, are removed and stored in cooling pools of water or air-cooled
dry casks. The problem with this is that these methods of storage were only meant to be
temporary. Many of the sites at which the spent fuel is stored arc near lakes, rivers, and
urban populations and the spent fuel is dispersed throughout the country, with most states
having at least some.
Remarkably few alternatives for the disposal of this waste have emerged. The
main focus of federal nuclear waste disposal has been the concept of permanent, geologic
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disposal. A 1957 Nat.onal Academy of Sciences report to the Atomic Energy
Commission recommended the burial of high-level waste in deep, stable rock fonnat.ons
and, in particular, suggested further research into fonnat.ons known as salt beds and salt
domes. Smce then, research has been conducted on such salt formations along with
volcanic rock formations (basalt and tuff) and crystalhne rock fomtations (granite). The
central idea behind permanent geologic disposal ,s to find a rock formation that ,s stable,
that wtll retard the flow of groundwater through a disposal site, and that will be able to
absorb as much of the radioactive material released as possible ,f groundwater does
penetrate the repository.^« 1„ addition to these natural bamers, a pemtanem geologic
repositoo/ would also have artificially engineered barriers but it is important to note that
spent fuel needs to be isolated for tens of thousands of years. As a result, the concerns
with permanent, geologic disposal include long-term issues such as climactic and seismic
change at the site and the possibility of accidental or purposeful human intrusion into the
repository.
One alternative to permanent, geologic disposal is the reprocessing of spent fuel.
When uranium undergoes fission in a reactor, plutonium is created which can then be
used to generate more energy. There are two problems with reprocessing this spent fuel,
however. First, reprocessing does not make financial sense for utilities because of the
worldwide abundance of uranium. Second, and perhaps more importantly, plutonium can
potentially be separated from the fuel and used in the construction of nuclear weapons
Neil Gross, “Between a Rock anii a Hot Place” in Business Week, No. 3574 (April 20, 1998), 134.
The League of Women Voters Education Fund, The Nuclear Waste Primer, 1993 Revised Edition
(Washington, D.C.: The League of Women Voters Education Fund, 1993), 42-43.
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raising national security concerns.
States.
As a result, reprocessing is not used in the United
Wtth dtsposal as the only cho.ce, a nun,her of alien, at, ves to pennanent, geologic
disposal have been considered and all but abandoned by the federal govenunent. The
most actively researched of these is subseabed disposal - disposal sediments below
3,000 to 5,000 meters of ocean water. Significant uncertainties reman, about subseabed
disposal including water flow through the sediments and the effect that the hea, generated
by waste packages would have on the sunounding sediment. A proposal to buiy the
waste in the Antarctic ice sheet never got off the ground because of uncertainty about the
stability of the ice cap over thousands of years. Proposals to launch the waste into space
have been abandoned because of the cost of such a proposal and because of the possibility
of a launch accident. Finally, some have suggested that spent fuel should either reman,
where it is in the short term or should be transferred to a temporary away-from-reactor or
monitored-retrievable-storage facility until a more technologically-sound alternative
emerges.'^ These latter alternatives remain the only viable alternative to pemtanent,
geologic disposal and will be discussed in greater detail later on.
Nuclear Waste Policy Prior to NWPA The short version of the history of nuclear
waste policy is that the history of nuclear waste policy prior to the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (NWPA) IS short. As Gerald Jacob points out, 1954 was a milestone year in the
beginning of nuclear waste policy. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act discarded provisions in
the 1946 Atomic Energy Act that kept reactor design data classified and encouraged the
League ofWomen Voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer, 39.
League of Women Voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer, 44-46.
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commercal development of nuclear power. The new law provided subsidies such as
nnancing and the necessary fuel to finns willing to set up nuclear reactors that would
generate electricity. The most important of these subsidtes from the perspective of tins
study, however, was that the act required the Atomic Energy Commission ,AEC) to take
responstbihty for the reprocessing or disposal of the spent fuel from commercial
reactors.
As was the case w.th tax policy and mih.aty installations policy, nuclear energy
pohcy ,n the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by a sub-govemment type of polities.
Jacob argues,
e 1 954 act maintained federal preemption of the authority to regulate the
nuclear mdustiy, freeing utilities from pesky state regulations that couldinterfere with their operations. The AECs relationship with Congress wasgenerally benign. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE)
monopolized congressional oversight and, with few exceptions, supported
and promoted the AEC’s mission. The AEC was both regulator andpromoter of atomic energy and for years no other federal, let alone state
entity threatened its authority. Growth of the industry and advancement of
nuclear power was accomplished by administrative fiat. The goals and
policies of the promotional campaign were never spelled out in legislation.
Similarly, the nuclear waste program would evolve for thirty years without
explicit legislative direction until the passage of the 1982 Nuclear Waste
Pohcy Act.
But another similarity between nuclear pohcy, tax pohcy, and military installations pohcy
is that these cozy arrangements were broken up in a variety of ways during the 1 970s.
The passage of the National Environmental Pohcy Act (NEPA) in 1969 and the Clean Air
Act in 1970 provided new avenues to consumer groups and states to challenge federal
Gerald Jacob, Site Unseen: The Politics ofSiting a Nuclear Waste Repository (Pittsburgh, PA-
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 26.
Jacob, Site Unseen, 27.
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dominance of nuclear policy.- m ,973, ,he A.onnc Energy Comnussion was broken
m,o the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and
Development Administration
,ERDA). wh.ch would later become the Depart,nent of
Energy (DOE).-’ Finally.
,n ,977, Congress eliminated the Joint Atontic Energy
Committee splintering junsdiction over nuclear-waste legislation between 3 Senate and 7
House committees.
In total, these changes provided new tools for groups and states to challenge
federal authority on nuclear policy, new points of access to challenge the nuclear
mdusto^’s dominance of nuclear policy such as the w.dened number of congressional
committees and the new legal tools available to groups seeking to sue in federal court
and new opportunities for political entrepreneurs in Congress to become part of the
nuclear policy process. At the same time this was happening, and in part because the
ck box of nuclear policy had been opened up, the nuclear industry found itself on the
negative end of the evening news more often than ever before. Gerald Jacob argues.
reports of nuclear accidents became commonplace in the mass media;
bizarre accidents attracted public attention. In 1975 a fire at the Browns
erry, Alabama, reactor started by a technician checking for leaks with a
candle, knocked out fifteen percent of the electrical capacity on the TVA
grid. The story was published in Newsweek magazine, and stories of
nuclear slapstick” became common. It became difficult to sustain a
confidence m engineered solutions under such assaults. Nineteen seventy-
nine was a very bad year for the nuclear establishment with Three Mile
Island, the Kerr-McKee/Silkwood verdict, the release of the movie China
Jacob, Site Unseen, 32-33.
Jacob, Site Unseen, 27.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VI, 1981-1984 (Washington D C •
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985), 364.
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^>" llie had press, there was a real problem bmidmg up. Ry ,ps2, 82
niicluu power plants were m operation m the United States and by 1980, these plants had
^Hreacly aocun„.,a,«, 25,000 spen, lac, assen,N,cs
,„a, ,„cy wee slonn,
.5c,npo,a„ly
-
MO.COVC. a cslaaalc ,n ,<«, cone icapa.ay capacily a, ,caCo.-
sites would no longer be adecpiate by \
Meanwlalc, w.lh.na
.lirccOon lion, Cong, css, Ihc liRDA, and laic.- II,c DOI-, had
hegnn in alicnp, addrc.ss Ihc prohicn oh
.li.sposing ol spcnl lud. Uy 1977, allchon
was already Incased on a landed n.anhcr ol silcs lha, woald renan, ,„c conlcadcns
ror a high-level nacicar wasic lac, lily over Ihc nex, decade. I.alher Ca.ler ponds o„l lha,
'I'd, yea,-. Cola, Ilealh, Ihc .lireelor ol geologic
.lispo.sal lor liRDA p,-epa,ed a
mcnorandan, lhal p,-oposed landing ,|,e sihng search to h “sail stales” - slates lha, have
geolog.c lonnalions of eilher don.cd or hedded sail - a.al siles in Wa.shingKa, and
Neva, la. The Wasinnglon and Nevada sites olTcred special advanlagcs, a, p„,-, heeaase of
the spec, lie geologic lin-n.alions there - hasall in Washinglon a,„l a variety of ,-„ck
lo,-,nalio„s inelading lalT in Nevada. In a.Iddion, howeve,-, these siles wee n.ore
pohhcally palalabie. Carter points „„l lhal niany governors and n.anhcs of Congress
had advised I«RI)A to look llrst to such government-owned reservations.^'^-’
.lacob, Site (Insccii, 57.
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plutonium or the testing of nuclear weapons."*'’
All this raises the quest.on of why DOE did not simply march forward and unilaterally
choose a site for the nation’s high-level nuclear waste. There are several reasons. First,
no state wanted to take the nation’s commercial high-level nuclear waste and each state’s
congressional delegation was gearing up to keep such waste out. For this reason, if for no
other, Congress was sure to weigh in on the issue. And as already pointed out. each of
Ihese congressional delegations now had new tools at their disposal. New fonns of
decisionmaking in the Held of nuclear policy had emerged as a result of sunshine laws,
dispersal of authority to a greater number of committees in Congress, more staff, and the
Freedom of Information Act. State and local authorities had developed significant
expertise independent of federal decisionmakers making it easier for them to challenge
geologic and engineering claims made by DOE.“" Additionally, opponents of any
parttcular sttmg proposal were emboldened by what Jacob calls “the emergence of a view
I
of the priorities and functions of the state which emphasized environmental protection,
public health, and safety’’"'’ throughout the 1970s. Moreover, this movement had more
than public opinion at its disposal. It had the legal tools provided by NEPA and the Clean
Air Act. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, DOE could never have unilaterally made
a decision about siting a high-level nuclear waste facility because any facility would
Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 132.
Jacob, Site Unseen, 48-51.
Jacob, Site Unseen, 47.
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require billions of dollars to study and construct - money that Congress would need to
make available.
For all these reasons then. Congress needed and wanted to deal with the problem
of siting a high-level nuclear waste fac.lity in the early 1980s. The task would not be
easy, however. Choosing a site presents a collective act,on problem sinular to the ones
already d.scussed in this study. Understand,ng the procedures Congress chose to deal
with this problem requires, of course, that we f,rst understand why ,t would be diff,cult
for Congress to choose a site. It ,s to a description of that problem that we now turn.
The Problem Posed bv Site rimic^
Though we discussed above why Congress wanted and needed to choose or create
a process to choose a nuclear waste site, it is also rather easy to see why Congress would
want to avoid the problem altogether. If legislators are, as Arnold asserts, concerned with
negative policy effects of identifiable government actions that can then be traced back to
their votes, we would expect that they would be especially leery of taking any traceable
action that leads to the depositing of high-level nuclear waste in their state or district that
will remain radioactive for tens of thousands of years. Much like base closure then, the
siting of a high-level nuclear waste facility necessarily involves a redistribution of the
costs and benefits of nuclear energy that is particularly difficult for Congress, as an
institution, to handle. The choice of a particular district can be expected to generate
fierce opposition from the legislators in question as well as from legislators representing
surrounding districts. Meanwhile, we would expect that the interest of those who benefit
from such a decision - those who live near temporary storage sites for spent nuclear fuel -
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would be far less intense and enduring. This collective action problem is commonly
referred to as NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard).
A nuntber of observers of the process of selecting a s.ngle national storage s.te for
spent nuclear fuel have argued that this case does not confonn well to the NIMBY
syndronte. For instance. Gerald Jacob cites evidence that local offic.als in Washington.
Utah, Nevada, Colorado, and South Dakota expressed support for attentpts to site the
noxious fachty in their towns. The lure of such a fac.lity is not hard to unagtne. In rural
and depressed areas, the facility would provide good jobs with relatively high incomes."’
These direct financial incentives were thus attract.ve to locals tn companson w.th the
impacts from a nuclear facility.”
intangible, vaguely defined, potential environmental n a ..25n
While such arguments have merit in explaining the behavior of some actors in
intrastate politics, they do little to illuminate the dynamics surrounding the national
legislature’s attempts to choose a site for storage of spent nuclear fuel. Both Jacob and
Carter acknowledge that despite local support for a facility at a few potential sites, this
support was countered in each and every case by opposition from state governors and
legislatures. Because the nuclear waste facility, in Jacob’s words, "lacked the pork barrel
qualities or the status of a research center or reactor testing station like the Idaho National
Engineering Lab,” members of Congress were not fighting at the trough to land the
facility m their district. Indeed, as we shall see, even after Congress included annual
financial compensation for the host state of a permanent spent fuel storage facility, the
congressional delegations of every state under consideration, including states explicitly
Jacob, Site Unseen, 42. Also see Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 145-146.
7C0
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highlighted by both Carter and Jacob as having locals supportive of hosting a facility,
fought to keep the facility out. This observation
,s consistent with the econonuc model
designed by Howard Kunreuther and Douglas Easterhng. Kunreuther and Easterling
conclude that cotnpensat.ng local ctizens tn retuor for permission to s,te a hazardous
facility ts unlikely to have a pos.t.ve effect on those who are already resistant
-unless the
risk is perceived to be sufftc.ently low to oneself and to others, nrcludtng future
generations. They eontinue,
this conclusion does not mean that tradeoffs between risk and benefits are
suggests that before one attempts to initiate this process, some threshold ofsafety to nearby residents must be assured.^^®
In addition to the fact that compensation could not provide an easy out for
Congress, there is another characteristic of the case of siting a spent fuel storage facility
that made it a particularly difficult collective action problem for Congress, In the case of
base closure, the seeds of a coalition to close excess military bases always existed in the
fact that not every congressional district has a major military base. Upon first glance, it
might appear that similar seeds exist in choosing a site for storing the nation’s
commercial high-level nuclear waste. After all, as mentioned above, DOE had appeared
to focus its efforts on 6 salt states plus Washington and Nevada. But, not surprisingly,
the congressional delegations of those states had already worked hard to find ways to
expand the possibilities. Some suggested that away-from-reactor (APR) storage sites -
located in South Carolina, New York, and Illinois - should take the spent fuel assemblies
259
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Howard Kunreuther and Douglas Easterling, “Are Risk-Benefit Tradeoffs Possible in Siting Hazardous
Facilities?” in The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (May 1990), 255.
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from reactors around the country. More significantly, others seized on the technological
weaknesses of the argu,nen. for pen^anenC. geologic disposal ,o argue for a single storage
facility where spent fuel assemblies could be temporarily stored, monitored, attd later
retrieved, once better technology was in hand. The facility came to be known as
monitored, retrievable storage (MRS) and, significantly, the champion of this proposal
was Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA), an tnfluential legislator from a printe salt state.
As Jacob points out, the beauty ofMRS was that it “could be located virtually anywhere
tn the country since it did not depend upon local geology, such as Louisiana’s salt domes,
to tsolate radioactive waste from the btosphere.”“' Others wanted DOE to reexamine the
possibility of siting a permanent, geologic repository in granite - a move that would
tnclude most of the states in the northeast in the search for a national repository. In short.
in this atmosphere, though some were politically advantaged, virtually every state and
congressional district could conceivably become the nation’s home for spent nuclear fuel
assemblies. The seeds of a coalition to choose a single national nuclear waste dump were
thus not readily apparent.
Ihe Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1 982 and the Amendments of 1 QR7
The process by which a permanent national repository for spent nuclear fuel
would be chosen was outlined in the NWPA in 1982 and then amended by Congress in
1987. As originally designed in NWPA, the process appears to delegate power to DOE to
choose two national repository sites according to a strict timetable. Within 180 days of
the Act s enactment, DOE was required to develop guidelines that outline criteria for site
Jacob, Site Unseen, 76.
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scleoioa ShorUy
.hccancr, DOE was
.cc,uncd ,o .con, end a, Icas, 5 canCdalc si,cs
10 11,0 prcsidcm for site charaOoriza.ion. Ecfore January I, ,>,85, DOE was ,cc,u.rcd to
narrow ,„c lis, ofcatKltdatc s.tcs Tor character,
.at.on tVon, 5 to 3. .dnal.y, „„ the basis of
IX)E she charactcrizatton of the 3 eat,d,date sites. NWI-A rec,,tired the president to
reeot„n,end a single site by March 31. 1>,87. The law also rec,uired the president to
recommend a site for a second repository by March 31. I>,<„, and outlined a specific
timetable leading up lo this decision as well.
NWI>A also appeared, on its surface, to provide numerous protections to state and
local officials hostile to the siting of a nuclear waste repository within their borders.
Before any she could he nominated by DOE to the president, the law required DOE lo
hold hearings in the vicinity of the site both lo inform local residents and to receive
comments. Environmental assessments prepared during DOE’S search were required lo
be made ptiblie. Moreover, the law provided funds lo slates and localities seeking to
assist them in reviewing the scientific work of DOE, developing requests for impact
assistance, monitoring site characterization activities, and providing information to
residents aboul site characterization. Most impohanlly, however, once a single she had
been selected, the host stale or, if applicable, Indian tribe would have the power lo veto
the federal decision. In addition to these protections, other provisions in NWPA required
DOE lo report on the feasibility of an MRS facility by June I, l>,85 and required NRC to
issue a license for such a facility if Congress authorized its construction.
For all these reasons then, the siting of the nation’s high-level nuclear waste
repository appears to have been handled by delegating power to technical experts.
Specifically, the process appears to rule out meddling by members of Congress. Writing
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in 1987 of NWPA, then-Govemor and now-Senator Richard Bryan (D-NV) argued that
lawmakers consciously attempted to craft a process that would destgnate a site
seientifically and “keep political factors front taking over the site select.on process.”“^
Such an impression of the process would be completely inaccurate, however. A.
no point, could the process be descnbed as extra-congress.onal. There are countless ways
in which we can see that congressional f.ngerpnnts were all over the ftnal chotce from
start to finish. First, while NWPA authorized DOE to develop gu.delines within 6
months for the s,te seleetion process, other provisions in the law severely c.rcumscribed
the options open to DOE in developing those guidelines. For instance, NWPA stated that
sites should not qualify if they are “(1) in a highly populated area; or (2) adjacent to an
area 1 mile by 1 mile having a population of not less than 1,000 individuals.”^’ Such
language effectively ruled out large parts of the eastern seaboard. Moreover, NWPA
stated at various points that DOE was required to “consider the various geologic media in
which sites for repositones may be located and, to the extent practicable, to recommend
sites in different geologic media.”’“ This language was repeated in a section in the law
authorizing DOE to carry out site characterization activities “beginning with the
candidate sites that have been approved under section 112 and are healed in various
geologic media
. The choices are narrowed even further later on when DOE,
Governor Richard H. Bryan (D-NV), “The Politics and Promises of Nuclear
from Nevada” in Environment, Vol. 29 (October 1987), 15.
Waste Disposal: The View
42 use 10132.
-"^2 use 10132.
42 use 10133, my emphasis.
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The importance of the specification that the s.tes chosen for characterization should be in
deferent geologic media is not read.ly apparent. But when we consider the ex.st.ng
inventor, of potential sites DOE had been mvestigat.ng and the additional specification
.hat the first repositoo^ site should be in a relatively unpopulated area, DOE is lefi with
numerous sites in salt formations, the basalt ntediun, of the Washington site, and the
various rock fonnations at the Nevada site. If these are the only options - and we are
about to see further evidence of why they were - i, is not hard to see how both the Yucca
Mountain, Nevada and Hanford, Washington sites were 2 of the final 3 sites selected for
characterization. Some 2 years after Yucca Mountain and Hanford were included in the
final 3 by DOE, Governor Bryan of Nevada argued,
when evaluated in relation to the other eight preselected sites that DOE
considered m its limited screening effort. Yucca Mountain would have
rated very low on the list had the department not used a self-imposed
requirement that the three top sites selected for characterization be in three
d^^ffererit rock t^es. Since Yucca Mountain was the only tuff site and
Hanford the only basalt site, and since all of the remaining sites were
located in salt formations, both Hanford and Yucca Mountain were
guaranteed to be selected among the top three.^^’^
In the light of the provisions of NWPA highlighted above, however, there is very little
that is “self-imposed” about the push to locate 3 sites in various geologic media. The
DOE was merely acting on Congress’ explicit language.
‘‘’'’42 use 10193.
Bryan, “The Politics and Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal,” 34, my emphasis.
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This bnngs us ,o a second way in which Congress limited the search for a
penrranent geCog.c d.sposa, site. Though NWPA authonzed DOE to issue guidchnes to
de.en.ine the best s.te, t. gave DOE 180 days to issue those guidelines. the tncan.nne,
NWPA also re, u,red DOE to no.tfy states ••wt.h one or more potentially acceptable sites
repository w.thm 90 days after the date of enactment.”““ Thus, DOE was rcqtiired
by law to Identify
..potentially acceptable sites" 90 days before issuing gtudehnes for its
search. In effect then, NWPA had given legal sanction to DOE siting effons already
underway. And those siting efforts were taking place ,n salt states such as Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas, and Utah, and at the basalt site in Washington and the tuff site in
Nevada. DOE complied with the provision in Februa^, 1983, identifying 9 sites and
notifying the 6 states (Mississippi, Texas, and Utah each had 2 sites) in which they were
located. Not surprisingly, Governor Bryan viewed the decision with skepticism.
Rather than engaging in a truly national site-screening program aimed at
arbitranlvmf^"'
''^P^itory, DOE proceeded
Taslge oVnwT;.-
" ^
When DOE finally issued its siting guidelines about 18 months behind schedule in
December, 1984, it viewed the guidelines as criteria by which to narrow the list from 9
sites to 3. DOE did not believe, however, that Congress wanted the Department to
reconsider its initial decision on “potentially acceptable sites.” A GAO report to
Congress indicated,
despite criticism from some of the affected states, DOE does not plan to
reconsider its initial identification of the nine sites using the final siting
42 use 10136.
Bryan, “The Politics and Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal,” 16.
137
guidelines. According to DOE’s May 1983 resnonse m rproposed siting guidelines the ^ j- , comments on the
selections to be recotTder d ' r
™‘
(see. 116(a)) requTed DOE m d er
S“'J^''nes because the act
acceptable sites” within 90 days of'thTa r
'^oalaming
"potentially
for issutng the siting gulres *::: X:“®^D^^^ T
Identification required by the act wonld^ h»
y. DOE believes the site
Congress had intended that DOE use the finarsitinu"
"7?*"'’'® “’®
sites for the first repository DOF nfr! , 7 ® S‘'>dehnes to select
all possible sites wo dTu req^
‘'t
^
-consideration of
”Sfr f - '2
'2~ :r;.=r.
To this explanation, Bryan responded by arguing.
ii
'' that Congress would have enacted NWPA letalone included language explicitly critical of prior DOE effZ had
Icfivtes.-^
the department to merely continue ongoing I^'seleln
Most obseiwers disagree with Bryan’s interpretation, however. Indeed,
,t was because
DOE could not move forward with its siting efforts on its own that Congress gave those
efforts legal sanction. Gerald Jacob points out that throughout the congressional debate
over NWPA. “the states that would host deep geologic repositories were already known.
There were few doubts about the outcome of the post-NWPA site selection process.”'’^
He also points out, "NWPA was not a break with the past; it set no new administrative
gears in motion but merely confirmed existing powers, priorities, and practices.”^^^
^70
General Accounting Office, “Department of Energy’s Initial Efforts
Policy Act of 1982,” GAO/RCED 85-27 (January 10, 1985), 20.
to Implement the Nuclear Waste
Bryan, “The Politics aniJ Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal,” 16.
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Thus, while Bo^an viewed NWPA as an a„e,np, by Congress ,o slop DOE f,o,n
dev,a.ing fron, a seien.ifie si,e-selee.,on process, a n,ore accurate in.erpre.a.ion would be
that Congress was attempting to help DOE
already had underway. Realizing that DOE
move along the site selection process it
would need funds for site characterization
act, V,ties and construct,on of a repository and legal sanctton for putting the nation's
commercial nuclear waste in one place, Congress enacted NWPA includntg provisions
meant to dtrect DOE to a politically feasible choice in s,le selectton.
This intenrretation of NWPA leads us to a third way in which Congress limited
the search DOE would conduct. It was pointed out earher that states were given the right
.0 disapprove a decision by DOE to site the repository within the,r borders. I. is hard to
.magtne any state not exercising such a veto and this could conceivably open up the
search anew. There are two important provisions of NWPA that we have not yet
dtscussed, however, that were designed to prevent this from happening. First, NWPA
gave Congress the power to override a state’s veto simply by passing a resolution ,n both
houses. While this action is conceivably a high hurdle, legislators would be voting on
such a resolution with the knowledge that reopening the process would put their own state
m harm’s way. The logic of such a vote would thus be that the only members of
Congress likely to vote to sustain the state’s veto would be those from the host state.
Moreover, the act required that congressional consideration of the state’s notice of
disapproval be guided by NRC data - the same source that would have produced DOE’s
recommendation.^" In effect then, the state power to veto DOE’s siting decision was of
little use. Second, NWPA created a nuclear waste fund into which consumers of nuclear
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power would pay user fees. Tlus fund would
.hen he
.,sed for sue eharae.eri.a.ion and
reposhoo, cons,rue,ion ae.ivi.ies, freeing Congress fron, ,he need ,o appropna.e
.noney
for ,hese pu^roses. The in,por,anee of ,his provision is far beyond ,he real,,, of
aceounhng, however. The appropr, aliens proeess eould have provided a loophole useful
.0 legislalors from a hos, s,a,e seeking ,o bloek cons.rue.ion of a reposhory. I, would no,
be hard ,o imagine a sena.or fron, a hos, s,a,e hlibuslering an appropria.ions bill or a
well-plaeed member of ,he House blocking an appropria.ions hill ,ha, includes funds for
.he cons,rue,ion of a reposhory. The nuclear was.e fund helps Congress ,o avoid d.ese
obstacles.
It is clear .hen, ,ha, in enacing NWPA, Congress in.ended ,o provide DOE will,
legal sanelion lo go ahead wiih siling aclivities already undem-ay. And since Ihe primary
polenlial largels of ,ha, effort were already known and Ihe vas, majorily of legislalors’
disiriels were no, in Ihe cross-hairs, and because Ihe MRS provisions held on, hope even
for .hose stales in Ihe eross-hairs, NWPA was enacted by a bipartisan majorily in boll,
houses.'” But while congressional control of the site seleetion proeess was subtle and
quiet in NWPA, it was forceful and loud in the amendments to NWPA passed in 1987.
The 1987 amendments can be viewed as an attempt by the Congress to clean up
the work done in NWPA. As argued above, Congress knew full well in passing NWPA
what path DOE would take in implementing the law. By 1986, DOE had recommended a
site in Deaf Smith, Texas, the Hanford, Washington site, and the Yucca Mountain,
Nevada site for site characterization narrowing the list from 9 to 3. In addition, DOE had
274
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The measure passed by a voice vote in the Senate and by a 256-32 margin in the House.
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a.so begun ,o focus on i.s Oak R.dge, Tennessee facib.y as a po.enna, bo,ne foe an MRS
facuy. I, was a. this point that Congress would take any sentbiance of discretion in the
matter away front DOE and unilaterally choose Yucca Mounta.n as .he sole site for the
nation’s geologic repository.
The 1987 amendments to NWPA required DOE
characterization activities at all sites other than Yucca
stipulated that if DOE found Yucca Mountain to be
to suspend all research and site
Mountain. Provisions in the law
an unsuitable site for the nation’
pennanent, geologic repository, the Department should come back to Congress for further
instruction. Looking back on the 1987 law, Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) admitted, ‘Ve did
arbitrarily reach out and pick Yucca Mountain, no question about that.”"- Numerous
unsuccessful appeals to the courts and the Congress by Nevada over the past decade have
delayed DOE’s work at Yucca Mountain, but they have not yet come close to stopping it.
NWPA required that the federal government take possession of the spent nuclear fuel
being stored around the country in 1998 - the time when Congress assumed a national
repository would be ready. But by 1998. DOE had not yet completed its site
characterization and licensing activities at Yucca Mountain. As a result, many in
Congress sought to "temporanly” move the nation’s commercial waste to Yucca
Mountain and store it there until the repository was approved and ready. During that
debate. Representative John Ensign (R-NV) summed up what he viewed as the logic
behind NWPA, the 1987 amendments, and eveiything that had happened since.
Congress has decided this issue, not the scientists. What Congress is
doing in [the 1998] bill is sa>dng, with Yucca Mountain and the temporary
Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) quoted in Holly Idelson, “Nevada Prepares for Battle on Nuclear Waste -
Again in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 49 (September 7, 1991), 2558.
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Storage site a, ,he Nevada ,es, she. "M do no. ea,e wha. any of, he sciemis.ssay. It IS going to be the site, and it is goim. to he snii ,hi„
going to lower the standards until it is suitable^’”’
’
The 1 987 amendments also took other steps to ensure that all of the nation’s spent nuelear
fuel would go to Yucea Mountain. First, it ntillincd the DOE’s proposal to site an MRS
facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and required that m searching for a site for an MRS
facility, the DOE “shall make no presumption or preference to such sites by reason of
their previous selection.”^™ Not only was DOE supposed to start over on MRS, a
provision was added prohibiting DOE from selecting a site until after a pennanent
repository has gone through site eharacterization and been approved.^'^' At that time,
however, Congress would need to appropriate funds for sueh a facility and if the
pemianent repository is ready for construction, there would be little incentive to begin
construction of an MRS facility. The philosophical idea behind MRS was to put the
spent fuel somewhere that it could be monitored and then retrieved once the technology
was in hand for permanent storage. In effect then, the provision delaying site selection
for MRS until after Yucca Mountain was approved was a provision to kill MRS.
Similarly, the 1987 amendments also contained provisions designed to block the
search for a second repository. In contrast with the provisions of NWPA that called for
DOE to recommend a site for a second permanent repository by 1990, the 1987 law
stated, the Secretary shall report to the President and to Congress on or after January 1,
Representative John Ensign (R-NV) in “Should the House Pass H.R. 1270, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1997?” in Congressional Digest, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January 1998), 25.
42 use 10162.
See 42 USC 10165.
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2007, bu, no. la,er than January 20,0, on ,he need for a second rcposi,ory.-« Even
this report is unlikely ,o emerge, however, because the law also staled ,ha, DOE ‘•,nay no,
conduct s, .e-specific acfivities with respec. to a second reposi.o^ mtless Congress has
specfically authorized and appropnated funds for such activities.-' Moreover, ihe new
law required DOE to phase out all act, v, ties
-des.gned to evaluate the stu.ability of
co'stalline rock as a potential repositoty host
.ned.um,”^*^ While the language may be
unclear, the purpose of this prov.sion was to rule out granite as a host medium thus taking
most of the east coast out of consideration as a host for a second repository.
As ,f the point that Yucca Mountain was the only show in town had not been
hammered home clearly enough, the 1987 law also conditioned compensatory payments
to the host state on that state's decision to waive its veto rights under NWPA. The law
discusses in some detail how and when a state will be compensated offering $10 million
per year to the state once a construction license is approved and $20 million per year to
the state once Ihe facility is built and receiving spent fuel. But later, the law requires that
any benefits agreement provide that “the State or Indian tribe that is party to such
agreement waive its nght under title I to disapprove the recommendation of a site for a
repository. With this provision, the veto rights guaranteed in NWPA take on even
less meaning.
use 10172a.
42 use 10172a.
42 use 10172a.
42 use 10173a.
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We have soon then, ,ha, i, was Congress, a,u, really Congress alone, ,ha, decKlec,
.0 pu. Ihe nahon's eonrnrere.al spen, nuclear fuel ,n Yucca MounUun. Such a llnrhng
,s
cemral ,o Ihe ,ues.ions
.ha. guide
.his s.udy. When conferring general honefi.s and
imposing parheularislic cos.s, why does Congress so.nci.ncs delega.e power
....li.u.g
exlra-congrcssional procedures and, in o.her cases, enac.
.hesc polices
....c-nallyV The
po.nl we have made ,s lha., all appearances aside in
.his case. Congress was responsible
for choosing Yucca Moun.ain from s.ar. .o finish. We have seen how NWPA and .he
amendmen.s
.o NWPA focused
.he par.icuiar,s.lc cos.s on Y.,cca Moun.ain,
wrihng in 1990, Gerald Jacob asks,
-was .he ou.come ever In douhfi. The evidence
suggests the answer must be ‘rarelvly. The nex. ques.ion ,s how Congress was able lo
pass these laws.
Procedures as Key
In discussing how Congress forced
.he nation's commercial spen. miclear fuel on
Nevada, Douglas Arnold remarks,
this solution, which seems so obvious to amichair theorists, required
nearly a decade for Congress to accept. Concentrating costs on the tiniest
group or area is seldom the easiest way to build a coalition in Congress.^^^
This statement serves as an excellent reminder that designating Yucca Mountain as the
nations sole repository for spent fuel required more than simple math (531 other
members of Congress versus 4 from Nevada). It required the deft use of procedures.
Jacob, Site Unseen, xviii.
^85
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 111-112.
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The critical procedural maneuver ,n the passage of NWPA was the adoption of a
Closed rttle in the House. Throughout the leg.slat.ve process leading up to the enact,nent
of NWPA, various members of Congress had attempted to amend the leg,station to
explicitly preclude selectton of a s,te in the,r distnct or slate. Coalition leaders from both
houses were also seeking to avoid having to go to conference on the legislation as that
would provide further openings for legislators seeking to protect their districts and states.
Finally, legislators also needed to avoid a conference as the Congress was winding down
and there was not enough time. The state veto provision in NWPA was only as strong as
It was because Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) had threatened to filibuster the bill
without it. The amendment to satisfy Proxmire and the bill itself were finally agreed to
by the Senate on Deeember 20, 1982, leaving no time for a conference.
To avoid all of these problems, just a few hours after the Senate had completed its
work on NWPA, the House voted on a rule for consideration of the Senate version that
provided for no amendments and, more importantly, provided that the vote to adopt the
rule was also the vote to pass the bill.^^^ The importance of this procedure cannot be
overstated. The elosed rule forced legislators to weigh the general benefit it was likely to
deliver versus what was, for most legislators, the incredibly unlikely possibility that the
process NWPA called for, would put a high-level nuclear waste repository in their
district. In this light, the rule was adopted and the bill was enacted by a vote of 256-32.
Procedural tactics played an even larger role in the passage of the 1987
amendments to NWPA. One important difference between 1982 and 1987 was that by
1987, Democrats had regained control of the Senate and the new Chairman of the Senate
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Energy Committee was J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA).
committee in 1982, Johnston had been the
As a minority member of the
mam proponent of including provisions
NWPA that allowed DOE to move forward with
in
a move designed to provide an alternative to
research and siting of an MRS facility -
a pennanent, geologic repository which had
a chance of being located in Lomsiana^- With the list of potential geologic repository
sites narrowed down to Deaf Smith, TX, Hanford, WA, and Yucca Mountain, NV in
1987, Johnston became the primary architect of what has come to be known among critics
as the “screw Nevada bill” - the 1987 amendments to NWPA. While Arnold argues that
with the search narrowed to Texas, Washington, and Nevada,
“coalition leaders finally
had the nucleus for an unbeatable coalition,”* the truth is that the next step would still
be difficult. As Arnold himself pointed out earlier, ganging up on liny Nevada, or any
state no matter how weak, remains difficult both because of congressional nonns and,
perhaps more importantly, because of the danger of a filibuster.
The fiscal 1988 reconciliation bill provided the procedural vehicle Johnston
needed. As originally crafted by Johnston, the amendments to NWPA would require
DOE to engage in site characterization activities at only one of the three sites the
department had on its list, though Johnston’s bill left the choice up to DOE. The
rationale, at least publicly, for attaching the plan to the reconciliation bill was that
conducting one site characterization instead of three would save $634 million over three
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VI, 1981-1984, 365-366.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VI, 1981-1984,264.
^88
Arnold, The Logic ofCongressional Action, 111.
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yea. - „,os. or .He on sav.n.s ove.
.Hnee yea.
.loHns.on's Energy Connnn.ee
was required to find to meet its reconciliation targct.^^‘^
Johnston’s original plan also included provisions to au.horize an MRS facih.y
once a permanem facli.y was licensed. This prov.s.on was i,npor.an. because, as a
backup, Johns,on, who also served as .he Chairman of the Appropriations SubconuniUee
for Energy and Water Development, also attached his plan to the fiscal 1088 energy and
water appropr.at.ons bill. The poli.tcal logic of attaching the plan to the appropriations
bill was .bat Johnston would then be able to go to conference on the bill with the
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Representative J amie Whitten (D-
MS, - a member from a state, like Louisiana, that was among the six final states under
consideration for a permanent, geologic repository but not on the list of the final three
states. While this backup proved to be unnecessary, the maneuver highlighted the
procedural importance of including the plan as part of the reconciliation bill. Fellow
members of the Appropriations Subcommittee for Energy and Water Development, Sen.
Harry Reid (D-NV) and Sen. Jim Sasser (D-TN, attempted to eliminate Johnston’s plan
from the appropriations bill.^‘» Reid was seeking to keep the permanent facility out of
Nevada and Sasser was attempting to keep an MRS facility out of Tennessee. These
junior members of the committee failed to keep Johnston’s plan off the appropriations bill
but Reid, along with Senator Brock Adams (D-WA), whose state also remained in the
cross-hairs, made good on a threat to filibuster the bill on the floor - a tactic that kept the
Congressional Quarterly, Congress ami the Nation, Volume VII, 1985-1988 (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990), 484.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VII, 1985-1988, 484.
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b.ll off
,he noor for several weeks.^” The denronsIraUon made clear lha. Nevada would
no. give up wrihom a figh,. Bu, I, nrade sonre.hing else clear as well - ,he difference in
procedural advantages between reconciliation bills and appropriations lulls.
Reconcihation bills cannot be f.libustered. Seenrg the writing on the wall, Sasser cut a
separate deal with Johnston. An amendment added a provision that would delay MRS
while it would be studied by a blue-ribbon commission.^” Tennessee was off the hook.
Not suirrisingly, Johnston opted to let the reconciliation conference have first
crack at his plan. A House bill on nuclear waste approved by Representative Morris
UdalTs (D-AZ) Interior Committee had gone in almost a completely opposite direction
from Johnston's plan. Udall's bill called for a bipartisan commission from within the
legislative branch to study DOE's handling of the waste issue, review the foundation of
NWPA, and report back to Congress on what legislation would be needed. During this
period, DOE would be prohibited from studying sites for a permanent repository
further.^*^^
When the conference convened, the political logic of the situation became
overwhelming. None of Nevada’s four members of Congress were involved. Texas and
Washington, on the other hand, each had strong representation in conference. The Texas
representatives demanded a provision that DOE could not choose as a site for
characterization any site that lay below an aquifer - an underground stream. The Texas
and Washington sites both lay below one and the Nevada site did not. Johnston agreed
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VII, 1985-1988, 485.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VII, 1985-1988, 485-486.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VII, 1985-1988, 486.
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and conferees later agreed to drop the murky provision on an aqmfer and just name
Nevada as the sole site. Along the way. House conferees, in a nod to fellow conferee
Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN), convinced Johnston to make authonzation of an
MRS facility condit.onal on DOE first approving Yucca Mountain as the nation’s
permanent, geologic repos.tory,”^
,n the end then, a conference seektng to negotiate
between Johnston’s plan to speed up the select.on process and Udall’s plan to slow it
down had sped the process up even further than Johnston had originally imagined.
Members’ comments before the vote to approve the conference report on the
reconciliation bill highlight the importance of Johnston’s procedural maneuver. Not only
did the procedural tactic preclude amendments and filibusters, it also packaged the plan
with a massive reconciliation bill promising $76 billion in deficit reduction over 2 years.
Legislators thinking about voting against the package would thus have to justify not only
why they voted against moving nuclear waste out of their constituents’ backyards, but
also why they voted against reducing the deficit. Moreover, because the hardest pills to
swallow m the bill were hammered out in conference, Johnston was quick to blame them
on the House conferees - a group that had come into conference seeking to delay the site
selection process. Johnston pointed out that “the House conferees insisted on the
selection of the Nevada site by Congress”^’^ and “the amount of money available to a
host State was reduced substantially in the conference agreement at the insistence of the
House conferees.”^*^^
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Motion, Volume VII, 1985-1988, 487.
Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37693.
Sen. Johnston quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37694.
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Regardless of who was ,o blame, however, members found dremselves wiih a
clear cho.ee. Rep. Udall argued,
-.he procedural course adopted by .he other body ,s
regrettable’-^ and suggested
.ha, he doubts “any one wtll point to thts bill as a noble
example of our democratic system’s abihty to resolve sensitive technical issues.’’^* In
the end, however, he supported the conference report. Representative Philip Sha^, (D-
IN) eompiatned that “the expedited procedures of the Reconciliation Ac, should no, have
been used for this
.mportan, matter” but added, “it has the virtue of cutting through the
pretense under some legislative proposals that any genuine consideration of other sites
would occur.”»’ Highlighttng the importance of Johnston’s procedural maneuver.
Representative Douglas Owens (D-UT) pointed out that designating Nevada as the sole
national site for a geologic repository would bring tons of nuclear waste through his state.
Nevertheless, he concluded,
m''
j'° conference report, which makes Utah a victim
with Nevada and“,he crossroads of the waste,” only because we mustabove all legislative imperatives, reduce the budget deficit. If we were
pemiitted a separate vote on the nuclear waste provision of this bill I
would vote Hell ’
Rep. Cooper of Tennessee, of course, also supported the conference report “reluctantly,”
thanked those who had been responsible for including him in the conference committee,
and expressed his heartfelt, though unsatisfied, desire to help Nevada.
My primary concern dunng the conference was defeating the Department
of Energy s ill-conceived plans to locate a monitored retrievable storage
Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37068.
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Representative Philip Sharp (D-IN) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37069.
Representative Douglas Owens (D-UT) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37084.
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(MRS) facility near Oak Ridge, TN. But my concern was not the selfishle of wishing the nuclear waste on someone else.^°'
A. the same time, of course, those from Nevada cried foul. Representative Barbara
Vueanovich (R-NV) argued that the bill would
-tuni our state into a federal colony” and
declared, “Congress is behaving like a pack of wolves going in for the kill,”’”
Vueanovich and Sen. Reid also complained that nobody from Nevada had been appointed
to the conference committee with Reid declaring that Nevada had been “shut out
completely.”’” Johnston responded, “they weren’t shut out. They just weren’t appointed
to the conference.’”” Reid also took to the floor with language strong enough for the
Civil War.
IS with a sense of revulsion and shame that I rise today to speak on thebudget reconciliation legislation that shortly will be before us; revulsion at
what can only be described as oppression and colonialism, directed at the
people of my State by 49 other States who are supposed to be our allies m
a political union; shame because the sad truth is that this legislation hasbeen subverted into becoming a vehicle for the grossest kind of political
chicanery.
Inflammatory language aside, however, what is clear from the legislative history of
NWPA and the 1987 amendments to NWPA is that procedural tactics - the use of closed
rules, omnibus legislative vehicles, legislating in conference, and the use of special
Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37074.
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Representative Barbara Vueanovich (R-NV) quoted in Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the
Nation, Volume VII, 1985-1988, 483.
Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) quoted in Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation Volume VII
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Sen. Johnston quoted in Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VII 1985-1988
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reconclia,ion procedures - were central to the congress,onal effort to designate Nevada
the sole site for the nation’s commercial spent nuclear fuel.
Procedural Choice anri M„c|ear Waste ni,pn,.i
That procedures were central to the congressional selection of Yucca Mountain ,s
thus clear. What is less clear is why coahtion leaders chose the procedt.ral path they did.
More specif,cally, why did legislators choose to impose a geographically-concentrated
part,cular, Stic cost utilizing internal procedures in this case while utilizing extra-
congressional procedures in the case of base closure? Answering this question requires
that we turn our attention to the factors we have been examining throughout this study.
What we find in examining those factors is that while most of the political dynamics of
siting a high-level nuclear waste facility are similar to the political dynamics of base
closure, there are a very few differences in the nature of the particularistic cost that
account for its different procedural treatment.
Geographic vs. Non-Geo
,^
aphic Benefits Despite the claim of some observers
that the siting of a high-level nuclear waste facility does not conform well to the NIMBY
syndrome, there is no shortage of evidence to demonstrate that the geographic cost being
imposed was more sensitive than the average particularistic cost. The language utilized
by Sen. Reid above is but one example of the desperation legislators felt in attempting to
keep the spent nuclear fuel out of their districts. During congressional deliberation over
NWPA, virtually every state maneuvered to keep the site outside their borders. States
west of the Mississippi attempted, but failed, to amend the law to prohibit nuclear waste
from being transported more than 500 miles from where it was generated - a provision
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designed to keep the waste in the
States in the east argued for
In 1987, the race became
east where more nuclear reactors were located.
a remote, pemianent facility with the emphasi s on remote.
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even more heated and the comments of members even more
explicit. Senator George Mitchell (D-ME) expressed how “pleased" he was with the
outcome because the new language in the reconciliation bill meant that “DOE is no,
authonzed to conduct any activities related
consider Maine as a potential nuclear waste
to a second site and DOE can no longer
site.”^°*^ Representative A1 Swift (D-WA)
who had been instrumental in guaranteeing that Washington would get off the hook along
with Texas described what had happened in conference as “a goddamned outrage” but
also made clear what his priority had been. “If we are going to have to do it over a barrel,
then this configuration gives me the parochial things that I need.""’ He would add, “we
are going to give somebody some nasty stuff"’" As we saw earlier. Rep. Cooper had
jumped on board the 1987 bandwagon when conferees assured him provisions would be
added delaying construction of an MRS facility. Expressing sympathy for Nevada a, the
time. Cooper claimed his victory was “bittersweet.” What he should have said instead
was that his victory was “incomplete” because just a few years later, with the House
Energy and Commerce Committee working on a bill to speed up the licensing process for
the permanent facility in Nevada, Cooper insisted not only on maintaining the prohibition
Jacob, Site Unseen, 123.
Jacob, Site Unseen, 41.
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on licensing an MRS facility until after
insisted on a provision that ordered DOE
a pemianent facility has been licensed but also
to locate the MRS aicility “as close as possible”
to the Yucca Mountain site.^"
ne other measure of the particular sensitivity of this geographic cost is the
electoral cost. Though Senator Chie Heeht (R-NV) did oppose the 1987 amendments to
NWPA arguing that the waste should be reprocessed tnstead of burted, most observers
agree that he subsequently lost his reeleetion bid in 1988 because he did not oppose the
plan acvely enough. Though Hecht himself claimed to have made the bill much better
by adding amendments along the way,''^ it is worth mentioning that he received no
thanks from any of the three other members of the Nevada congressional delegation.
Note, for instance, Hecht’s absence from Representative James Bilbray's (D-NV)
comments.
Our delegation has fought together. The gentlewoman from Nevada [Mrs.
Vucanovich] and myself and the junior Senator from our State have fought
Vigorously to oppose this.^ ^
Later he added,
Nevada’s House delegation has fought shoulder to shoulder to bring sense
to this body. My friend and colleague, Congresswoman Barbara
Vucanovich has worked long and hard to keep nuelear waste out of
Nevada. In the other body. Senator Harry Reid, led a long filibuster to try
to prevent what is happening here today.^'"^
Idelson, “Panel Acts of Waste Dump,” 2613.
See the comments of Senator Chic Hecht (R-NV) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21 1987
37690-37691.
Representative James Bilbray (D-NV) quoted in Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37076.
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No. surprismgly, a comn.cn refrain heard in .he wake of Hcch.’s |.)88 ree.econ loss .0
Governor Richard B^^an was .ha. Hech. was no. opposed enoug,.
.0 .he dmnp. For
instance. Congressional Quarterly reported that Hecht had lost,
An?'LTh'.'’s" '’‘“f
•!’<= planned Yucca dumpd Hech. s
.nalaprop.sm
- he once sa.d he did no. wan.
.he stale obecome a nuctor suppository”
- did little to persuade Nevadans of theseriousness with which he approached the issue.
Thus, there is no question that because sit.ng this nuclear waste facility in a
particular place imposes geographically-concentrated costs, it was far more sensitive and
far more important
.0 legislators
.0 avoid blame than would have been the case if the
costs were particularistic but geographically dispersed. But there is reason .0 believe that
this type of geographic cos. is, in fact, even more difficult .0 swallow than the geographic
costs imposed by base closure. Legislators seek to keep bases open because they believe
constituents working in and around these bases will face heavy economic losses if the
base IS closed and will seek to punish the legislator in the next election. We saw earlier
that Kunreuther and Easterling found that citizens will be unwilling to accept the
presence of a hazardous waste facility in their district in exchange for compensation
unless they have reason to believe the physical harm to them and to future generations
will be minimal. But tn addition to these costs, legislators seeking to keep a nuclear
waste facility out of their district also have the same economic concerns as those seeking
to keep a base open in their district. While legislators in Nevada worry about the impact
on tourism in Las Vegas - a mere 90 miles from Yucca Mountain - the economic
concerns of legislators elsewhere are no less frightening. For example. Representative
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Kent Hance (D-TX), who represented the district that contained the Deaf Smith site.
received a letter from Fnto-Lay - a company that purchased up to $23 million a year
worth of com and potatoes from the area in and around Hance’s d, strict - that contained
the following passage.
We all know that nuclear waste is an emotional issue, and it doesn’t takemuch magmation to conjure up the eventual hue and cry of the publicbout food crops being irrigated by water that flows over nuclear LsteUnder such a situation our alternative would be to move into other comand potato producing areas for raw materials, seriously disrupting theeconomy of your district. It seems that a far better alternative for tery
p rty concerned would be to locate nuclear waste disposals in areas of
gro^n^°*“‘^
wastelands where even sage brush has a hard time
The dual dimensions of the geographic cost - both environmental and economic - imply a
theoretical explanation for what we have seen above. Legislators have even more reason
to be concerned with a nuclear waste facility being located in their district than they do
with losing a military base.
This conclusion further complicates the puzzle of procedural choice. A central
hypothesis guiding this study is that geographic costs are more difficult for legislators to
impose because the costs are borne by particular, identifiable individual legislators.
Blame avoidance techniques are far more difficult in such cases and, as a result,
legislators are more likely to delegate the authority to make such decisions as they did in
the case of base closure. In the case of a nuclear waste facility, we have an even more
difficult geographic cost to swallow. So why didn’t legislators delegate?
Letter to Representative Kent Hance (D-TX) from Charles H. Murphy, vice-president of government and
consumer affairs for Frito-Lay quoted in Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 157.
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One par, of the answer to this
.uestion that desewes ntention is that legislative
leaders dtd consciously attenrp, to ntit.gate some of the costs borne by the host
commumty. As mentioned earlier, a compensat.on package was included that is to
del.ver $10 mtllion per year to Nevada once the site is licensed and $20 mill,on per year
once the site begins accepting spent fuel. In addit.on, Nevada was also given assurances
in 1987 that ,t would receive special considerat.on for other federal projects such as the
Super-Collider^-
- a prom.se that yielded no fruit. Finally, whether intentionally or not,
legislators did choose a site that was least likely to provoke local resistance. Yucca
Mountain ,s located on federal land that served in the pas, as a nuclear test site that is
already considered to be contaminated. Moreover, the surrounding area is rural and poor
- a demography less likely to be resistant to the jobs and federal dollars that will
accompany the waste facility. Indeed, Gerald Jacob points out that in 1979, total DOE
expenditures in Nevada - nearly $450 per state resident - were slightly higher than
Department of Defense expenditures.
These geographic benefits that flow to Nevada from DOE activities
notwithstanding, the geographic/non-geographic variable offers more questions than
answers when it comes to procedural choice. The geographic sensitivity of members of
Congress suggests that they should want to delegate this decision, if not to the DOE or
some other standing agency then to an ad hoc commission empowered to make the
decision. The puzzle becomes all the more confusing when we recall that various
proposals to do just that were considered and rejected at a number of points in the
Jacob, Site Unseen, 170-171.
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process. Since the powerful force of geography was unable ,o compel leg.slalors ,o
delegate power in tins instance, we are compelled to look to our other factors to answer
why.
Ihe Scope of the
_PplicxArea, The scope of the policy area also does not provide
many msights to the question of procedural choice in s.ting a high-level nuclear waste
facility. Our central concern about the scope of the policy area is that we expect
legislators to be less willing to delegate power in policy areas that are broad and that
allow greater discretion to decisionmakers. The siting of a high-level nuclear waste
facility provides some evidence of this principle in action as we saw that legislators
appeared to delegate power to DOE to choose a site but actually constrained the
department’s options in so many ways that DOE really had very little, and with the
enactment of the 1987 amendments no, discretion.
With respect to this study, we would expect that Congress would only be willing
to delegate authority if the scope of the policy area is narrow. And because, in this case,
we are talking about finding a site to house only one type of hazardous waste, we would
expect that this is a narrow enough policy area that Congress might be willing to delegate
authority without fear that that delegation would spill over into other policy areas.
Furthermore, because members of Congress had very little trust in DOE^'*^ - this is similar
to members lack of trust in the Pentagon in base closure - we would expect Congress to
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Various proposals were offered in 1982 by Representative A1 Swift (D-WA), Representative Ron Wyden
(D-OR) and Representative Stanley Lundine (D-NY) to name a few. In addition, we discussed earlier the
proposal of Rep. Udall in 1987 that was rejected in conference.
Establishing this point requires only that the reader skim any history of relations between Congress and
DOE. Several authors have made this argument including Jacob, Site Unseen and Carter. Nuclear
Imperatives and Public Trust.
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delegate to an ad hoc commtssion to site a facility instead of DOE. Nevertheless,
Congress did not choose to delegate authority in this policy area. This does not suggest
that the scope of the poiiey area is not a useful faetor to examine in this study. It was
never claimed that this factor is determ.native
- only that the ability to na.ow the policy
area is an important precondition of delegation. That this precondition was satisfied and
Congress still chose not to delegate says more about other factors involved in this case
than it does about the scope of the policy area.
That said, there was one point in the battle over siting a high-level nuclear waste
facility that is relevant to this factor that is worth mentioning. One part of the reason
Congress took as long as it did to enact NWPA was that members disagreed over whether
or not high-level nuclear waste from military programs ought to be stored in the same
facility with high-level nuclear waste from commercial nuclear reactors.^^® The issue was
difficult, in part, because of the turf battles that are common in many policy areas when a
policy area cuts across congressional committee lines. But it was also difficult because
including military wastes in the facility would broaden the scope of the policy area.
President Carter had issued an executive order prohibiting DOE from reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel and using the byproducts to build nuclear weapons but President Reagan had
reversed that decision. While no spent fuel was reprocessed in the early 1980s, the
Congress explicitly prohibited the federal government from reprocessing in 1982. This
action is relevant in the context of nuclear waste disposal because it is an indicator of the
sense of Congress in keeping military and civilian nuclear programs separate and, by
extension, keeping the scope of the policy area in siting a high-level nuclear waste facility
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narrow. Luther Carter makes precisely this point arguing,
“it should be pointed out that
for most members of Congress the waste issue was strtetly a domest.c cottcem.”^^'
Indeed, Senate Amred Serviees Chainnan John Tower (R-TX) warned members that he
would demand NWPA be referred to his committee if it included provisiotts to store
military waste as well as civilian waste.
Surpnsingly, in the end, NWPA effectively delegated authority to dcctde whether
military waste should be stored with civilian waste to the president.^« This delegat.on of
authority probably says more about Congress’ lack of destre to deal with the entire
process agatn for disposing of high-level nuclear waste than anything else. The point that
IS relevant for our purposes here, however, is that Congress chose not to delegate
authority to site a high-level nuclear waste facility despite the fact that the policy area in
question was sufficiently narrow. What we are about to see is that this procedural choice
was a result more of the moment in political time and the number of geographic locations
targeted than the geographic nature of the cost or the scope of the policy area.
The Moment in Political Time. The particular moment in political time made it
more likely legislators would handle the siting of a high-level nuclear waste facility
internally rather than delegating. As with any case in which legislators are seeking to
impose particularistic costs in favor of a general benefit, legislative leaders were very
sensitive to the electoral calendar and found ways to mitigate negative electoral impacts
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VI, I98I-I984, 361
.
Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 195.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VI, I98I-I984, 364.
See 42 USC 10107.
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for most legislators. As Gerald Jacob points out, NWPA
-‘only materialised in the final,
hectic hours of the Ninety-seventh Congress.” Remember that in the ease of base elosure,
coahtion leaders had amanged for legislators to be able to vote for the not.on of base
closure in general just before the 1988 elect,on with the spec, tie list of closures to he
announced just after the election. And in the case of tax reform, legislators had been able
to vote for taxpayer rate rehef just before the 1986 election. In fact, it was so close to
Electron Day that legislators had less reason to worry about PAC funds drying up. The
race for money was all but over at that point. Stnniarly, in the case of nuclear waste
dtsposal, coahtton leaders scheduled a vote at a point on the electoral calendar that left at
two full years least (the siting process set in motion would take even longer) to get out
from under the negative policy effects of their votes. This sensitivity to the electoral
calendar also dtsplayed itself in the struggle over the 1987 amendments to NWPA. After
Sen. Sasser of Tennessee had fought alongside Sen. Reid to stop Johnston’s bill in the
appropriations committee, Johnston struck a deal with Sasser that would set up a
commission to study whether MRS (the facility proposed for Tennessee) was feasible
and, tmportantly, the commission was not expected to report back until January, 1989 - a
scant two months after Sasser’s expected reelection to the Senate.
But a second, and far more important, way in which the moment in political time
offered opportunities for coalition leaders to handle site selection internally has to do with
the strength of Nevada’s congressional delegation. Nevada’s delegation is small and that,
as we will discuss in the next section, was a critical factor. But, in addition to being
small, the delegation was particularly weak in 1987. When the choice came down to
Nevada, Washington, and Texas, there was no match, not only because of the relative
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sizes of ,he congressional deleganons, bu, because of ,he ins.Uu.ional posii.ons
.heir
members held. Douglas Arnold points out,
frieltd^ p’o" "’*= President’s closest
legislators held no“’
feer remaining
werfelec ed n 1987°^. ’"“"iT ^^"'°ri‘y (twoere ele t i 1982, and two m 1986). Texas and Washington not onlvad size, committee positions, and seniority on their side, they were alsof.™“ " “-.4 L.t
The same logic worked in reverse in 1998 when Nevada’s delegation was much stronger.
When most in Congress wanted to create a temporary waste site next to Yucca Mountain
to store the spent fuel until the permanent site was constructed, Nevada found it had
friends in high places. Challenging Sen. Reid for his seat that year. Representative John
Ensign (R-NV) was able to convince the Speaker of the House, Representative Newt
Gingrich (R-GA) to keep the bill off the legislative calendar. At the same time. Sen. Reid
and Sen. Bryan killed the bill in the Senate by holding all but 3 Democrats with them on a
cloture vote.^^^
The One, the Few, and the Many. The moment m political time thus played a key
role in presenting opportunities to legislative leaders to handle the issue internally. But
while the moment in political time helped legislative leaders to handle it in this way, a
different factor served as the major impetus. Site selection for a high-level nuclear waste
facility differs from base closure as a collective action problem in one very significant
way. In base closure, legislators seek to impose particularistic costs on a number of
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 1 12fn73.
Chuck McCutcheon, “Nevada Waste Site Defeated in Election-Year Tussle Over Reid’s Senate Seat” in
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 56 (June 6, 1998), 1536.
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geography areas a. once. ,n choosing a she for a was.e fachhy on ,he other hattd,
legislators single out one locat.on to shoulder the costs while the res, of the nation shares
in the general benefit. Moreover, while many congress,onal districts - Representahve
Amtey’s is a notable example - had no military
.nstallations of significant size, nearly
every legislative district had to fear the prospect of one of a geologic, MRS, or APR
fachty being placed in the district and accepting all of the nation's spent nuclear fuel.
The minority to be overcome was thus smaller in the case of nuclear waste site choice and
the natural majority of districts seeking to dodge this bullet was thus larger. While „ is a
truism that a determined minority in Congress is quite capable of blocking action on any
given bill, it is also a truism that no, all minorities in Congress are created equally.
Specifically, all other things equal, small minorities - we saw above that the minority in
question was not only small, but weak - are less capable of blocking action than large
minorities and larger majorities are more capable of overwhelming minorities than
smaller majorities. In short, the mathematics of site choice are different than those of
base closure. While singling out one site still requires that legislators target an
identifiable, particular legislator, the task is much easier if it becomes a process of
ganging up on the weakest member of the herd.
Not surprisingly, this process was a very slow one. The best analogy is to imagine
it as an extended game of musical chairs. Luther Carter points out that as the NWPA
began to take focus in Congress, there were about a dozen states that still remained as
potential sites for either the first permanent, geologic facility or for a temporary storage
facility for the nation’s spent fuel. In addition to the six states eventually named by DOE
as “potentially acceptable” in 1983 (Nevada, Washington, Texas, Utah, Louisiana, and
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Mississ.pp„, three states w.th good gran, to fonnations were athact.ng attention
(Wisconstn. Mich.gan, and Minnesota) and three states were cons.dered likely hontes for
an APR (South Carolina, lll.nois, and New York). H.s deseription of these states as a
bloc suggests why i, took so long for Congress to narrow its choice down to Nevada. He
argued, “the host states all wanted the waste legislation to give then, a strong voice, but in
a number of
.nstances their interests could be divergent or conflicting.”'^'’ The salt states
all wanted to include the upper midwest states in DOE’s considerations. New York,
Ill.no.s, and South Carolina wanted to make sure a permanent facility wotild be built
somewhere soon. Nevada and Washington wanted to make sure states had as much veto
power as possible.
Thus, the enactment of NWPA, DOE’s implementation of NWPA, and the
enactment of the amendments to NWPA in 1987 can all be seen as a long process of
eliminating players from the game, sometimes one by one, until only one site remained.
As we have seen, this process took on a variety of fomis. Members of Congress from
Tennessee were brought on board very late in the process when provisions were added to
delay and study MRS. Members from Texas and Washington only came on board when
they demanded and received, in conference, a provision to name Nevada as the sole site
for characterization. Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) described the process this
way.
We passed another bill in 1987. What did we say? Well, the [Speaker] of
the House then came from Texas. He said, “I don’t want it in Texas.”
That was one of the sites. The Majority Leader came from Washington
State. He said, “I don’t want it in Washington State.” It was out. The
third State was the salt domes in Louisiana. The Chairman of the
Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 197.
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andParR^lan"^^
not urying all the nuclear waste in America in New Hampshire ” So wekept search, ng. playing this game of thennonuclear hearts tr^n g ,o Lck
we fm^o" WeT :
-‘h
--ebody. So we looked around, ^,d w^:!
“V t 11
^
' ^^o congressmen, two senatorsYou get all the nuclear waste. We are picking you.”“’
When the moment in political time was right - when the electoral calendar
allowed It and when Nevada's congressional delegation was at its weakest point - other
legislators stuck Nevada with the queen of spades.
Conclusion
Along the road to choosing Yucca Mountain as the nation’s sole site for a
permanent, geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel, many legislators complained that
the scientists and technicians were being forced to yield to legislators and politicians.
While he remains a harsh critic of how site choice was handled in this case, Gerald Jacob
argues that such complaints are misguided for two reasons. First, categorizing a decision
as technical” is often a simple way of shifting responsibility for making social and
economic choices to others who may be less responsible to the electorate. But they do
not eliminate the underlying value conflicts associated with those choices. Jacob
provides the following example,
Determining what kind of bolt to use seems to be a straightforward,
mundane technical decision best left to the engineer. However, the choice
between a cost-saving, less durable bolt and a high tolerance, but
expensive one can affect the potential for catastrophic failure of a hotel
Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) in “Should the House Pass H.R. 1270, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1997?” in Congressional Digest, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January 1998), 17.
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skyway or a nuclear power plant cooling system
. n
s.mplo “icchnical”
.lcc,si„„ canacs lx>imcrn;,lKa.,on
gcogtapliic area anil popnlalion cxposcii lo a level of risk- Ih ' I l^V*
**'
«l nopacls anil benclns associalcil will, ,,se ol I ' ! , n
of the more expensive one; and the social burden of resiwmhn'rto
'a
savn g boll, however, Ihe mcreaseil risk of injury or ile-,U, issociali/eil I hat is, Ihe cost is ilislribiileil among Ibe popihation alVirgei mplex decisions, such as which waslc disposal lechnology or site lo
in,plicIL"““'"’’ ’"'•'-"-'cononiic
A second reason Jacob beheyes relegaling decisions lo lechnoerals in Ihc case of a high-
level nuclear waste she choice is misguided is that in Ibis case, 'unlike the i|ueslion of
how lo rebuild an automobile carburetor, consensus cannot necessarily he reached on Ihc
basis ol cxisling technical standards or practice."’^'’ Because of this technical uncertainly,
technical debates become proxies for debates about underlying yaltie conllicts that go
unresolved. Kor instance, it is not terribly surprising to imagine how Sen. Johnston
became such an ardent tidvocalc of developing MRS technologies, while legislators from
lenncssec had determined that permanent, geologic disposal was a far belter technical
solution than MRS. Jacob’s critique of technocratic tillcrnalivcs lo Ihc process utilized
lor choosing a high-level nuclear waslc facility thus offers a lc.s.son lo those who suggest
the choice ol Yucca Mountain was arbitrary. At worst, Ihc procedure utilized yielded a
decision no more arbitrary than might have otherwise been the case.
lAithcr Carter suggests another lesson to be drawn from this site selection process.
Writing before the 1987 amendments to NWPA were enacted, Carter argued that NWPA
Jacob, Site Unseen, 124.
Jacob, iSV/c' Lhiseen, 125.
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argues that in tackling similar policy
had delegated too much discretion to DOE. He
problem in the future, legislators would be wise,
to keep the geographic scope ami procedural complexities of the sitesearch within modest limits. To seek a distribution of potential reposiloi-y
sites over several regions is more likely to spread the misery than topromote a sense of equity and fairness. The elaborate, long-drawn-out site
screening process which the waste act explicitly and implicitly prescribesamounts to a cruelly demanding political marathon.^^®
Carter is correct to assert that, as general rules. Congress ought to want to limit a search
to as few regions as possible and Congress ought to want to keep the process as simple as
possible. But his view seems to express a lack of appreciation of how difficult those
simplifying maneuvers are. In short, Douglas Arnold’s view of high-level nuclear waste
site choice cited earlier is the best response to Carter. Even though the Nevada site
emerged in the late 1970s as the leading candidate, it still took legislators a decade to
accept this seemingly obvious solution. That it look so long is the result of the
importance of the geographic concentration of costs and the opportunities the moment
political time offered. That it was resolved in the way it was is a result of the fact that
only one site needed to incur the costs.
A final normative conclusion seems in order given the rather negative view that
many observers of high-level nuclear waste site selection have taken. Practitioners and
observers of this process alike frequently assert that Congress mistakenly allowed
“politics” to seep into the process of site selection and that Congress is incapable of
handling such issues objectively. For instance, Gerald Jacob asserts,
while everyone can appreciate that a complex, highly sophisticated
engineering is required to safely store nuclear materials for thousands of
Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 415.
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been developed
strategy for nuclear waste management have not
While Congress' eho.ce of Yueea Mounta.n may have taken some t.me and
.nay have
been short of elegance, it does sewe to remind us that legislators need not wait w,th bated
breath for social scienhsts to develop new inst.tutional solut.ons to these types of pohcy
problems. They appear to be quite capable of developing and implementing them on the.r
own.
Jacob, Site Unseen, 164.
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CHAPTER 6
NAFTA
The pursuit of free trade presents a policy problem ve^ similar to the problents
discussed in the previous chapters. Whtle virtually all economists agree that lowering
trade ban-iers promotes economic growth and reduces prices for consumers, legislators
find it difficult to avoid the allure of particularisttc protectionism in the absence of
procedural restraint. Despite this collective action problem, however, tariffs have stead, ly
dechned over the past sixty years and other non-tar, ff barriers have been reduced a, times
as well.
Th,s changed pattern in trade policy^" is largely the result of the changed
procedural context in which trade policy is made and, as in the other cases with which
this study has been concerned, we are interested in examining precisely what kinds of
procedures are used and why. This chapter will examine the adoption of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the so-called “fast track” procedure
employed by Congress to gain additional leverage on the question of procedural choice.
NAFTA reduced tariffs and other non-tariff barriers in trade between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico effectively creating a freer North American trading zone. Like the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, NAFTA presents a policy problem in which Congress is
seeking to impose relatively geographically dispersed particularistic costs in a relatively
337
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It IS true that while legislators no longer seek to protect domestic industries by setting individual tariff
rates, they have employed other policy tools to provide relief from foreign competition. Nevertheless, the
move from the setting of tariff schedules to what Pietro Nivola has called “procedural protectionism” is a
significant policy change worthy of examination.
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broad pobcy area. In the case of tax refonn. we saw iha, legislators chose proccdttres
.ha,
allowed then, to overcome the collective act.on problem with,,, the tns.itut.on. That they
did so was expected both because it allowed leg.slators to systemat.cally protect the more
geographically sens.t.ve particulanstic tax benefits and because legislators were
understandably reluctant to delegate authority m a policy area that cuts across and impacts
virtually eve^. other policy area. While NAFTA presents the same type of policy
problem, the conventional understanding of the enactment of this international agreement
ts that legislators were able to reduce trade barriers because they delegated authonty to
the president - an institution which is understood to have more liberal trade preferences
because of its national constituency. So why did legislators delegate in the ease of
NAFTA - a case veor s.m.lar in its characteristics to tax refonn? We will see that the
extent to which legislators delegated in the case of NAFTA has been overstated and that
what delegation there was, was the result of the fact that NAFTA required negotiation
w.th foreign powers. But in making this case, it is first necessary to briefly review the
history of trade policy in the United States.
A Brief History of Trade Policy
—
789-1930. Among the first powers granted to Congress in Article I Section 8 of
the Constitution are the powers to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises” and
to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” Because the generation of revenue was
wholly dependent in the early days of the republic on these types of taxes, it is not
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suT,rising ,ha, ,he f.rs. law enacted by Congress was a tariff b, II Front that point on,
along with slavery, the issue of the tanff becante tbe most important and controversial
political issue for more than a century. And for most of that time, it is important to note,
tanff policy was considered a domestic niatter. Tariffs were enacted to promote industrial
development and to raise revenue. And throughout the 1 9»' century, battles over the tariff
were fought mainly along sectional lines. The rural and less industrial south was more
dependent on imported goods than the north and it was northern industries that primarily
benented from proteet.omsm. Not surprisingly, at the turn of the century, this nteant that
the Democratic Party had somewhat more liberal trade preferences and the Republican
Party was more protectionist. But even when Democrats were able to gain control of the
House, the Senate, and the presidency, trade liberalization was hard to achieve. In 1894,
with Democrats in control of Congress, and President Cleveland in the White House, the
Wilson-Gomian Act reduced tariffs modestly but only made a small dent in the high
tariffs instituted by the McKinley Act of 1890. A couple of months later, the Democrats
lost control of the House and, in 1896, they lost the Senate and the presidency."" Indeed,
in the period between 1890 and 1930, Congress enacted 7 major trade bills, only one of
which enacted substantial tariff reduction. That bill - the Underwood Act of 1913, was
enacted with Democrats and Progressives in control of the Congress and the White
House, a weakened Speaker in the House,""^ and not surprisingly, the use of what was
Sharyn O’Halloran, Politics. Process, ami American Trade Policy (Ann Arbor, Ml: The University of
Michigan Press, 1994), 2. The law was the Duty Act of July 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 24.
Michael J. Gilligan, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity’, Delegation, and Collective Action in American
Trade Policy (Ann Arbor, Ml; The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 64.
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 66.
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‘essentially a closed rule-‘ on the House floor. The penod ended with the poster ch.ld
for part.cularistic protect.onism run amok - the Smoot-Hawley tar.ff of 1930 which
increased duties on over 25,000 specified commodities.^^^
193Mm The New Deal changed both the fonn and the substance of American
p policy in virtually every policy area, and trade policy was no exception. The signal
event of change in trade policy was the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934 (RTAA). Whtle the Democrats took control of the Congress and the White
House because of the profound economic consequences of the Depression, perhaps no
piece of legislation better represented the failed Republican response to the economic
calamity than Smoot-Hawley. Among the incumbents who were not returned to Congress
were the authors of Smoot-Hawley, Senator Reed Smoot (R-UT) and Representative
Wilhs Hawley (R-OR).“* When legislators pay that ultimate price, other legislators take
note and the RTAA was the result. The RTAA gave the president power to negotiate and
commit the nation to reciprocal trade agreements by executive proclamation. The
president’s power was limited in that the delegation of authority was not pemianent (only
3 years), the president could only reduce tariffs by up to 50 percent from 1934 levels, and
the president could not transfer items between the dutiable and free lists.^^^ Despite these
limitations, the RTAA stands as a striking example of congressional delegation. Contrary
to most observers who view the RTAA as a sharp departure from trade policy procedures
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 1.
™
O’Halloran, Politics. Process, and American Trade Policy, fn2 p2-3.
338 Smoot was defeated in the general election and Hawley failed to even secure his party’s nomination.
O’Halloran, Politics. Process, and American Trade Policy, 85-86.
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of the past, Shan^ O’Halloran argues there was “a long tradition in U.S. trade policy of
delegating authonty to the executive branch to negotiate reciprocal concess.ons”
Nevertheless, O’Halloran concedes that while it was “not wholly unconnected to previous
trade policy,” the RTAA was “a great leap forward.
The results of the RTAA program are well known. Between 1934 and 1945, the
United States entered into agreements with 28 countries with RTAA being renewed in
1937, 1940, and 1943, and Congress acted m 1945 to give the president authority to
reduce rates by an additional 50 percent
- permitting a total reduction of 75 percent from
1934 rates. Congress also renewed RTAA authority ,n 1947, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1953,
1954, 1955, and 1958."' The frequency of these renewals suggests two points. First,
legislators found their new role as supervisor of an executive setting rates more appealing
than setting the tariff rates themselves. Second, despite the fact that RTAA was
consistently renewed, the short terms suggest the short leash on which members of
Congress hoped to keep the president. O’Halloran argues renewals of the president’s
negotiating authority,
were anything but automatic. In many instances, as in the one-year
extensions of authority in 1947, 1953, and 1954, Congress strongly
contested the president’s use of his discretionary authority. When imports
threatened sensitive domestic industries. Congress introduced new fomis
of import relief (the escape clause and the peril point provision) to protect
disaffected constituents. At each turn, the authorizing legislation showed
the effects of partisan conflict and a willingness on the part of legislators
to design complex procedures that protected specific industries.^"^^
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, ami American Trade Policy, 108.
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 87-92
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 108.
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The resulung
.rend ,n (ar.ffs was also easy ,o spc. While ,n ,he per.od between ,he Cvil
War and the New Deal, the ra.to of total tariff reeeipts to total du.iahle nnports had been
around
.4 to
.5, the ratio declined steadily after the enactment of RTAA and hovered
throughout the 1950s and 1960s at about
In 1962, President Kennedy asked for and reeeived new negotiating authority.
The Congress gave the president broad powers to pursue tariff reductions and removed
some of the impediments to trade negotiations by providing avenues of compensation for
injured industries rather than exempting them from coverage. This new negotiating
authority set the stage for the first multilateral trade negotiations under GATT - a
negotiating round that reduced average duties by about 35 percent. But conflict broke out
between the Johnson administration and the Congress over whether non-tariff trade
barriers should be part of the trade talks.''^^ The conflict remained unresolved and the
president’s negotiating authority became a victim of the impasse. When the authority
conferred in 1 962 lapsed, no new authority was granted over the next several years.
1974 - 1988. The 1974 Trade Reform Act marked a dramatic procedural shift in
American trade policy. By the end of the Kennedy - Johnson round of tariff reductions, it
had become increasingly clear that tariffs no longer presented the major threat to free
trade. Instead, non-tariff barriers were the concern and this posed a new challenge. Non-
tariff barriers are defined by what they are not rather than what they are and that
observation suggests a problem with breaking them down. Because the category contains
a wide variety of trade practices, delegating authority to the president to unilaterally
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 1-2.
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 95-96.
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reduce these barriers would be far too wide a delegation of power. Moreover, as we have
discussed in pnor chapters, the early 1970s were no, a period in Amcr.can poUhcal
history in which Icgtslaiors were particularly inclined to delegate addit.onal power to the
president. As a result, since 1974, though non-tariff burners have been the subject of
international trade negotiations, presidents have been unable to enter into intentational
trade agreements without congressional approval. The Trade Refonn Act gave b.rth to
the so-called “fast track” procedure in which Congress would have to approve any
international trade agreement before it became binding but, in return. Congress would
have to consider the agreement under expedited legislative procedures that did not allow
for any amendments. Congress also gave itself a greater role in trade negotiations in a
variety of ways that we will discuss in greater detail later and created the Office of the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to be headed by the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR). In addition to conducting negotiations with trade partners, the
USTR would investigate alleged unfair trade practices such as foreign import restrictions,
export subsidies, and dumping, and section 301 of the Act authorized the president to
unilaterally retaliate against these practices.
The 1974 Act paved the way for the Tokyo round ofGATT negotiations and when
Congress acted to approve the agreement in 1979, they also enacted a slightly modified
extension of the new trade procedures for 8 years. In 1984, Congress again amended
these procedures allowing the Ways and Means and Finance Committees to revoke fast
track authority within 60 days after the president notified Congress of his intention to
enter into trade negotiations. Moreover, Congress took steps to bolster its power in the
wake of the Chadha decision, which had taken away Congress’ power to unilaterally
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Ihc presulcm u, .caluUc agains, unfair Marie pniciccs. Cong, css lespunrlal by
shilling Ihc aulhoiily l„ iuiiialc unfair Irarlc pracliccs cases lo Ihc US I k.
In l»8H. when Congress cxlcn.lcl fasi Hack aiilhorily for 3 ,„orc years will, Ihc
<’l nn arldihonal 2 years if neilhcr house pa,s,sc.l a disapproval resoluliou. Congress
look holh of die l-«4 provisions slrenglheniug Congress’ role a slep fnriher by adding a
so-called ••reverse fasI track” procedure ,n which Congress could revoke fast track
milhorily hy passing a rlisapproval resohilion in boll, houses williin any (,() day period and
hy iransferring lo Ihe U.SI R (from Ihe presirlenll the aulhorily ,o uudalerally relahale
against imrair trade practices.
Ihc 19X8 law put in place the (Inal piece of the procedural context in which
NAM A would he negotiated and eventually approved. While this historical tour Mas
been brief, it has served to highlight an important point that will be emphasi/.ed in the
coming pages. The standard interpretation that American trade policy has become
increasingly liberalized as a result of congressional abdication of authority during the 60
years prior to the enactment ofNAI"l'A is simplistic at best and inaccurate at worst. I'Me
procedures by which international trade agreements are negotiated, aiiproved, and
implemented are far more complicated and provide far more procedural power to
C ongress than is commonly understood. We will examine the complexity o( these
pioeeduies m moie detail later, but (list, it is uselul to take a ste|i back and understand the
collective action problem C ongress is seeking to resolve with these complex procedures
in the first place.
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Tlic l»i-ohlcm ,,l
ami T.n,l,.
The p,ohlcn. p„se.l by bade policy ,s one ,ha, ,s no, nnlanniia. U, ns. inee bade
reduces pr.ees lor consu.bcrs by chnbna.ing lar.lTs and olhcr nou-lari ff costs to produce,
s
are usually passed on to eonsun.crs. |.>ec t,a.lc also encourages greater co,npet,t,on
r>ncl ,„novat,o,t by leveling the playing Held lor protlueers. Of course, ntentbers of
Congress would all like to be assoeialed with the benelits of IVce trade but wouUI like to
protect the particular utduslrics based in their districts front lorcigu con,pctit,on. Bceattse
no sutgle legislator can protect the uulustries in thcr district on their own, the result ,s a
coliccttvc logroll in which univcrsalistic protcctionisnt tritnuphs over free Itade. I he
nation wouki be collectively belter off with reciprocal bade agreements leducing tra.Ie
harriers but members of Congress have individual iucenlives that are collectively
destructive.
Pohlieal economists have long been aware that collective action problems arc a
key feature of normal trade politics. While Maneur Olson published his seminal study „,,
the sources of collective action problems in l%5, Michael (iilligan points out that Olson
himself outlined the implications of his theory for trade politics in his 1U82 work, rhe
Rise and Decline of Nations, (jilligan summarizes the logic.
Since import competing industries form a much smaller group than
consumers do they have much less stringent collective action problems
and can more readily take political action. I'urlhermore, producer groups
can sometimes provide selective incentives such as closed shops or
professional licensing requirements that consumer groups cannot. As such
there is a bias in the political system in favor of protectionism.
.145
(iilligan. Empowering Exporler.s, 4.
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Following this argu,nom ,o ,.s logical encipo.m, various scholars poim ou, ,ha, prcsulcnis
will Ihcrcforc have more liberal trade preferences than Congress. Robert Haldwin argues
the presidential bias in favor of free trade is the result of the foreign policy
responsibilities associated w.th the office. Presidents seek to advance their nal.onal
security agenda, particularly dunng (he Cold War by pronioltng closer economic lies w.th
foreign powers.^' While this argument has some ntent, ,t is more likely that presidents
have more liberal trade preferences than members of Congress for the same reason
presidents are more likely to support base closures, tax reform, and the ehoiee of a site -
any site - for high-level nuclear waste disposal. A president is one person representing a
national constituency and therefore docs not suffer from the collective action problems
that plague Congress. The natural answer then, would appear to be delegation. Will,
members of Congress “tom between their free trade proclivities and the protectionist
demands of their constituents,”-’'''' the president is “in a belter position to weigh the
overall costs and benefits of protectionism.”’-"’ This theory conforms with our anecdotes
and observations of trade politics in action. In pushing for the passage of the enabling
legislation for NAFTA, President Clinton even promised to defend congressional
Republican incumbents against Democratic challengers who attack them for their votes
supporting the agreement. Recognizing the collective action problem at work, Clinton
Robert Baldwin, “U.S. Trade Policies: The Role of the Fxecutive Branch” in Alan V. Deardorff and
Robert M. Stern, eds., Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies (Ann Arbor, Ml: The University of
Michigan Press, 1998), 81-82.
Howard Wiarda, “The U.S. Domestic Politics of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement,” in M. Delal
Baer and Sidney Weintraub, eds.. The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1994), 131.
O’l lalloran. Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 32.
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giess should be defeated for doing
deelared, “I do not believe that any member of Con
what is plainly in the national interest.
Why Study NAFTA?
The collective action problem described above applies to any trade agreement of
course. Studying the case of NAFTA seems appropriate because of its temporal
proximity to the other cases examined in this study but NAFTA is also a particularly
attractive case for study because there are several reasons why NAFTA presented a
particularly difficult problem for free trade minded legislators.
First, taking down trade barriers with Mexico is fundamentally different than
taking down trade barriers with more industrialized trading partners. Congressional
Quarterly pointed out, “it was the first time the United States had agreed to take down all
economic walls guarding it from a country whose economy was as poor and as different
from its own as Mexico’s.”''^ Timothy MeKeown makes the argument more directly in
his assessment of how interest groups impaet American trade policy.
The least painful and most valuable agreement is one between two
countries whose produetion is complementary, and whose consumption
patterns create a large demand for the produets of the other country.
Increased competitive pressure on import-competing industries, such as
that faced by American lumber from Canadian imports or by American
low wage manufacturing faces from Mexican imports, creates economic
adjustment costs and political opposition to agreements.
President William J. Clinton quoted in Gwen Ifill, “Clinton Extends an Unusual Offer to Republicans on
Pact” in New York Times (November 13, 1993), A2.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress ami the Nation. Volume IX, 1993-1996 (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1997), 153.
Timothy J. McKeown, “What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?” in Charles F. Doran and Gregory
P. Marchildon, eds.. The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America (San Franciso:
Westview Press, 1994), 67.
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McKeown also points out a second reason why NAFTA represented a particularly
tough ease. He argues, “evidence is accumulating that for ftmts, naltons, or the
tntemational system as a whole, growth does create the polittcal condiltons for trade
openness, whtle the lack of growth does the opposite.””^ While the American economy
was growing when legislators deetded to delegate authortty to the president to negotiate
NAFTA, the American economy went into a recession while the pact was being
negottated and this altered the polittes of the negotiation. O’Halloran points out that
because of the recession, a number of industries were more sensitive to import
competition.
The most vocal opposition to the proposed free trade agreement came
trom fruit and vegetable producers, textile and apparel manufacturers, auto
suppliers, and the steel industry, all of whose products competed directly
with Mexican imports. This opposition was even more difficult to ignore
in hard economic times.
And this leads to a third reason NAFTA represented a particularly difficult
problem for legislators. Whereas the Republicans had been the majority party in the
Senate m 1986 when Congress gave a Republican president fast track authority to
negotiate a trade agreement with Canada, the Democrats held majorities in both the
House and the Senate throughout the negotiation and approval of NAFTA. The
importance of unions in the Democratic coalition and the importance of the steel, textile,
and auto industries in parts of the nation that Democratic members of Congress tend to
represent meant that NAFTA would face a particularly difficult path.
35 ^ McKeown, “What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?” 71.
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 159.
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Fourth, related to the prior point, legislators are less likely to give authority to a
president of a different party. O’Halloran argues.
If a prineipal could find a perfectly representative agent, she could obtain
her ideal outcome by delegating completely to the agent. One corollary to
this observation is that the greater the difference in preferences between
the principal and the agent, the less authority will be delegated. If we take
partisanship as a proxy for preferences, then the implications for trade
policy are clear. Congress will delegate more power to a president of the
same party than to a president of the opposing party.
McKeown echoes this view arguing, “when the presidency is controlled by an opposing
party, delegation is less likely, since the preferences of the president on trade are more
likely to be different than those of the party which controls Congress.”^^^ One example
of this dynamic in action is the creation of the reverse fast track procedure. Democratic
congressional leaders were less than pleased with the level of consultation they had been
accorded during the negotiation of the U.S. - Canadian Free Trade Agreement.^^^ They
responded by adding the reverse fast track provision for the negotiation of NAFTA that
allowed the Congress to revoke fast track authority if both houses of Congress enacted a
resolution with any 60-day period.
A final reason NAFTA was a more difficult agreement to enact than the standard
collective action problem associated with free trade is that any agreement would require
that regulatory structures be erected in a deregulatory era. Because tariffs had been
reduced to such low levels under the RTAA program, those who promote free trade have
been far more focused on reducing non-tariff trade barriers in the past 25 years. The
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 35.
McKeown, “What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?” 72.
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 159-160.
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promotion of free trade in the 1980s and 1990s therefore requires regulatory structures
that will monitor, investigate, and fight unfair trade practices undertaken by foreign
competitors. The enhanced powers and roles of the USTR discussed above are the result
of this new emphasis. The importance of this regulatory paradox for our purposes,
however, is that it serves as yet another reason why NAFTA was even more difficult to
enact than the traditional collective action theories would suggest. Pietro Nivola argues.
Not only did much regulation of foreign trade practices take root amid a
policy dissensus; it expanded during a period of growing awareness and
sophistication about the limitations of other economic regulatory ventures.
While the U.S. government was policing more international commerce, it
curtailed its role in important sectors of the domestic economy, areas such
as transportation, energy, and telecommunications.^^^
Given all of these difficulties, it is not surprising that NAFTA became “the most
contentious piece of trade legislation of the twentieth century.”^^*^ More than a difficult
collective action problem, NAFTA was a trade agreement that required legislators to
delegate authority to a president from the opposing party to negotiate a trade pact with a
neighbor whose economy was far less industrialized during a recession and it was an
agreement that would regulate commerce during an anti-regulatory era. Before
examining how reelection-minded legislators accomplished this herculean task, it is
useful to first examine the provisions of NAFTA as enacted so that we can better
understand where the process was headed.
Pietro S. Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Insitution, 1993), 15.
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 82.
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The Provisions ofNAFTA
Before we examine the procedures utilized to enact NAFTA, it is important to
first understand the provisions of NAFTA as it was finally enacted. The NAFTA
implementing legislation cleared the House on Nov. 17, 1993, cleared the Senate on Nov.
20, 1993, and was signed into law by President Clinton on December 8, 1993.^^'^ The
major provisions of NAFTA significantly liberalized trade between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. The legislation gave the president authority to make tariff
reductions specified in the agreement, lifted import quota restrictions on a variety of
Mexican agricultural products, and liberalized some U.S. agricultural standards.
Moreover, the agreement also liberalized U.S. government procurement procedures
making some government contracts available to Mexican bidders, qualified automobiles
manufactured in Canada or Mexico as domestically produced if 75 percent of the cost of
the car was value added in North America, and established trade dispute settlement
procedures.
While these major provisions of NAFTA effectively created a much freer zone of
trade between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, the details of the legislation also
contained a variety of provisions that restrain us from contending that NAFTA created a
pure free trade zone. The legislation established mechanisms to protect U.S. industries
from floods of imports in much the same way the U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agreement
had a few years earlier. The president was empowered to suspend tariff reductions on
certain products if the International Trade Commission determined the imports to be a
The NAFTA implementing legislation was PL 103-182.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation. Volume IX, 1993-1996, 159-161.
183
serious threat to a domestic industry. The legislation also included a special expedited
mechanism to protect the American orange juice industry. Moreover, while certain
American agricultural standards were relaxed, the standards for certain products such as
peanut butter still had to meet U.S. standards. Finally, the legislation also provided
transitional worker assistance to workers hurt by NAFTA, codified side agreements
negotiated by the Clinton administration on labor and the environment, authorized the
funding of a Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade, and authorized
Amencan participation in the North American Development Bank, a bank that would
fund border cleanup and economic development projects.
In the coming pages, we will outline a number of other ways in which NAFTA is
not simply a case of legislators voting for free trade over particularistic protectionism.
But the general theme of the major provisions ofNAFTA should not be lost. NAFTA did
create a significantly liberalized trading zone between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
Legislators who, according to the textbook understanding of legislative behavior, were
worried that constituents would fail to notice the benefits of NAFTA and fail to connect
those benefits with their vote, indeed did vote to liberalize trade. How? As we have seen
in the other cases with which this study is concerned, specialized legislative procedures
allowed Congress to overcome this collective action problem.
Procedures as Key
In her examination of how trade policy is made, Sharyn O’Halloran suggests that
many students of trade policy emphasize the ways in which interest groups seek favorable
184
treatment while others focus on the role played by executive agencies. Of this scholarhip,
O’Halloran points out,
each of these approaches certainly captures an important element of how
policy IS made, but before they can be effectively evaluated, we must first
ask: What procedures define the decision-making process, and what effect
do they have on public policy? The choice of institutions is a political one
and is crucial to determining outcomes.
Few political scientists would dispute O’Halloran’s argument but there remains a great
deal of misunderstanding about the nature of the procedures used in the case of NAFTA
and the degree to which those procedures delegate authority to the executive. As we have
discussed, most scholars view trade policy as a case where Congress recognizes its own
institutional shortcomings in dealing with a difficult collective action problem and
delegates authority to presidents who are more likely to make policy consistent with the
general interest. As we will see, this view is far too simplistic but before tackling that
theoretical question, it is useful to first review some of the details of the fast track
procedure adopted for NAFTA and the way in which this procedure has been understood
by most scholars.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988^^^ authorized the president
to negotiate bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that would be submitted for
congressional approval under expedited procedures that would guarantee an up-or-down
vote without amendments. The law also allowed the president to request a 2-year
extension of fast track authority that would be automatically granted unless either the
House or the Senate adopted a resolution of disapproval.
O’Halloran. Politics, Process, ami American Trade Policy, ix.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is PL 100-418.
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Most observers have viewed this fast track procedure as a congressional
abdication of authority and the best example of this view ,s the work of I.M. Destler.
Writing in 1998, Destler argues,
for the great majority of members to whom trade is but an occasional
concern, it is sufficient to advocate the cause of constituent groups
important in one s district - and the national extensions of these groups,
and to strike general trade policy postures which appeal to one’s support
coalitions. For most members in most instances, it is simply not cost-
effective to strive for direct, significant personal influence over trade
policy outcomes. Nor is such influence necessary to the member.
Mayhew points to three activities typical of re-election seeking
Representatives: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming. None
of these requires actual impact on policy.^“
It is particularly appropriate that Destler links his view of American trade policymaking
to Mayhew since the larger study of which this chapter is a part is linked to the critique of
the Mayhewian model of legislative behavior offered by Douglas Arnold. In any case,
Destler’s view of how trade policy is made under fast track is clear. Presidents and
executive agencies dominate the process and legislators abdicate their authority seeking
only symbolic victories. Before Congress gave away its power in this policy area, Destler
argues, industries seeking protection had to come to Congress for assistance.
Now, they must seek that action elsewhere. Legislation still matters to
them, of course: it can establish rules, set priorities, make import relief (or
export-market-opening action) easier or harder to obtain. And
constituencies still matter to Congress: representing them is something
members and their staffs take very seriously. But Congress has tied
members’ hands regarding their ability to legislate constituency-specific
trade measures. So if it is effective, product-specific trade policy action
these constituents want, they are unlikely to get it on Capitol Hill. Non-
binding resolutions backing semiconductor makers in their fight for
Japanese markets? Certainly. Textile quota bills for the President to veto?
I.M. Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” in Deardorff and Stem, eds..
Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies, 98.
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Of course. Advice on who to talk to at USTR or Commerce? Sure But
something real? Not likely.^^*^
Whtle Destler’s view of congressional authority in trade policy is commonplace, it
fails to recognize the vanety of subtle and not-so-subtle ways that fast track procedures
allow members of Congress to influence the process. A more detailed look at the
particular procedure utilized to enact NAFTA reinforces this view.
One aspect of this procedure that has received scant attention is the fact that
NAFTA was negotiated and adopted as a congressional-executive agreement rather than
as a treaty. It is a little-mentioned fact that NAFTA was passed by the Senate by a vote of
61-38, several votes short of the two-thirds vote necessary to approve a treaty. Of this
observation, Bruce Ackerman and David Golove ask
whatever happened to the Treaty Clause? No less puzzling is why this
obvious question was never raised during the long hard battle over
NAFTA. The opponents were grimly determined to gain victory at all
costs. They could well have mustered the thirty-four Senators needed to
defeat NAFTA if it had been treated as a treaty rather than a congressional-
executive agreement. And yet the obvious questions were left unasked.
Ackerman and Golove review the history of the evolution of the process by which
Congress and the president negotiate and approve international agreements but their
argument is important for our purposes because they make the important point that there
was nothing inevitable about the evolution of this procedure. The Constitution, they
argue, puts in place three distinct legislative systems; law-making, treaty approval, and
Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy,” 95.
Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 1-2.
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the process for constitutional amendments. The existence of these three distinct systems,
however, begs the question of interchangeability.
To what degree could statute-making substitute for treaty-writing, and vice
versa? The Supremacy Clause provides part of an answer by stipulating
that a treaty could serve as the “law of the land” and take immediate effect
as a federal law. But the text is not equally clear about the opposite
relationship. Could a majority of both Houses, in the exercise of its
statute-making powers, approve international agreements? The Treaty
Clause does not say Yes or No, and so constitutionalists are left to
construe the sounds of silence.^*'^
The point is relevant to our discussion because it is only relatively recently that the
answer has become a clear yes. During and after World War II, infomial precedents were
set that allowed for the interchangeability of the statute-making and treaty processes for
international agreements despite the failure of parallel efforts to adopt a constitutional
amendment explicitly authorizing this interchangeability. The Trade Act of 1974 further
codified the process grafting fast track procedures onto the congressional-executive
agreement process.
Seen in this light, fast track procedures are an enhancement of congressional
capacity and authority rather than an abdication of power as Destler claims. If NAFTA
had been considered as a treaty, for instance, it is highly plausible that a minority of
senators would have been able to kill the agreement. And because the treaty procedure
offers legislators no formal opportunity to influence the treaty in its formative stages, it is
no surprise that treaty approval debates are so contentious. In contrast, as we will see,
fast track procedures encourage and facilitate congressional input in the negotiating
stages while simultaneously empowering majorities in both houses at the expense of a
Ackerman and Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 8.
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minority m the Senate. In Ackerman and Golove’s tenns, “the classic constitutional
procedure not only generates unnecessary disaffection abroad but encourages obfuscation
at home. The Trade Act strikes at these practices, but succeeds only because it
encourages interbranch consultation at the policy fomiulation stage.”^^’^
The notion that members of Congress simply throw up their arms and delegate
authority to the executive to dominate trade policy isn’t even logically consistent.
Michael Gilligan asks tough questions of those who believe Congress delegates authority
to get around the collective action problem associated with trade policy that are
particularly relevant to this study. First,
if Congress was unable to resist constituency pressures in order to
liberalize trade policy itself, why was it able to resist them to make an
institutional change that led to liberalization? It is also hard to see how
delegation could in any way insulate Congress from constituency
pressures. Congress was still faced with periodic renewals of the
president’s delegated authority.^^’^
Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this study, “if a universalistic logroll
was the source of the problem why did Congress choose delegation rather than one of
several other institutional innovations that also would have cured This latter
question reads as if Gilligan had read the earlier chapter on tax reform. The answer to
this question, of course, is that Congress did not delegate in the case of NAFTA to
overcome a collective action problem. Rather, Congress delegated authority to the
Ackerman and Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?
,
105.
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 5.
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 5.
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president because the nature of the policy problem, unlike the case of tax reform, required
that someone negotiate with a foreign power.
Indeed, when we look closely at the fast track procedure utilized for NAFTA, we
see a variety of ways in which legislators restricted the authority that was delegated and
made sure that their preferences would be taken into account in any agreement. A
number of the more restrictive provisions adopted for the NAFTA negotiations, were the
result of congressional displeasure with the president’s handling of previously delegated
authority. For instance, in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
the law that put the fast track procedures for NAFTA in place, Congress added so-called
super 301 amendments that transferred authority to conduct investigations into unfair
trade practices from the president to the USTR, required the USTR to provide Congress
with reports on countries engaged in unfair trade practices, and required mandatory trade
retaliation if a country was found to be engaging in unfair trade practices.
But what are the procedures by which Congress maintains control over trade
policy while delegating authority to the president to negotiate trade deals? The obvious
aspect of fast track that gives Congress authority is the fact that an international
agreement requires positive congressional action in order to take effect. Because this
forces legislators to make a binary choice between an agreement and no agreement,
legislators find it easier to justify a vote for free trade over protectionism. Pietro Nivola
argues.
The assumption that the American trade policy process suffers whenever
Congress is presented with a polarizing choice is questionable. An
administration defending a regime of liberal trade may wind up better off
debating its dissidents than trying too hard to co-opt them. The reason is
quite simple: most lawmakers are not anxious to restore outmoded
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protectionism. They remain conscious that a reprise of the Smoot-Hawley
syndrome would constitute, in the words of Senator John C. Danforth, “an
act of gross stupidity.”^^°
But the fast track process offers legislators far more control than a mere up-or-
down vote on an agreement negotiated by the president. Though it is not well-known nor
frequently pointed out by scholars who view fast track as a tool of presidential
dominance, Congress retained several other formal tools at its disposal to derail NAFTA.
First, though Congress delegated fast track negotiating authority to the president in 1988,
the president is required to notify Congress before entering into negotiations with any
nation. Within the next 60 days, if either the House Ways and Means or the Senate
Finance Committee passes a resolution disapproving the negotiations, fast track authority
is revoked. The president is, of course, free to negotiate with whomever he wants,
whenever he wants. But those negotiations are unlikely to be fruitful if Congress has not
agreed to vote on an agreement without amendments. Effectively then. Congress
instituted a one-committee legislative veto over trade negotiations. Assuming Congress
does not exercise this option. Congress still retains the option of stopping the negotiations
at any point through use of the so-called “reverse” fast track procedure. If both the full
House and the full Senate pass a disapproval resolution within any 60-day period, fast
track authority is revoked. These reverse fast track procedures thus constitute a second
legislative veto - a two-house legislative veto - over fast track negotiations. Finally, as
discussed earlier, even though Congress provided for an automatic two-year extension of
fast track authority in the authorizing legislation, that two-year extension could be
revoked if either house of Congress voted a simple resolution disapproving of the
^™Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, 149.
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extension within a 90-day period once the president requested the extension. Effectively,
this would provide a third legislative veto - this time a one-house veto - that members of
Congress could use to kill the negotiations altogether.
These formal procedures that members of Congress could use to pressure the
administration were supplemented with procedural requirements that would provide
members of Congress with an insider’s view of the negotiations as they proceeded. The
president was required, for instance, to provide the International Trade Commission with
a list of articles to be diseussed in negotiations before any agreement was negotiated. The
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act also created a host of private sector advisory
committees that would advise negotiators and attend negotiating sessions to keep an eye
on issues that might affect their particular industries. In addition, Congress instituted
significant reporting requirements on both the USTR and these private sector advisory
committees. Finally, members of Congress ensured their own physical presence at
negotiating sessions by allowing the Speaker of the House and the president of the
Senate to appoint congressional delegates to the negotiations.
The purpose of all these requirements is clear. As O’Halloran describes it, these
procedures created,
an elaborate “fire-alarm” oversight mechanism that incorporates the
private sector, government agencies, and even congressional committees
in developing international trade agreements. These consultations serve
two purposes. First, groups sensitive to or threatened by the proposed
agreement are given an opportunity to express their concerns and seek
compensation. Second, negotiators learn from these consultations which
are the industries that, if ignored, may lobby members of Congress to veto
any eventual agreement.^^'
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 144-145.
192
A number of less formal aiTangements also allow members of Congress to impact
trade policy. First, even though Congress is required under fast track procedures to vote
up-or-down without amendments within 90 days on the agreement as negotiated by the
president, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees do hold mock
mark-up sessions on the implementing legislation, and this provides an opportunity for
legislators to not only learn more about what is in the agreement but to also strike side
deals with the administration in return for their support. It was at this point in the
process, for instance, that the Clinton administration agreed to add worker retraining
money to the NAFTA implementing bill.^^^
All of these procedural requirements add up to real congressional influence over
trade negotiations without allowing legislators’ protectionist proclivities to run rampant.
President Bush expressed his intention to negotiate a trade agreement with Canada and
Mexico in September 1990, and that meant he would need the automatic two-year
extension of fast track authority that would expire in May 1991 if either house of
Congress voted a simple resolution to deny the extension. Each house had a tough debate
on a resolution in May 1991 in which the vote to extend fast track authority was widely
viewed as a referendum on NAFTA. And while the House rejected the disapproval
resolution by a vote of 192-231 and the Senate rejected the disapproval resolution by a
vote of 36-59,^^^ the episode demonstrated the importance of the procedural hurdle in
ensuring congressional influence. O’Halloran points out that the Congress “took the
opportunity of the renewal of fast track to ensure that many of the most controversial
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume IX, 1993-1996, 157.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VIII, 1989-1992, 189.
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issues - the environment, labor concerns, and workers’ rights - were written directly into
the authorizing legislation.”’’^ Specincally, the Congress insisted on a variety of
safeguard and transition provisions that would reduce barriers slowly and provide for the
restoration of barriers with escape clauses if domestic industries faced significant
damage. The president was also forced to agree to a domestic-content rule for cars of
more than 50 percent. Finally, the president also vowed, “not to negotiate lower
standards than were currently in the law in the areas of pesticides, energy conservation,
toxic waste, and health and safety.
While O’Halloran eorrectly criticizes the dominant presidency-centered
understanding of how trade policy is made, it is important to note that many other
observers also seem to recognize the greater role played by Congress as a result of fast
track procedures. Because many of these authors tend to view presidential dominance of
trade policy not only as a fact, but as a good, their take on this effect of fast track
procedures is decidedly different. But it is unmistakably the same view of congressional
influence. Robert Baldwin, for instance, complains that,
one consequence of the new implementing procedures is that members of
Congress and various special interests have become involved in the
negotiations at a micro-management level. Under the threat of the
rejection of the agreement by Congress, administration officials have
sometimes been pressured into negotiating detailed provisions that favor a
particular interest group at the welfare cost of the general public.
Similarly, Ackerman and Golove argue that under fast track procedures,
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no longer can legislators escape their moment of truth, yet both Senatorsan Representatives are given many opportunities to voice their concerns
advileTe ^lmd - 'heir
Michael Gilhgan takes this argument a step further by suggesting that the only reason
legislators delegate authonty in the first place is because they are seeking to reduce
foreign trade barriers and this requires the assistance of an executive Finally,
O Halloran views fast track procedures as an explicit attempt “to ensure that the actions
taken by the president are in line with legislators’ preferences ””> In defending this view,
O’Halloran points out that,
I do not go as far as congressional dominance theorists in insisting that
Congress always gets its way; after all, one central reason for delegating
authority is to make policy different from what Congress would have
passed on its own. But I do recognize that Congress has the constitutional
authority to regulate eommerce, and therefore any executive authority in
this area is delegated authority and should be analyzed as such.^^^
Procedural Choice and NAFTA
We have seen in the preeeding section that the subtle details of fast track
procedures and the extent to which those procedures allow for congressional influence in
trade negotiations have been under-appreciated. Both of these points speak directly to the
central question with which this study is concerned. Why do legislators choose the
particular procedures they choose in attempting to overcome collective action problems?
Ackerman and Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 106.
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Answenng this question m the case of NAFTA requires returning to the factors we have
examined in each of the previous three cases.
Geographic vs. Non-Geographic Benefits. Few observers of trade policy doubt
that geography matters. Destler points out that the trade literature “has established,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the responsiveness of individual members to constituent
interests concentrated within their districts.”^'' This behavior is nothing new, of course.
In discussing the relative advantage heavy industry had over agricultural producers in
securing reciprocal trade provisions late in the 19'*" century, Gilligan argues that “factors
inherent in industrial production put industry in a much better position to overcome
collective action problems and lobby the government than agriculture enjoyed.”^^^ What
were those factors?
Industry was geographically concentrated in a few states in the Northeast
and the eastern Great Lakes region of the country. Agriculture was spread
over hundreds of thousands of square miles throughout the country often
in areas of great isolation where communication was very difficult.
In a study of the politics of protectionism in the 1970s and 1980s, Wendy Hansen tested
the hypothesis that “more political power is generated when an industry is geographically
concentrated in a relatively small number of states or congressional districts.” When she
examined the relative level of protection afforded industries whose operations were
Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy,” 93.
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concentrated in a small number of states, she found that those whose operations were
concentrated received more protection.
While all these authors agree then that legislators afford greater protection to
tnterests that are geographically concentrated, scholars who view fast track procedures as
a scheme of presidential dominance argue that Congress overcomes its collective action
problem by delegating authority to the president to lower trade barriers across industrial
boundaries. Destler, for instance, argues,
For sixty-plus years. Congress has simultaneously been yielding power on
trade and approving major liberalizing initiatives. It has done so while
regularly sounding protectionist-enabling liberal traders to warn regularly
of the wolf at their door. But somehow the wolf never gets in. Of if he
does, he spares most of the sheep.^^^
But this view is far too simplistic. As discussed above, m adopting fast track procedures,
members of Congress are not simply accepting that they cannot play a reasonable part in
trade policy and therefore throwing control over the policy area over a barrier into the
president s hands. Just as in the case of tax reform, where members of Congress were
able to protect the most sensitive
- geographically concentrated - tax benefits, in the case
of NAFTA, members of Congress sought to design procedures that would allow them to
lower trade barriers while protecting the most sensitive trade benefits. Scholars who view
fast track procedures as a simple delegation of authority to the president to negotiate a
trade agreement and present Congress with an up-or-down vote without amendments
miss the subtle and important steps of the process outlined in the previous section.
Wendy L. Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 1 (March 1990), 36.
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Legislators designed numerous fire-alann oversight mechanisms to ensure that private
groups could alert Congress during the negotiations to potential negative policy impacts
before any agreement was signed. Legislators also designed fast track procedures in such
a way that they would have a number of formal avenues and opportunities to suspend the
negotiations if the president deviated too far from congressional preferences. Why would
legislators interested in washing their hands of the collective action problem associated
with trade policy provide themselves with so many avenues of mlluence? The answer is
that legislators wanted to make sure they would be able to lower trade barriers while
protecting the most sensitive
- geographically concentrated - interests. Thus, while
Destler suggests that Congress has been involved in a symbolic game, O’Halloran
suggests a more sophisticated understanding of congressional behavior.
Congress s solution has been to temper its delegation, diluting it with
procedures through which industries can seek compensation from the
adverse effects of increased competition. Thus, instead of Congress
legislating itself out of the business of making product-specific trade laws,
it has gone into the business of procedural protectionism.
This latter point is undoubtedly a reference to arguments such as that made by Pietro
Nivola in Regulating Unfair Trade. Nivola argues that legislators seeking to protect
individual industries have turned away from erecting trade barriers and towards erecting
regulatory structures to fight foreign trade practices deemed unfair. And the same
argument can be made in the case of fast track procedures. Legislators, as we will see,
have found a way to delegate authority to the president to negotiate lower trade barriers
while maintaining enough influence over the president to guarantee that the most
geographically concentrated industries will continue to receive preferential treatment.
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Returning to the case of NAFTA, one clear indicator of the i.nportance of the
geographic concentration of trade benefits is the relative difficulty in adopting the
enabling legislation for the agreement on the House and Senate doors. Timothy
McKeown argues,
if, as some argue, representatives of small districts have a greater tendency
to support policies that create costly spill-overs for other districts (such as
federal construction projects) then the Senate ought to be on average less
protectionist than the House.^^^
^
This dynamic played itself out when the enabling legislation for NAFTA came to a vote
m the House on November 17, 1993 and m the Senate on November 20, 1993. Senators
approved the bill 61-38 while House members approved it by a narrower margin of 234-
200. Congressional Quarterly explained the difference this way.
The margin of victory in the Senate was larger in part because senators
were less susceptible to the pressures that caused many House members to
vote no. Most states were expected to derive some benefit from free trade
with Mexico; that was certainly not the case with every House district.
For example, two of labor’s strongest Democratic allies - Edward M.
Kennedy of Massachusetts and Tom Harkin of Iowa - backed the
agreement because Mexico offered export opportunities for their states’
high-technology or agricultural exports.
Legislators in both houses also displayed the institution’s geographical sensitivity by
voting largely along geographical lines. In considering an extension of the president’s
fast track negotiating authority in 1991, Congressional Quarterly reported the House was
divided more along regional than party lines. Members from the west and southern
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border states, the southeastern sunbelt, and the midwest tended to support the measure
while those from areas with large numbers of union workers, large numbers of non-
Mexican immigrants, and heavy manufacturing sectors tended to oppose it. Recognizing
the geographie sensitivity of the vote, Democratic House leaders essentially declared
members free to vote their consciences. House Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) supported
the pact while the Majority Leader, Richard Gephardt (D-MO), and the Majority Whip,
David Bonior (D-MI), both opposed it. Rather than voting their consciences, it would
have been more accurate to say members were free to vote their constituencies. While
business interests spent millions of dollars attempting to convince wavering members to
vote for the pact, President Clinton told business leaders late in October 1993 that their
lobbying strategy was not working. He argued,
Ask your employees who support this to contact their members of
Congress. I ve had as many Republican as Democratic members of
Congress that I am lobbying say to me, “I want to hear from the people
that work for the employers, not just from the employers.”^^^'^
In short, geographic constituencies mattered and because the particular procedures
employed required positive congressional approval, the agent to whom power had been
delegated was forced to negotiate an agreement that protected those particular interests.
While fast track procedures allowed members of Congress a greater degree of
influence and input on NAFTA while it was being negotiated than is commonly
recognized, the procedures also allowed for a great deal more congressional influence that
is commonly recognized even after it was negotiated. Indeed, a significant number of
members were convinced to support the measure as a result of last-minute concessions
President Clinton quoted in Joshua Mills, “Business Lobbying for Trade Pact Appears to Sway Few in
Congress” in New York Times (November 13, 1993), A28.
200
that offered geographically-concentrated benefits. The Clinton administration was forced
to negotiate a side deal before the enabling legislation could be passed “to reinterpret the
language of the original pact to restrict trade in sugar and orange juice.”^‘" The orange
juice provisions bought a number of votes in Florida, while the sugar provisions bought
votes m Louisiana and Maryland. Representatives from Tennessee were appeased when
the president included their suggestion in the enabling legislation that only whisky
produced in Tennessee could be labeled “Bourbon Whisky” or “Tennessee Whisky.”^^'^
Representative Tom Lewis (R-FL) agreed to support the pact after the administration
agreed to include tomatoes on the list of crops subject to tariffs if imports began flooding
the market and two House members from Oklahoma wheat-growing districts agreed to
support the pact after the president added teeth to a promise to working towards ending
Canadian government subsidies for the transportation and marketing of Canadian
wheat. Other members held out for particularistic trade benefits for their districts.
Representative Esteban Torres (D-CA) led the way in getting an initial endowment of $4
billion for the North American Development Bank - an institution created by the trade
pact that would provide border cleanup and development funds.^^'^ And lawmakers in
Texas got administration support for a $10 million trade policy research center. Still
other lawmakers held out for benefits that had nothing to do with trade at all.
Congressional Quarterly reported,
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After announcing his support for the NAFTA hill, Floyd H Flake D-N Ygot a call front Chnton tellutg hurt that a Small BusLss AdntmLatmnpi o program would he located m Ins Queens district. The White Houseso agreed to let a dredging project go forward at Jones Beach on LongIsland in response to a request hy NAFTA hacker Peter T. King, R-N.Y.^’^
In short, the process was a congressional logroll at its best. And, importantly for
our purposes, it is clear that this was the only way something hke this could be done.
Members with concentrated geographic costs had to be compensated. Representative
Tom Lewis (R-FL) complained that the administration had waited until the last minute to
strike its deal with him. ‘T look with disdain on the way this whole thing has been done,”
he said. “It almost looks like you’re selling your soul.””'’ Representative Glenn English
(D-OK), one of the members who switched his vote as a result of the wheat concession,
argued, ”It’s not a question of buying votes. This is the only way we could have
supported the agreement.””’ Thus, though they had different opinions of the process,
both legislators would agree that the process worked because members had an
opportunity to protect the most sensitive of particularistic benefits - those that are
geographically concentrated.
The Scope of the Policy Area. International trade agreements in general, and
NAFTA in particular, clearly represent what this study has defined as broad policy areas.
In pointing out the difficulty of negotiating a pact as significant as NAFTA, Floward
Wiarda argues trade negotiators must certainly yearn for the good old days.
Congressional Quarterly, Volume IX. 1993-1996, 158.
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Tariffs used to be the main concern, but this was a subject that was remotetrom most people’s consciousness and without high political stakes or
even visibility. A handful of experts and interest groups got togetherhammered out their differences if necessary, and worked out an agreement!
ut now, the U.S. and Mexican trade negotiators must also deal with “hot”
or new agenda” political topics such as pollution, the environment drugshuman rights, and democratization. In addition, the negotiators must deal
wit subjects such as farm and industrial subsidies, patents and
trademarks, industrial standards, child labor, minimum wages,
unionization and labor rights, government purchasing, and investment
issues - all areas that are close to the bone of national economic
policymaking.
Given the breathtaking breadth of this policy area, one is led to wonder, as I.M. Destler
does, why legislators would delegate. We saw, for instance, in the similarly broad policy
area of tax policy, that legislators never even considered delegating authority as a solution
to their collective action problem. Though Destler steadfastly, and incorrectly, asserts
that Congress yields virtually all control over trade policy to the president, he seems to
wonder aloud at one point why Congress would do this in such a broad policy area and
concludes, correctly, that the congressional delegation of authority has something to do
with the fact that trade agreements are mechanisms offoreign policy. He finds it difficult
to.
offer a serious explanation of why Congress behaves rather differently on,
say, tax policy - where the same Congressional committees are much more
prone to assert their power and distribute particularist benefits. Part of the
explanation may be that our domestic trade policymaking system evolved
under the international auspices of the GATT, now the WTO. This creates
an international constraint on national policy and reinforces the role of the
President in the U.S. policy process.
Wiarda, “The U.S. Domestic Politics ...,” 119.
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203
While Destler overstates the degree to which Congress has delegated authority, Gilligan
agrees that it is this foreign policy dimension of trade policy that forces members of
Congress to delegate. He points out, “after all Congress did not delegate to the president
the power to set any trade policy, only to reduce trade barriers reciprocally with other
countries.”'^®®
This point not only explains why legislators chose to delegate “over some other
remedy to the umversahstic logroll,”'^'^' it also explains why legislators required positive
congressional approval on trade agreements once fast track procedures were adopted for
the first time m the Trade Act of 1974. As argued above. Congress is very careful to
ensure that the trade actions taken by the president are in line with legislators’
preferences. It is no accident, therefore, that at the same time Congress expanded the
president s negotiating authority to include non-tariff barriers, it reserved for itself a
requirement of positive congressional approval of any negotiated trade agreement. In
short, because the policy area is broad, we expect Congress to delegate only if it has to
and to restrict that delegation of authority as much as possible. What we see is exactly
that pattern of behavior.
The Moment in Political Time. There are number of ways in which the particular
moment in political time offered opportunities and constraints that led to the enactment of
NAFTA. A first important question that is answered by the moment in political time is
why members of Congress would want to liberalize trade at all. Michael Gilligan points
to a variety of trends in the second half of the century that made it more politically
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 6.
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 10.
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profitable to vote for free trade. He argues that the global economy is inereasmgly
interdependent, that American foreign policy increasingly came to be dominated by the
search for export markets, and that the rise of the Cold War meant that trade concessions
would be used to stabilize economies m friendly nations.^^' Finally, Gilligan also argues
that an increasingly powerful export lobby began competing with the groups lobbying for
protection of their industries so that the interest group playing field became, relatively
speaking, more level. The result of all this was that free trade as an idea became a
dominant political force. In particular, by the late 1980s, when legislators began
considering trade barriers with Mexico, there “was a growing sense that trade barriers
must be relaxed.”^®^ In his study of a variety of policy areas over long periods of time,
Gary Mucciarom found that despite increased global competition and a breakdown of the
pre 1970s free trade coalition, “protectionism’s advance has been contained,” both
because of favorable institutional arrangements and “an intellectual commitment to
liberal trade.”'^®'^ He concludes, “free trade remains a cherished (albeit tarnished) ideal
among policy experts and top policymakers while protectionism remains discredited.”'^®^
Indeed, in his research on trade policy in the 1980s, Pietro Nivola found that legislators
who opposed free trade initiatives felt positively ostracized. Nivola reported that one
legislator who voted against the extension of fast track authority in 1991 felt that.
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IS almost a shameful thing,” he coneluded, “to be labeled apro ectiomst ” That agreeable generalization may not last forever, but
neither should it be dismissed as prematurely passe.'^®^’
More important, for our purposes, than the faet that free trade as an idea had
beeome popular, the partieular procedures utilized to enact NAFTA were also a result of
the moment m political time. As was discussed earlier, the concept of the congressional-
executive agreement as a method of enacting international agreements was a relatively
new innovation. Ackerman and Golove argue that NAFTA would likely not have been
enacted if it had been submitted as a treaty and that “if NAFTA had been negotiated in
1937, Roosevelt would have submitted it as a treaty to the Senate without recognizing
that he had a choice in the matter.”^^'^
Fast track procedures were also necessary because it was being enacted by a
particularly decentralized Congress. Nivola argues that by the mid 1980s,
access points in Congress abounded. Responsibility for managing trade
had once been concentrated in the Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means committees by virtue of their primary jurisdiction over tariffs. As
trade questions moved beyond tariffs and conceptions of malfeasance
changed, however, legislative power flowed downward to subcommittees
and outward to other panels. At one time the chairmen of the two tax-
writing committees could control the contents of trade bills. Now the cast
of characters and the agendas they were trying to advance were becoming
longer because of new, more complicated policy requirements and because
of increased staff support and opportunities for political aggrandizement.
Participation spread to include the House Energy and Commerce
Committee (domestic content, certification standards), the House Foreign
Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees (foreign loans, export
controls), the Judiciary committees (antitrust reciprocity), the banking
committees (financial services, foreign investment, the Export-Import
Bank), the agriculture committees (farm trade), the armed services
Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, 149.
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committees (procurement codes), and so forth. Trade bills had alwaysbeen potential legislative Christmas trees, but weaker congressional
gatekeepers, multiple referrals, and new parliamentary nonns that invited
to?" ““W be hung on
As a result, in addition to “regulating unfair trade,” as a substitute for legislating,
members of Congress retired to the relative safety and predictability of fast track
procedures. There, even at thts decentralized moment in the institution’s history,
members of Congress could have input on the substance of a free trade agreement, have
the formal power to accept or reject the agreement, and keep the enabling legislation from
dying a death of a thousand pinpricks.
Conclusion
The fact that Congress has not granted fast track authority to the president since
NAFTA was enacted is worthy of our attention. Theories of American trade
policymaking institutions that suggest presidents dominate trade policy or those that
suggest interest groups dominate American trade policymaking fail to recall that the
Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. As
Sharyn O’Halloran points out, “this might seem to be a simple point, but most previous
studies of trade policy have failed to recognize its significance.”'^”*^ In arguing that
American trade policy has become more liberalized as a result of the rise of exporter
lobbying, Michael Gilligan agrees with O’Halloran’s view of the congressional delegation
of trade policymaking power. Congress did not delegate, as presidential dominance
Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, 97-99.
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(heorists argue, to take itself out of the trade game. Rather the choice of institutional
arrangements is seen by Gilligan as an assertion of congressional power. He argues,
specifically, delegation did iwt insulate Congress from constituency pressures - instead it
transformed those pressures to include a voice for liberalization from exporters.”^'® Even
I.M. Destler, who argues that in enacting fast track procedures “Congress has tied
members’ hands,”'^" concedes that in order to continue liberalizing global trade in the
future,
there needs to be a close executive-congressional working relationship in
support of open trade policy. Specifically, this means close ties and
mutual responsiveness between USTR and the two key trade committees.
Senate Finance and House Ways and Means.*^'^
So even for Destler, in recent years, the president appears to be playing a lesser role in
trade policymaking.
Thus, while this chapter began with what appeared to be a paradox, it has ended
with a confirmation of our hypotheses. At the beginning of this chapter, we asked why
Congress would delegate authority in the case of NAFTA when it chose not to delegate
authority in the case of tax reform. Both eases are attempts to overcome a collective
action problem in a broad policy area where particularistic benefits are relatively
geographically dispersed. We have seen that the key to understanding this apparent
paradox is three-fold. First, legislators delegated far less power to the president than is
commonly understood. Congress constructed elaborate fire-alarm oversight mechanisms.
Gilligan, Empowering Exporters, 10.
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provided Itself with numerous opportunities to make legislator preferences clear to
negotiators, and required that positive congressional action must be taken for any
agreement to take effect. Second, where particularistic benefits were geographically
concentrated, and therefore more sensitive to legislators, legislators were fully capable of
protecting their interests. Finally, the only reason legislators delegated authority at all, is
that they were seeking foreign trade concessions and this required executive negotiation.
In short, as this study has hypothesized, rather than evading responsibility through
delegation, the institutional mechanism Congress adopted to overcome the particular
collective action problem involved in NAFTA is far more similar to the mechanisms
utilized in tax reform than is commonly understood. NAFTA is far more a congressional
triumph than congressional abdication.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The question at the heart of this study is why legislative leaders choose the
procedures they do in attempting to overcome collective action problems. The case
studies of base closure, tax reform, nuclear waste disposal siting, and NAFTA have
exposed a number of factors that help us to answer this question. But the case studies
have also provided insights that are of use in the debate between the competing schools of
thought on legislative institutions and behavior and insights on the nature of legislative
delegation.
This study began with a review of the debate between the distributive,
infomiational, and party-centered models of legislative institutions and behavior. That
the distributive school of thought has much to offer in understanding how Congress
works is not a matter of dispute. It is no doubt the case that legislators regularly seek to
“bring home the bacon” to their districts and, in so doing, seek appointments to
committees and subcommittees that can serve as a means to that end. But this study has
also validated the critique of the distributive school of thought offered by infomiational
and party-centered models. Legislative leaders do, in fact, sometimes seek to enact
policies that confer general, diffuse benefits while imposing particularistic costs. And
legislative leaders who are successful in enacting these policies are not alone. They do
not impose procedural strategies on an unwilling public. Rank-and-file legislators are
active co-conspirators in these undertakings because legislative institutions, as we have
seen, arc routinely a matter of majoritarian choice.
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The debate about whether the informational or the party-centered school of
thought is a more accurate model of congressional behavior continues and this study
cannot claim to have resolved it. Indeed the cases studied have provided evidence
supportive of both camps. For instance, the case of base closure appears to vindicate the
claims of the informational models. Party leaders did not play a significant role in the
process and legislators actively sought to construct a process as free from partisan
influence as possible. While the party-centered model would predict that a legislative
cartel would seek to protect members of the cartel and impose the particularistic costs on
outsiders, nothing of the sort happened. Indeed, the leading force behind base closures
within the House of Representatives - the chamber where base closures was a more
sensitive issue - was Rep. Richard Armey (R-TX), a member of the House minority. On
the other hand, the cases of tax refomi and nuclear waste disposal offered evidence
supporting the claims of party-centered models. In the case of tax reform. Chairman
Rostenkowski, Speaker Foley, Chairman Packwood, and President Reagan each
expressed concerns at various points that their party not be seen to be the party that killed
tax reform. This concern over party labels as an important electoral commodity cannot be
accounted for by informational models of legislative choice. Moreover, in the case of
nuclear waste disposal, we saw that partisan leaders intervened for similar reasons.
President Reagan worked to keep nuclear waste out of New Hampshire in a nod to then-
Vice President George Bush’s presidential bid. And, in 1998, Speaker Gingrich kept a
bill off the floor that would have set up a temporary nuclear waste site at Yucca Mountain
in a nod to Representative John Ensign (R-NV), who was challenging Senator Harry Reid
(D-NV) for his Senate seat that year.
211
While these anecdotes provide support for the claims of both camps, it is to he
remembered that the party-centered model has greater explanatory llexibility. As David
Rohde argues, “the distributive, infonnational, and partisan perspectives are not mutually
exclusive but apply to different issues and institutions in different contexts.”'"^ At least
m Aldrich and Rohde’s formulation, the party-centered model is referred to as conditional
party government. In their view then, it is plausible that Congress does indeed sometimes
work more as informational theorists say it does and sometimes works more as party-
centered models suggest. Thus, because infonnational models of legislative behavior
cannot account for the role played by partisan leaders and partisan institutions displayed
in the cases presented here, this study must conclude more closely aligned with party-
centered models.
This study has also yielded useful insights on the nature of congressional
delegation. Students of congressional delegation frequently ask why and under what
circumstances legislators delegate authority by examining cases in which Congress has
delegated. While some view congressional delegation of authority negatively"^' and
others have a more sympathetic view of it, virtually all scholars assume, as this study did
at the beginning, congressional delegation as a fact. Rarely reassessed in these cases is
the extent to which Congress has delegated at all. This study began with an observation
of extra-congiessional procedures - cases in which Congress appeared to delegate
David W. Rohde, “Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional
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authority to ad hoc institutions to frame policy altematives for a particular policy problem
at a particular moment m time. While base closure and NAFTA remain examples of
delegation, I have found that they are far less e.r/m-congressional than 1 originally
assumed. For instance, the standard interpretation of trade policy in general, and NAFTA
m particular, is that legislators are confronted with a collective action problem in which
individually rational behavior - in this case particularistic protectionism - is collectively
irrational and so legislators delegate policymaking authority to an agent - the president -
who is understood to be institutionally immune to the collective action problem. But
legislators delegated far less authority to the president than is commonly understood and
only delegated what authority they did delegate because of the foreign policy
characteristics of the policy problem. Similarly, in the case of base closure, where
legislators clearly delegated a relatively greater amount of authority, that delegation was
tempered in significant ways that are not commonly recognized or understood. For
instance, legislators imposed requirements in the first round of closures that ruled out
foreign bases for consideration and required that any closure would have to be shown to
recover its costs within 6 years, effectively ruling out large bases whose cleanup and
relocation costs would be too high to recover quickly. Thus, the question of delegation
that guides this study remains relevant. Why, when confronted with similar policy
problems, do legislators sometimes choose to delegate authority and sometimes choose to
handle the matter internally? But the cases presented here suggest scholars need to
examine the complexity and subtleties of legislative delegation more closely before
lumping cases into one category or the other. At quick glance, the process by which a
high-level nuclear waste site was chosen might appear to be a case in which Congress
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delegated authority to the DOE to choose the technically superior site. But, as described
in Chapter 5, what appeared to be a delegation of authority to the DOE was really just an
initial step in a process by which Congress effectively chose a site on its own. In short,
before scholars ask why legislators would ever voluntarily tie their own hands, they need
to look closely at the knot. It usually isn’t as tight as we think.
With debates over where this study fits into the legislative behavior literature and
the literature on congressional delegation out of the way, it is useful to turn our attention
back to the mam question with which this study is concerned. Why do legislators
sometimes employ extra-congressional legislative procedures in overcoming collective
action problems and why do they sometimes use the internal institutions and procedures
of the Congress to accomplish similar ends? While a quantifiable answer eludes us, the
independent variable and other factors examined in this study have each proven to be
important determinants of procedural choice.
Geographic Versus Non-Geographic Benefits
This study has served as empirical support of an important point implied by
Arnold. Arnold argues that the distinction between particularistic costs and benefits that
are geographically-concentrated and those that are not is useful because geographically-
concentrated groups that receive the benefits or pay the costs are, by definition, more
directly represented in Congress and have an easier time overcoming organizational
barriers.*^ Throughout the cases examined in this study, we found countless examples
where legislators did indeed display greater sensitivity to geographically-concentrated
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costs and benefits. And importantly, we found that this enhanced sensitivity played an
important role m procedural choice. Legislators, for instance, chose to delegate authority
to draw up a list of military bases to be closed because the costs of the policy were so
geographically-concentrated as to make the possibility of handling the matter within
Congress impossible. In choosing a single high-level nuclear waste site for the nation,
the Congress took over 10 years to finally gang up on Nevada’s small and weak
congressional delegation. In designing procedures to enact a free trade agreement with
Mexico and Canada, legislators were sure to leave themselves leverage at a variety of
points in the process so that they would be able to protect the most sensitive trade benefits
- those that are geographically concentrated in their states and districts. Finally, and
perhaps most tellingly, in the case of tax reform, legislators settled on a procedure that
would leave to themselves the tough choices about which tax expenditures would be
spared and which would be eliminated. Again, it was the geographically-concentrated tax
expenditures that were advantaged.
The sensitivity of geographically-concentrated costs and benefits thus has two
implications for students of collective action problems in Congress. First, in the search
for cuts in particularistic benefits or expansion of particularistic costs, geographically-
concentrated benefits and costs do have a privileged position. Second, when legislators
do decide to impose geographically-concentrated costs, they are likely to delegate
authority to impose those costs.
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
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The Scope of the Policy Aren
This study has suggested a distinction between “broad” and “nanow” policy areas.
Despite the lack of a quantifiable index of the scope of policy areas, it is clear from the
evidence presented here that the relative broadness or narrowness of a policy area is an
important determinant in procedural choice. All other things equal, legislators are more
likely to delegate authority in a narrow policy area and less likely to delegate in a broad
policy area because of the difference in the ability of legislators to contain agency losses
m the two different types of areas. Because military installations policy is a relatively
narrow policy area both m terms of its fiscal impact and its relative lack of impact on
other policy areas, legislators found delegation an attractive procedural alternative. On
the other hand, because reforming the tax code impacted virtually every policy area and
had the potential to touch virtually every penny the federal government collects,
legislators never even seriously considered delegating authority. Similarly, in the case of
NAFTA, legislators only delegated the authority they had to delegate in order to carry on
international negotiations. That legislators chose not to delegate in the case of nuclear
waste disposal despite the narrow nature of the policy area tells us more about other
factors impacting procedural choice than it does about the scope of the policy area.
Narrow policy areas do not require delegation. It is more accurate to say that the ability
of legislators to contain agency losses is a precondition of delegation. The more narrow a
policy area is, the easier it is to contain those losses because there is less room for agents
to whom power has been delegated to make policy in conflict with legislators’
preferences.
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The Moment in Politic^] Timp
It IS equally clear from the cases examined in this study that the political calendar
impacts the question of procedural choice. Legislative leaders were consistently
constrained in their procedural choices by both the electoral calendar and the history of
institutional development within particular policy areas. In the case of base closure, for
instance, advocates of the commission process argued that the presence of a lame duck
president m the White House offered an unusual opportunity to delegate authority when
legislators would otherwise be more hesitant to do so. More importantly, the perception
among legislators of a history of abuse of the base closure process by presidents and the
Pentagon constrained the choices of agents to whom power to determine the bases to be
closed could be delegated. One cannot understand why legislators chose to create an
independent commission in the case of base closure without understanding that historical
development. Similarly, the Ways and Means Committee was able to draft a significant
revenue-neutral tax reform bill in 1986 because of institutional developments in the years
prior to tax reform that strengthened the Committee’s ability to resist the particularistic
demands of Gucci Gulch.” Senator Paul Laxalt’s (R-NV) departure from the Senate
cleared the way for Congress to choose Yucca Mountain as the nation’s sole high-level
nuclear waste repository. It is quite possible Nevada’s delegation would have been able
to hold out longer with the aid of the President’s closest friend in the Senate. Finally,
reverse fast track procedures, added because of legislators’ displeasure with President
Reagan’s handling of the U.S - Canada Free Trade Agreement, were an important
insurance factor in a close vote for legislators deciding whether to reauthorize fast track
authority during the negotiation ofNAFTA.
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The moment m political time thus captures an important element of procedural
choice. Legislators are constrained both by institutional developments that precede their
actions and by the electoral landscape they expect to confront in the coming years, .lust as
base closure advocates m the mid-1980s were constrained by a perceived history of
Pentagon abuse, base closure advocates today are constrained by a perceived history of
abuse of the commission process by the Clinton administration. The procedural options
available are not what they were a decade ago because of institutional developments that
have occurred in the interim.
Existence of a Powerful Champion
A less-emphasized but potentially important factor examined in this study is the
existenee of legislative leaders who are willing to champion the cause of particularistic
cuts in favor of general benefits. It isn’t hard to imagine that, in any reasonable model of
legislative behavior, the legislator who seeks to impose costs on particular, identifiable
fellow legislators’ districts in favor of a general benefit for which few will be able to
credibly claim credit is unlikely to be popular. Yet the existence of such a character is an
important precondition of the pursuit of an internal procedural strategy. Base closure
attracted no such person and delegation was the procedural answer. While NAFTA
eventually attracted the votes of some party and committee leaders, none of them was
particularly interested in becoming the champion of the free trade agreement. In the end,
it was the President’s fight. Tax reform and nuclear waste disposal displayed very
different dynamics, however. Tax reform attracted all of the key legislative leaders
including Speaker O’Neill, Chairman Rostenkowski, Chairman Packwood, and President
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Reagan. One reason for this was that the general benefit was so large that there was
credit to be claimed for being connected with the popular legislation. Nuclear waste
disposal attracted legislative leaders including Chairman Johnston, Speaker Wright, and
Majority Leader Foley, who were each attempting to stick the waste in Nevada to keep it
out of their own states. Regardless of motivation, however, the important point here is
not why powerful legislative leaders championed these causes but just that they did. With
these well-situated champions, internal procedures became realistic possibilities.
The One, the Few, and the Many
A final important factor examined in this study that impacts procedural choice is
the quantity of particularistic groups that are impacted. The case of nuclear waste
disposal differed from base closure in that only one location was to bear the burden of
particularistic costs. Containing costs to one location makes it easier for legislators to
avoid delegation both because of the legislative math involved - fewer legislators object
and a greater number of legislators are supportive as they are off the hook - and because it
becomes easier to compensate smaller numbers of localities. For this reason, legislators
were able to determine a site for a national nuclear waste repository on their own.
As discussed above, legislators employing procedural strategies to impose
particularistic costs in favor of general benefits are more likely to delegate when the
particularistic costs are geographically-concentrated, when the scope of the policy area is
relatively narrow, when an agent can be found or created without a history of abusing the
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process, when powerful legislative leaders cannot be found internally to champion the
issue, and when a greater rather than smaller number of particularistic groups will be hurt.
Speaking more generally of strategies utilized by legislative leaders to overcome
legislative roadblocks, Douglas Arnold argues, “there are no universal strategies,
appropriate for any proposal under any conditions. Leaders must tailor general strategies
to fit the idiosyncrasies of specific policy proposals.”""’ This study has vindicated
Arnold’s view but has offered more in response to the legislative leader who asks how to
proceed than Arnold’s apparent answer of “it depends.” Legislators can close military
bases, close special interest tax loopholes, designate a site as a national nuclear waste site,
and overcome their particularistic proclivities in trade policy under the right conditions.
We have seen that those right conditions are diverse, explainable, and within the power
of legislative leaders to construct. Barbara Sinclair has suggested that our textbook
understanding of how a bill becomes a law no longer describes the contemporary
legislative process. She argues, “congressional actors - especially congressional majority
party leaders but also individual senators - now have more choices, and the alternatives
they choose lead to different legislative processes.”"’^ It is the hope of the author that this
study has contributed in some way to a better understanding of those “different legislative
processes.”
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 91
.
Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 220.
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